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Abstract 
Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory of 
historical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist posited 
that social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be a 
gradual  process  rather  than  one  resulting  from  a  sudden,  cataclysmic 
revolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benign 
change  depended  much  less  on  natural  resource  endowment  or  technological 
developments  than  on  the  ability  of  state  institutions  to  respond  to  changing 
political demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamental 
to formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meet 
them. Since each society was different there was no single model of development 
to be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state on 
others,  either  through  force  or  through  foreign  aid  programs.  Nor  could 
development  be  promoted  simply  by  copying  the  model  of  a  more  successful 
economy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demands 
arising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation–
states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individually 
but  could  meet  collectively.  It  was  not  simply  the  result  of  their  increasing 
interdependence.  It  was  how  and  whether  nation-states  responded  to  these 
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1. Introduction 
 
Alan  Steele  Milward  (1935-2010)  was  first  and  foremost  an  historian,  a  contemporary 
historian. Although he was not a Marxist he shared with Karl Marx a belief that the material 
basis of existence was the starting point for an understanding of the world and, since he 
believed that ‘all history is change’, he sought to explain contemporary history through an 
understanding  of  the  forces  responsible  for  economic  change.
1  Unlike  most  neoclassical 
economic  historians,  he  considered  that  one  of  the  most  powerful  of  these  forces  in 
contemporary  Europe  was  the  State.  Therefore  in  his  research,  which  focused  mainly  on 
twentieth-century Europe with some excursions into earlier times, he sought to uncover the 
interaction  of  the  political  and  the  economic.  Accordingly,  it  spanned  several  academic 
disciplines,  with  his  professorships  ranging  from  economics  at  Stanford  University  to 
European  studies  at  the  University  of  Manchester,  Institute  of  Science  and  Technology 
(UMIST),  to  contemporary  history  and  later  the  history  of  European  integration  at  the 
European University Institute (EUI), Florence, and to economic history first as a lecturer at 
the University of Edinburgh and later as a professor at the London School of Economics and 
Political  Science  (LSE).  From  all  these  fields  and  several  others  Alan  Milward  drew 
inspiration for his historical research. 
‘When  through  some  obstinate  and  now  unredeemable  error  of  judgement’,  as  he 
himself wrote, ‘I first decided I would be an historian “Contemporary History” was a phrase 
spoken in Britain only with an accompanying sneer.’ That was in 1956 when, with a first 
class degree in Medieval and Modern History from University College London, he could find 
in  Britain  ‘only  one  Professor  of  History  […]  who  would  accept  as  a  research  student 
someone who wanted to work on the history of the Nazi period. “That is not history”, they 
said,  or,  more  cunningly,  “there  are  no  sources”.’
2  His  supervisor  at  the  LSE  was  the 
renowned diplomatic historian and author of two volumes in the  British Official History 
series of the Second World War, Professor William Norton Medlicott.
3 After three years of 
research, Alan Milward submitted a Ph.D. thesis entitled ‘The Armaments Industry in the 
German  Economy  in  the  Second  World  War’,  which  granted  him,  at  25  years  of  age,  a 
doctorate in Economic History. 
                                                 
1 Milward (1992), 437 (quotation). 
2 Milward (1975a), 92 (both quotations). 
3 Medlicott (1952) (1959).   3 
When he was working on his thesis in the second half of the 1950s the two dominant 
views of the Nazi regime were, on the one hand, the orthodox Marxist-Leninist view  as 
defined by the Communist International (known as Comintern) in 1935, namely that it was a 
form of  fascism  and was the direct agent of monopoly  capitalism; and on the other, the 
liberal-bourgeois view which saw it as a form of totalitarianism and thus a state-controlled 
command economy similar to Communism in the Soviet Union.
4 As a first demonstration of 
one of the most enduring features of his work, Alan Milward preferred to develop his own 
understanding by ferreting in all the available sources of information which he, as a young 
British student with a reading knowledge of German and French, was able to find.
5 On the 
strength of an unusual linguistic ability, he adopted a method which was to characterize his 
research activity throughout the next fifty years: to be among the first to uncover and read in 
a systematic way hitherto secret government archives from many countries and to combine 
his documentary findings with a wide range of statistical material often ignored by historians. 
For his thesis, from which his first scholarly publications were to be derived, he based 
his  research  on  the  largely  unexplored  captured  records  of  the  German  Ministry  for 
Armaments  and  Ammunition  and  the  Economic  and  Armaments  Office  of  the  High 
Command of the Armed Forces, as well as other documents then kept in the Air Historical 
Branch of the Air Ministry in London. He also consulted the records of the United States’ 
Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), the purpose of which had been to examine the relative 
success of the various Allied bombing policies during the war.
6 This survey provided him 
with valuable material for his thesis in so far as it presented a detailed study of the German 
war economy which the strategic bombing was meant to cripple. One of the authors of the 
survey, the economist Burton H. Klein, was at that time writing his own book based largely 
on the results of that survey.
7 But the young Alan Milward, who defended his thesis in 1960, 
shortly after the publication of Klein’s book, and shortly before becoming assistant lecturer, 
then Lecturer, in Economic History at the University of Edinburgh (1960-1965), reached very 
different conclusions to those of Klein. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Kershaw (2000), 12-13. 
5 Milward’s linguistic skills were learned entirely at High School in Stoke-on Trent. His first visit outside the 
British Isles was in 1955 when he won a university competition for his project to cycle around Finland and 
Northern Norway. At a later stage of his academic career, he would also be able to read Danish, Dutch, Italian, 
Norwegian, Portuguese, Romanian, Spanish, and Swedish and speak many fluently.  
6 USSBS (1945).  
7 Klein (1959).   4 
2. The German Economy at War (1965) 
 
The  most  succinct  and  accessible  account  of  Alan  Milward’s  argument  about  Nazi 
Germany’s war economy can be found in his first article, published in The Economic History 
Review (EHR) in 1964.
8 The following year his first book, The German Economy at War, 
now considered a classic, was published.
9 In spite of its title, Alan Milward did not consider 
his book to be a history of the German war economy as a whole. He himself pointed to the 
fact that, by 1965, there were still ‘too many serious gaps’ in the documentary and statistical 
knowledge of the German economy from 1939 to 1945 for his own study to be taken as ‘a 
comprehensive history of German war production to serve as a counterpart of the United 
Kingdom Official History of the Second World War, Civil Series’, which his own doctoral 
supervisor  and  mentor  had  completed  shortly  beforehand.
10  His  research  focused  on 
determining the turning points in Germany’s wartime economic strategy. 
Milward’s main thesis was that until 1942 Nazi Germany was being prepared to wage a 
war of a special kind which was most suited to the German economy and to the political 
nature of the Nazi party and its ideology. That war was briefly referred to as ‘the Blitzkrieg’, 
a term commonly translated into English as ‘lightning wars’. It rested on a military strategy 
which implied a succession of rapid knock-out blows delivered against the enemy’s forces 
from a position of strength without requiring the full-scale and permanent mobilization of the 
country’s  economy  and  society.  Temporary  efforts  to  boost  the  production  of  particular 
sectors were to precede each military campaign. The degree of wartime resource mobilization 
was  to  be  flexible,  varying  in  accordance  with  the  military  needs  of  each  successive 
aggressive campaign between September 1939 and the summer of 1941. These campaigns 
were based on German military forces being superior in number and capacity to the opposing 
forces at the time of each surprise attack.  
In Milward’s interpretation, the Blitzkrieg was an economic and political as much as a 
military strategy. In this sense, the Blitzkrieg strategy was based on operating a war economy 
within the general framework of the heavily mobilized economy which Nazi Germany had 
sustained since 1936. It thus required balancing the preparation of the country for war, which 
was  an  intrinsic  goal  of  Nazi  ideology,  with  the  maintenance  of  consumption  at  levels 
necessary to retain sufficient domestic support for the Nazi regime. The Third Reich would 
                                                 
8 Milward (1964). 
9 Milward (1965). 
10 Milward (1965), v.   5 
impose on German civilians the rigors of a full-scale war economy only if and when it was 
forced to do so. Thus, for Alan Milward, the Blitzkrieg was ‘a method of waging war which 
would  avoid  misery  which  war  seemed  destined  to  bring  to  the  [German]  civilian 
population.’
11 It was based on achieving the Nazi party’s ultimate political objectives with 
less disruption to the national economy and society than would otherwise have been possible. 
In Alan Milward’s own words, the Blitzkrieg economy 
 
was pre-eminently suited to the structure of the National Socialist state. It was the system of 
warfare best suited to the character and institutions of Hitler’s Germany. For a democratic 
country such a method of waging war would have presented immense difficulties, for Germany, 
it was politically and economically convenient.
12 
 
As a political strategy, it was to prepare the country to wage successfully the sort of war 
which would lay the basis for the future German dominance of continental Europe under the 
leadership  of  the  National  Socialist  party.  The  subsequent  simplified  depiction  of  his 
argument as that of ‘a peacetime economy at war’ is at best a distortion.
13 Indeed, Alan 
Milward stressed that ‘[n]o nation had ever previously spent so vast a sum in peace time on 
preparations for war’.
14 
What Alan Milward set out to do was explain, firstly, how Nazi Germany was able to 
conquer most of continental Europe within a short space of time while maintaining living 
standards, and thus support for the regime at home; and secondly, when and why the initial 
strategy was changed. It was at the beginning of 1942 that, as he claimed, due to the immense 
cost generated by the invasion of the Soviet Union, Germany was forced to abandon the 
economic and military strategy of the Blitzkrieg and develop an alternative one aimed at 
sustaining a prolonged war effort. Given the Allied superiority in the quantity of strategic 
resources at their disposal, the emphasis in Germany was placed on achieving qualitative 
superiority. Adolf Hitler and the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions assumed that it was 
impossible for Germany to out-produce its enemies in armaments but that it ‘could still win a 
war of mass production by harnessing her technology and science to the task of keeping a 
qualitative superiority in many individual armaments.’
15 This illusion was abandoned in turn, 
Alan Milward argued, in the summer of 1944, when Germany geared itself toward a total-war 
effort which required the full mobilization of all available resources at the expense of both 
                                                 
11 Milward (1965), 7. 
12 Milward (1965), 31. 
13 For further elaboration on this question see below, 57-58. 
14 Milward (1965), 27. 
15 Milward (1965), 101.   6 
the  quality  of  armaments  and  domestic  living  standards.  Hitler’s  ‘Concentration  Order’ 
(Konzentrationserlass)  of  19  June  1944  marked,  he  said,  a  desperate  effort  to  postpone 
disaster by abandoning Germany’s qualitative superiority and focusing all efforts on the mass 
production  of  the  existing  weapon  types,  as  did  the  appointment  in  July  1944  of  Josef 
Goebbels as Reich Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Total War. This question of when 
Nazi Germany was organized or aimed to be organized for ‘total war’ dominated scholarly 
debates for many years after the 1960s.
16 
If the Blitzkrieg strategy had been successful in the first twenty months of the war in 
defeating  the  armed  forces  of  Poland,  Denmark,  Norway,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the total-war effort which the Third Reich 
initiated in 1942 was insufficient, however impressive its actual results, against the combined 
resources and capabilities of powers which were not only economically stronger but, through 
an  efficient  system  of  cooperation,  proved  themselves  to  better  suited  for  the  kind  of 
command over all the resources which was necessary to win the war. Thus, in his first book, 
Milward was making a persuasive case for the importance of economic and political as well 
as military strategy in explaining the outcome of the war, and for the importance of the Soviet 
Union, along with Britain, to Allied victory by defeating the Blitzkrieg before the United 
States joined the Allies. 
The first (recorded) reviewer of The German Economy at War aptly described the social 
and academic atmosphere in which Alan Milward carried out his first academic research: 
 
It is not unfair to use the British war economy as a standard of comparison for the German 
economy. For, at the time, the British were spurred on to sacrifice partly by their belief that the 
Germans had won their victories because they had learned long ago the lessons of giving up 
butter in order to have guns. It came as a shock to read the [USSBS] after the war and to 
discover how wrong we were. The Germans had, it seemed, maintained high civilian standards 
throughout the war: even the number of domestic servants had increased. Unfortunately, apart 
from articles by one or two notable economists who worked in the Bombing Survey, there has 
been little systematic study of the German war economy, and historians have been slow to 
quarry among the patchy, although massive, documentation on the subject.
17 
 
One of the ‘notable economists’ was Klein, whose book Germany’s Economic Preparations 
for War (1959) had already shown that the degree of preparation of the Nazi economy for war 
by 1939 was very much less than had been believed by the Allies at the time. Klein had 
effectively destroyed the widely held belief that Hitler had armed Germany to its full extent 
                                                 
16 Detailed information about the changing interpretation of the concept of total war can be found in Beckett 
(1988). 
17 ‘Guns and Butter’ (1965), 772.    7 
for  the  purpose  of  waging  the  kind  of  war  that  the  Second  World  War  represented.  In 
agreement with Klein and the other authors of the USSBS, Alan Milward showed – in both 
his article and monograph – that Germany was not operating a full-scale war economy in 
1939, nor in the first two years of war. This did not mean, however, that the Third Reich was 
not preparing Germany for a major war; it simply meant that 
 
Germany was preparing for war, but for a war of a special kind – Blitzkrieg – which demanded 
not  ‘armament  in  depth’  [armament  producing  permanent  military  potential]  but  the  less 
burdensome ‘armaments in width’ [ready weaponry the provision of which could be increased 
right before each military campaign].’
18 
 
Where Milward disagreed with Klein and the USSBS was in assessing the actual level of 
mobilization  of  the  German  economy,  both  before  and  throughout  the  war.  Indeed,  in 
challenging the wartime assumptions of the Allies, Milward argued that the authors of the 
USSBS had ‘weighed the balance down on the other side rather than correcting it’.
19 He 
maintained that the main reason why Klein and the other USSBS authors had underestimated 
the degree of preparation for war of the German economy by 1939 and overestimated the 
change after 1942 was because they had accepted ‘very uncritically the description of the 
German war economy given by the most co-operative, the most intelligent, and certainly the 
most knowledgeable of the Allies’ prisoners, Albert Speer, the former Minister of Armaments 
and Munitions.’
20  
In the United States, Speer, who was at that time serving a twenty-year sentence in 
Spandau prison in West Berlin, having escaped the death penalty at the Nuremberg trials 
because  he  acknowledged  his  guilt  in  Nazi  war  crimes,  was  given,  according  to  Alan 
Milward, too much credit for having reformed the administration and direction of the war 
economy. Speer had taken with him many extremely valuable documentary records relating 
to the wartime German armament effort which he was to use, at a later stage, toward his own 
public  rehabilitation.  In  American  eyes,  had  Speer  not  come  to  power  as  a  result  of  the 
accident in which his predecessor, Fritz Todt, was killed in an air crash on the Eastern front 
on 8 February 1942, ‘the German economy might never have been geared to the long war of 
attrition and mass production forced on her by the overwhelming defeat at Stalingrad’.
21 For 
Klein and the USSBS, the German defeat in Stalingrad in February 1943 was the turning 
                                                 
18 Forsyth (1965), 124. 
19 Milward (1964), 499. 
20 Milward (1964), 500. 
21 Milward (1964), 501.   8 
point in the war. Up until that point they believed that Germany was following the military 
tactics of the Blitzkrieg. After Stalingrad, the Third Reich would have had to switch tactics  
and mobilize the economy for a full-scale war. Had they switched tactics earlier, as Speer and
others were to argue, then the Germans, under the steady direction of the Minister of 
Armaments and Munitions, might have won the war. 
Alan Milward disagreed with almost all of this. Having worked with the same official 
German statistics as those used by the USSBS he was much more skeptical of their veracity 
than were the U.S. officials. In fact, he considered that, before the creation of the German 
Statistical Service in 1942, it was almost impossible to get reliable statistical information 
from which to analyze the weight of armaments production in the German economy for the 
critical  years  1939-1941.  Even  after  the  creation  of  this  office,  he  demonstrated  how 
misleading  were  the  indices  of  armaments  production  compiled  by  the  Statistisches  Amt 
during the war. In order to help get around the problem caused by the inadequate statistics, he 
investigated the ‘politics and personalities’ because he believed that ‘the political framework 
in which the economy of National Socialist Germany operated was extremely important.’
22 
His reading of the official documentary record of important wartime bodies of the German 
state caused him to challenge with some authority Klein’s and the USSBS’s understanding of 
the Blitzkrieg and of when it was abandoned.  
He considered it a mistake to view the Blitzkrieg, as the bombing survey had done, 
solely in terms of military tactics which ran aground during the five long months, between 
July 1942 and February 1943, of hand-to-hand fighting in Stalingrad, which killed almost two 
million people. It was Alan Milward’s firm view, first of all, that the Blitzkrieg, as we have 
already underlined, meant much more than military tactics, and secondly, that the Blitzkrieg 
strategy had proven a failure long before the battle of Stalingrad had begun. The Führer-
command  ‘Armament  1942’  of  10  January  1942,  he  maintained,  was  the  break  with  the 
economics of the Blitzkrieg and the beginning of a new program of military expansion which 
committed Germany to sustaining a long-term  war effort on a large scale, which in turn 
implied  a  more  effective  centralized  control  over  industrial  production.  Todt,  the 
Reichsminister  for  Armaments  and  Ammunition,  was  the  main  critic  of  the  Blitzkrieg 
strategy after the campaign against the Soviet Union had required scaling up the military 
requirements  of  Germany’s  overall  war  effort  quite  significantly.  It  was  Todt  who  had 
already persuaded Hitler of the need for change, it was Todt who had designed the numerous 
                                                 
22 Milward (1965), v.   9 
administrative  innovations  –  central  control,  rationalization  of  mass-production  of 
armaments, and the system of authoritative industrial committees – which would be central to 
the economic organization of the German economy operating on the basis of a long war in 
search of greatly increased efficiency levels from 1942 onwards, all of which, as we have 
seen, Speer (and the Allies) would attribute to Speer himself after the war. 
By examining what he called ‘the machinery of administration’ of the German war 
economy, Alan Milward concluded that ‘it was the failure of the first Russian campaign, 
rather  than  the  catastrophe  of  Stalingrad,  that  caused  Hitler  to  abandon  the  Blitzkrieg.’
23 
According to Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, considered by many at the time as one of the most 
distinguished  academic  authorities  on  Nazi  Germany,  Hitler  himself  had  insisted  on  the 
invasion of Russia, arguing that such an operation made sense ‘only if we smash the [Soviet 
Union] heavily in one blow’.
24 The consequence of the failure of this strategy was that the 
Third Reich became entangled in a long war of attrition against a combination of countries – 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and those in the British Empire and Commonwealth – 
with superior forces and military potential which was precisely what the Blitzkrieg strategy 
had  been  designed  to  avoid.  In  the  colorful  language  which  was  to  become  one  of  his 
trademarks, Milward wrote ‘[a]s the German advance squelched to a halt on Russian mud, 
and  as,  for  the  first  time,  serious  losses  of  equipment,  losses  which  were  exceeding 
production, made themselves felt, the advocates of “armament in depth” were heard with 
louder voices.’
25 ‘The Blitzkrieg is over’, Milward affirmed, quoting a memorandum of 15 
January 1942 written by General Hermann von Hanneken, the chief of resources, energy and 
mining in the German Ministry of Industry. ‘As for the economy,’ the memorandum ran, ‘it is 
a matter of the first priority that it should clearly be reconstructed on the basis of a long 
war.’
26 As Milward summed up, 
 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  decisive  change  in  the  administration  of  the  German  war 
economy  came  in  February  1942  with  the  creation  of  a  powerful  civilian  Ministry  of 
Armaments and Munitions with control over service departments. And this was clearly the 
response to the failure of the Blitzkrieg offensive against Russia, and the necessity to rearm for 
a longer struggle than had at first been envisaged.
27 
 
                                                 
23 Milward (1964), 507. 
24 Trevor-Roper (1966), 61. 
25 Milward (1964), 509. 
26 Milward (1964), 509. 
27 Milward (1964), 512-513.   10
In  case  anyone  was  left  in  any  doubt  about  where  he  disagreed  with  Klein,  Milward 
concluded his ‘The End of the Blitzkrieg’ article insisting that ‘economically the Blitzkrieg 
ended in January 1942. Stalingrad merely convinced the unbelievers.’
28 
He also strongly disagreed with all those who at that time saw the Nazi regime as a 
firm-command style economy: ‘[T]he whole structure of the German administrative body 
was one of competing individuals and competing machines which by 1942 represented a 
powerful collection of vested interests each unwilling to relinquish its control of its own 
small  part  of  the  war  economy.’
29  While  he  agreed  that  private  businessmen  exercised 
considerable  power  in  the  committees  used  by  Speer,  he  argued  that  there  were  ‘strong 
centrifugal forces in the National Socialist Party, which found the whole idea and system of 
the Blitzkrieg immensely more attractive than a full-scale war economy which would need 
centralized direction.’
30 Even after Speer had firmly defeated those in favor of Blitzkrieg, 
Milward  identified  ‘an  equally  determined  struggle,  involving  different  questions  of 
principle, between the Speer Ministry and the élite of the National Socialist movement, the 
SS.’
31 The raison d’être of the Blitzkrieg economy had been the possibility of avoiding an 
overall economic centralization of power and decision-making, allowing for the maintenance 
of independent economic empires responding to different, even opposing objectives despite 
operating under the supreme authority of the Führer. According to Alan Milward, the kind of 
central  planning  and  command  that  ‘armaments  in  depth’  entailed  inhibited  the  very 
economic flexibility on which Hitler’s strategy so much depended. It was precisely the need 
for flexibility which made the Blitzkrieg economy suit the structure of the Nazi state. The end 
of the Blitzkrieg thus meant the end of the perfect symbiosis between war, the independence 
of the Nazi party leaders, and a sufficiently high level of popular support for the regime.  
The final issue over which Alan Milward disagreed with Klein and the USSBS was 
over why Germany ultimately lost the war. In the fall of 1944, Alan Milward argued, ‘to all 
but fanatics the war was economically lost’.
32 We have seen that he refused to accept that the 
first  mistake  was  the  adoption  of  the  strategy  of  the  Blitzkrieg  itself.  Nor  did  he  accept 
Speer’s suggestion that ‘their economic edifice would never have fallen down had the Allies 
not first bombed the roof off and then occupied the rooms’.
33 While he did agree that the 
Allied bombs had played a part, he insisted that ‘[t]he complexity of the economy of so 
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30 Milward (1965), 11. 
31 Milward (1965), 155. 
32 Milward (1965), 163. 
33 Milward (1965), 165.   11
highly-industrialized a country as Germany proved greater than the plans for strategic air 
warfare allowed.’
34 Of equal importance for the defeat he listed the chronic labor shortage in 
Germany as well as shortages in vital raw material supplies. Since in his view ‘Germany had 
circumvented her raw material shortages very shrewdly throughout the war, by conquest and 
by substitution, although in theory they were her greatest weakness’, the Allies’ conquest in 
turn of those parts of Europe on which Germany depended was a major blow.
 Finally he 
included the tensions between the central  economic organization and the central political 
organization as a cause of equal importance for the defeat of Germany, since they determined 
the quality and quantity of the German war production. 
‘Personal  rivalries’,  as  one  reviewer  summarized  Alan  Milward’s  findings  in  this 
respect, ‘prevented a satisfactory solution for the maximum and efficient use of German and 
foreign labour and for the best allocation of materials and components.’
35 Central authority 
over the whole of the German economy never existed, apart from Hitler’s personal supreme 
(and contradictory) command. It was not until August 1944 that Speer gained authority over 
armaments production for all the armed forces, but even then Hermann Göring’s industrial 
empire escaped the Armaments and Munitions ministerial authority, and the Schutzstaffel or 
S.S. under Heinrich Himmler continued to constitute a ‘state within a state’ with its own 
industrial empire. In spite of everything, German armaments production reached its peak in 
July 1944, and in January 1945 it was still more than twice as high as it had been three years 
earlier.
36 ‘The Allies were fortunate’ – another reviewer concluded – that the Germans began 
to display centralized efficient planning ‘only when it was too late to do more than postpone 
the inevitable collapse.’
37 In fact, most reviewers of The German Economy at War concurred 
in  underlining  the  novelty  and  excellence  of  Alan  Milward’s  treatment  of  the  damaging 
consequences, for the coherence and consistency of the German war effort, of the personal 
and institutional rivalries within the Third Reich.
38 The careful analysis of the relationship 
between the economic, strategic, and political factors, which Alan Milward deployed for the 
first time in The German Economy at War, would constitute another permanent feature of his 
scholarly work, a further component of what could be defined as the Milwardian method. 
The main merit of the book was seen to lie in its attempt to understand and explain for 
the first time the economic rationale underpinning the Nazi military strategy. Alan Milward’s 
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evidence was seen to challenge, on the one hand, the belief of those who had argued that the 
German  economy  was  so  fully  extended  by  1940  that  the  British  bombing  policy  could 
quickly bring about its collapse and on the other, the view of the appeasers who minimized 
the  extent  of  German  rearmament.
39  Trevor-Roper  went  further  than  Alan  Milward’s 
conclusion that ‘under Blitzkrieg economics Germany achieved one of the most remarkable 
periods of conquest in modern history’ by saying that ‘one more victory in the series might 
well have established the New Order on a lasting base.’ For Trevor Roper, ‘[i]t was by such 
methods, after all, that Prussia, which was not a great power in its time, became the German 
Empire, which was. By the same methods, a new German Empire might have been the super-
power of today.’
40 Likened by Michael Hurst to an Emmental cheese which, ‘[d]espite the 
holes that can be found in it […] is of a very high quality’, The German Economy at War was 
to become the standard text for many years for a study of the preparation for and wartime 
efforts of the German economy.
41 Hurst was not mistaken. 
 
3. The New Order and the French Economy (1970) 
 
The origins of the Third Reich’s Blitzkrieg strategy and the ultimate outcome of the German 
war effort were both related, in Alan Milward’s view, to the concept of a New Order in 
Europe. This referred to the place which occupied territories – and the subsequent policies for 
their  control  –  had  in  the  overall  German  war  effort  and  postwar  planning  for  the 
establishment of a  revolutionary socio-economic system on a  continental scale.  For  Alan 
Milward, the Blitzkrieg strategy encompassed the occupation of some parts of Europe and the 
subsequent control of their resources in order to achieve the fascist objectives of a New Order 
in Europe which was neither capitalist nor communist, while the failure to make the best use 
of the occupied territories represented a fatal blow to the overall efficiency of the German 
economy in the later phase of the war. 
As  he  pointed  out  in  the  early  1960s,  the  effects  ‘of  German  occupation  on  the 
economies  of  the  occupied  countries  are  still  unknown  except  in  the  broadest  outline, 
certainly less well known than the political effects of occupation.’
42 Almost fifty years later, 
we can observe that this is still the case. What he wanted to understand was what the New 
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Order in Europe might have looked like if the Nazis had not been defeated and to what extent 
their defeat was due to the failure of their occupation policies. In two subsequent monographs 
on  the  German  occupation  of  France  and  Norway  he  provided  some  answers  to  those 
questions. He started with France, the most significant of all the economies which Germany 
controlled during the Second World War.
43 The official French account of the Occupation 
was  that  it  had  failed  because  the  majority  of  French  people  had  resisted  rather  than 
collaborated  with  the  Nazis.  Raymond  Aron’s  distinction  between  the  good  Vichy  of 
Marshall Henri Philippe Pétain, the Verdun hero and aged head of the Vichy régime, which 
sought to soften the impact of Nazi policies on France, and the bad Vichy of Pierre Laval, 
deputy president of the first Council of Ministers from June to December 1940 and premier 
after  April  1942,  which  collaborated  willingly  with  Nazi  Germany,  went  largely 
unchallenged  as  most  public  records  in  France  for  the  Vichy  period  were  closed.
44  Alan 
Milward, basing his research on France primarily on captured German documents located in 
Britain  and  the  United  States  and  on  published  French  records  of  war  damage  and  of 
negotiations  at  the  Armistice  Commission  meetings,  was  interested  in  the  purpose  of 
occupation and the extent of French collaboration.  
On the first question, he quite typically  rejected as too simplistic the view that the 
primary purpose of occupation was to loot and punish. What he set out to do was to assess the 
rationale  behind  the  various  measures  which  the  Germans  devised  in  order  to  extract 
economic benefit from an occupied territory; in the French case, from the fall of Paris in June 
1940 to the invasion of Normandy four years later. Anticipating that there was more to the 
various  forms  of  German  pillage  of  France’s  resources  and  treasuries  –  which  included 
seizures of stocks of raw materials and of cash, extraction of occupation costs, levies, the use 
of  an  overvalued  currency  (Reichskreditkassenscheine)  for  the  purchase  of  goods  and 
services by the occupation forces, capital penetration in French industry, and forced transfers 
of French labor and foreign holdings to German factories – than pure plunder or punishment, 
he  measured  the  extent  of  French  collaboration.  This  enabled  him  to  answer  the  bigger 
theoretical question of whether the Nazi policy of uniting Europe by force could have worked 
had the ultimate outcome of the war been different. 
The way in which he formulated his questions are clearly set out in an early essay, 
published in 1967: 
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The tendency has been to assume that Germany’s policy towards the French economy was 
merely to ‘exploit’ it in her own interests. This view of the problem is certainly too simple. 
What exactly were German interests? And which of the many different ways of ‘exploitation’ 
should Germany choose? Should Germany invest in the French economy, particularly in the 
agricultural sector, in the hope of increasing output and thus the share which she herself could 
take? Or should she merely loot the French economy taking what she could as booty? Owing to 
deficiencies in investment in armaments industries before 1942 Germany’s own armaments-
producing capacity was fairly low until 1943. Should she therefore use French plant to increase 
this capacity? And if so, should she do this only when it was absolutely necessary and as a 
temporary measure? Or should she incorporate the economy of occupied France, and even 
Vichy France, into her own war economy, forming what Jean Bichelonne, secretary of state for 
industrial production in the Vichy government after April 1942, was to call the ‘European war 
economy’? Or should she transfer, in as large quantities as possible, the factors of production 
from France to Germany, turning France into a rump state, a primary producer like the General-
government of Poland? What fate was reserved for France in the ‘New Order’?
45 
 
As he saw it, the German occupation of France went through three main phases. During the 
first one, which followed the fall of Paris, he argued that the economics of Blitzkrieg did not 
require much pressure to be imposed on France’s economic resources, apart from on aircraft, 
stocks of military equipment, transport, and raw materials. The second period, which started 
in  the  fall  of  1941,  at  the  height  of  the  Russian  campaign,  was  when  the  needs  of  the 
Blitzkrieg strategy were greatest, necessitating a more substantial contribution to be made by 
France  in  terms  of  ammunition,  consumer  goods,  and  labor.  This  period  of  increased 
exploitation  was  dominated  by  the  policies  of  Fritz  Sauckel,  the  Commissar-General  for 
Labor, who demanded the transfer of French (and other foreign) workers to Germany’s basic 
and arms-producing industries in order to speed up production. It was during this period that 
the  new  era  of  a  continental  European  Order  under  German  dominance  appeared  within 
reach. It was to serve not only the interests of the German wartime political economy but also 
lead to the postwar reorganization of the whole European political economy. The final phase 
was dominated by the consequences of the collapse of the Blitzkrieg strategy in favor of, 
firstly, a more efficient mobilization of all available resources for a long-term war effort and 
then, the simple exploitation of the conquered economy in the context of an emergency total-
war effort within the wider context of a European war economy. 
Alan Milward’s analysis encompassed German as well as French views on the future 
role of France in the New Order. As he had shown in The German Economy at War, the 
German state, far from constituting a monolithic administrative and political entity, was riven 
with divisions, initially over the purpose and degree of control and exploitation of conquered 
territories, and subsequently over the degree of administrative centralization that followed the 
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end of the Blitzkrieg economy. In the case of occupied France, the most prominent dispute 
was  between  Speer,  who  favored  expanding  the  production  of  armaments  and  consumer 
goods in France in order to meet both the needs of the German armed forces across Europe 
and civilians at home, and Sauckel, who preferred to force French labor to work in factories 
in Germany where their level of productivity was higher. Whereas Speer followed a policy of 
progressive  economic  rationalization  on  a  pan-European  basis,  Sauckel  was  emotionally 
linked  to  the  early  revolutionary  doctrine  of  National  Socialism  for  which  the 
Grossraumwirtschaft (the economics of large areas) would be based on the creation of a self-
sufficient continental-wide economic system in which the industrial regions of western and 
central Europe pivoting on the Third Reich would be surrounded by a periphery of countries 
acting as suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials. For the old National Socialist guard, 
Speer’s centralist policy represented ‘an attack on the National Socialist ideas of the New 
Order’.
46 
Once again, as Alan Milward had shown in The German Economy at War, under the 
façade of a monolithic organization, Nazi Germany’s leadership was actually quite divided, 
lacking a clear sense of direction over which were the most effective policies to win the war 
and  establish  the  New  Order  in  Europe.  Against  the  backdrop  of  conflicting  and  ever 
changing demands from the Nazi masters, there were, as Alan Milward saw it, fundamental 
differences of opinion within the Vichy state over what the future of France should be in the 
German New Order for Europe. Marshall Pétain had at the time of the Armistice, in June 
1940, readily accepted a role for France as a supplier of food and raw materials to Germany 
as offering a ‘means to France’s social and spiritual regeneration’.
47 On the other hand Laval, 
on returning to power as Prime Minister in April 1942, welcomed Speer’s plans as a way for 
France  to  avoid  the  fate  of  the  eastern  territories  and  retain  the  possibility  of  having  an 
industrial future.
48 All these divisions and changes made Alan Milward’s calculation of what 
Germany managed to extract from France all the more surprising. 
He used five cases studies – coal, iron ore, bauxite and aluminum, wolfram (the ore 
from which the strategic metal tungsten is made), and agriculture – which together constitute 
the main body of The New Order and the French Economy – to show how the interaction of 
all these factors influenced what Germany was able to extract from the French economy. As 
he  demonstrated,  by  1942  ‘France  had  become  an  integral  part  of  the  German  war 
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economy.’
49 Toward the end of 1943 the general level of exploitation was between forty and 
fifty  per  cent  of  French  capacity  as  France  became  ‘the  most  important  supplier  of  raw 
materials, foodstuffs, and manufactured goods to the German economy.’
50 Expressed in other 
terms, ‘the total value of goods and services’ which Germany was able to obtain from France 
during the war ‘was roughly equal to one-quarter of [France’s] own Gross National Product 
on the eve of the war.’
51 To the value of raw materials, food, production, and labor Alan 
Milward added the value to Germany of its trade with France. He showed that during the 
occupation, the prewar trend in which the countries of south-eastern Europe had become the 
most important source of German supply was broken, and their place was taken by France, 
with Belgium and the Netherlands in a subordinate role. 
The failure of the Blitzkrieg on the eastern front turned attention from the New Order to 
the organization of a total-war economy on a continental-wide basis which resulted in France 
becoming by 1943 the most important supplier of the German economy for a wider range of 
industrial  products  as  well  as  food.  As  a  consequence,  the  relative  importance  of  south-
eastern  Europe  to  the  German  economy  declined,  and  long-term  plans  were  designed  to 
reduce the German dependence on eastern supplies even further. How was France to fit into 
those longer term plans, he asked. But it was a question which, as he himself admitted, could 
not be answered in wartime: ‘Indeed the answer seemed to recede as the war progressed’.
52 
What he was anxious to settle in The New Order and the French Economy was whether the 
‘startlingly’ high level of exploitation of the French economy could have been sustained had 
German domestic economic policy not changed and with it the economic policy in occupied 
Europe. On this he felt there was no room for liberal complacency: ‘In so far as German 
policy had to be changed in autumn 1943 this was not so much because it was, economically, 
a failure. Rather it was because events in Germany, the changes in economic policy which 
had  taken  place  there  in  1942,  spread  their  implications  to  occupied  Europe.’
53  If  Alan 
Milward was interested in the effects of occupation on individual economies he saw the even 
more important theoretical question to be whether the Nazi conquest of continental Europe 
could have worked economically had Germany not been defeated militarily. Was the liberal 
theory that war and conquest did not pay disproved by the Nazi experience in the period 
1939-1942 when it controlled the resources of most of continental Europe? As he wrote, 
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[t]hat conquest, in the long run is not profitable, is too satisfyingly moral a lesson to draw. Each 
conqueror  has  his  philosophy  of  conquest  and  can  only  act  within  the  bounds  of  that 
philosophy. Seen in historical perspective the National Socialist conquests were an attempt to 
solve the political and economic problems of Germany by solving those of Europe on the same 
principles. The New Economic Order was ultimately essential if National Socialist Germany 
was not always to face overwhelming economic problems in a hostile world. The economic 
developments in Germany after the National Socialist revolution were meaningless in the long 
run if confined to one country; conquest was inherent in them.
54  
 
As far as he was concerned, to understand the National Socialist theory of conquest and the 
nature  of  National  Socialism,  which  he  insisted  was  a  variant  of  fascism  rather  than  of 
totalitarianism, it was necessary to ‘think ourselves out of the weight of the two hundred 
years of thought which fascism itself rejected’.
55 Rejecting both the liberal-capitalist and the 
Marxist theories of fascism, Alan Milward argued, at that time, the following: 
 
The philosophical starting-point of fascism was the rejection of what fascists called the ‘Greek 
idea’, the idea of the individual’s growth to emancipation and maturity. It was this particular 
conception of human destiny, they argued, which was recaptured from Greek philosophy during 
the Renaissance and thus became the basis for Smith’s ‘economic man’. Fascism therefore 
attacked liberal economic thought at the very base of its trunk. The emancipated individual, 
who was both the producer and the product of capitalism, was disruptive to society, selfish, and 
an enemy to the community. Conversion to fascism was a revolt against interpreting the world 
from an individualist and materialist standpoint. Communism, in this light, was merely the last 
and latest form of materialism, the ultimate liberal heresy. The fascist philosophy imposed 
drastic restrictions on the ‘rights’ of the individual and the group. Capital was a public trust. 
Instead of the class-ridden state of the materialists fascism proposed the ethical state, the spartan 
virtues of whose inhabitants would be far removed from those of the capitalist entrepreneur or 
consumer. Philosophically, fascism represented a search, not for further economic development 
in new and more difficult international circumstances but for a point of economic equilibrium, a 
haven from the pressure of social and economic change.
56 
 
Berating liberal historians for dismissing the New Order as ‘windy rhetoric, a verbal disguise 
for  conquest’,  he  also  criticized  Marxist  historians  –  such  as  Wolfgang  Schumann  and 
Gerhard Lozek – for interpreting it as ‘the subjection and looting of the occupied territories 
by  German  bankers  and  industrialists  in  whose  interests  the  war  had  been  prepared  and 
carried out.’
57 Alan Milward’s view was that  
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the conflicting strains of economic thought in National Socialism spanned the whole range from 
anti-capitalist,  or  even  pre-capitalist,  millenarianism  to  the  ruthless  advocacy  of  the 
businessman’s right to dominate all economic policy. These gross differences of opinion were 
never better shown than in German economic policy in occupied countries.
58 
 
If The New Order and the French Economy had two main levels of analysis, it was only his 
analysis of German economic policies toward occupied France from 1940 to 1944 which 
found favor. All reviewers without exception praised Alan Milward’s ability to analyze the 
existing evidence from that new perspective. The second level of analysis was not seen to be 
as successful as the first. Richard Tilly and Hans Umbreit, while acknowledging the wealth of 
data which Alan Milward had produced on the French economy, were not convinced that the 
New Order was a useful way to interpret the economic aspects of Nazi occupation policy in 
France.
59  Arthur  Schweitzer  was  more  critical:  ‘While  the  factual  investigation  is 
competently  done,  limited  mainly  by  the  inadequacy  of  available  information,  the  same 
cannot be said for the efforts to interpret either the occupied economy or the Nazi empire.’
60 
Indeed Schweitzer had also written a caustic review of The German Economy at War, and 
was  not  sympathetic  to  Alan  Milward’s  apparent  adventurism  in  formulating  wider 
interpretations of National Socialism.
61 Schweitzer was not alone. Charles P. Kindleberger, 
one of the earliest reviewers of The New Order and the French Economy, found it ‘futile’ to 
use the French case to generalize about the benefits of military conquest. For Kindleberger, 
the controversy between liberal theory and the revolutionary doctrine of National Socialism 
was ‘pressed too hard’ and unpersuasively.
62 Urs Brand referred to the book’s section on the 
liberal and fascist theories of the profitability of conquest as ‘historical digression’.
63 
It has to be said that Alan Milward never shied away from an argument, and in his 
analysis of the operation of the Nazi economy during the war, he was taking on two very 
powerful theories, those of liberalism and Marxism at the same time. In trying to understand 
the theoretical underpinnings of the Nazi war economy and of the New Order for Europe he 
was  anxious  to  avoid  what  he  considered  to  be  the  dangerous  complacency  which  their 
oversimplified  views  created.  Many  reviewers  considered  that  his  determination  to 
understand the politics and economics underpinning Nazi policy in the Second World War in 
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some way indicated his tacit support for the Nazi regime. Two reviewers intimated that he 
would have welcomed the establishment of the National Socialist New Order. ‘Might an 
imposed economic order have been better for Europe than present bickerings and divisions?’, 
Arthur L. Funk asked rhetorically, after which he added, ‘Milward’s argument in favor of 
force  as  a  possible  (and  presumably  legitimate)  method  of  imposing  a  supranational 
economic  system  is  a  tortuous  one.’
64  Volker  Wieland,  in  turn,  saw  ‘expressions  which 
suggest a certain sympathy [of Milward] with National Socialism.’
65 Nothing could have 
been further from the truth, but it was easier to insinuate that Alan Milward might have had 
secret sympathies for the Nazis than to consider whether the National Socialist New Order in 
Europe might have been seen as a viable long-term solution to the socio-economic problems 
faced by Germany and the rest of Europe in the interwar period. 
Although  Alan  Milward  based  his  views  of  war  on  those  of  the  nineteenth-century 
Prussian general, Carl von Clausewitz, rather than on the more fashionable game theory as 
developed by Thomas C. Schelling in 1960, his views were quite similar to those of Schelling. 
On  the  first  page  of  his  influential  text  Schelling  had  argued  that  ‘rational  behavior’  is 
associated  with  morality  and  goodness,  while  ‘irrational  behavior’  is  associated  with 
pathological  behavior:  ‘Among  diverse  theories  of  conflict  […]  a  main  dividing  line  is 
between those that treat conflict as a pathological state […] and those that take conflict for 
granted and study the behavior associated with it.’
66 Alan Milward was certainly among those 
scholars  who  operated  on  the  assumption  that  rational  behavior  was  ‘motivated  by  a 
conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and 
internally consistent value system.’
67 
  Alan Milward wanted, through his research, to discover exactly why the Nazi system 
of  Occupation  had  failed  rather  than  accept  the  official  version  of  events.  In  France  the 
official explanation which had been carefully controlled since the end of the war was that it 
was the resistance of most French people to the occupation which was responsible for the 
defeat of Germany. This had received a near fatal blow in 1969 with the release in cinemas of 
the documentary film, Le chagrin et la pitié (The Sorrow and the Pity), which showed the 
speed of the collapse of the French state under German military pressure.
68 While this was 
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attributed to poor French military strategy and the deep political divisions within the Third 
Republic, the film also exposed the degree of popular support enjoyed by Marshall Pétain. 
This was reflected in the large numbers of French volunteers who were recruited to fight 
Communism both at the front and in the German armaments factories, as well as in the anti-
British and anti-Semitic sentiments held by many – and not exclusively Vichy politicians – in 
France. Although what the documentary film portrayed was not dissimilar from what some 
French authors had already published in the 1960s, as with many of the accounts of the 
history of France in the period from June 1940 to August 1944, particularly if produced by 
foreigners, it was subject to the policy of a selective combination of memory and amnesia, a 
sort of ‘Vichy syndrome’.
69 
The New Order and the French Economy, which was published a few months after the 
release of the film, received few reviews in France and was not translated into French.
70 As a 
result it was neither debated nor perhaps read. If Alan Milward had shown that the conquest 
of  France  was  profitable  to  the  Third  Reich  and  that  there  was  extensive  voluntary 
cooperation between many French businesses and officials with the occupying forces, his 
overall conclusion to the question of whether the New Order in France could have proved 
viable was that it was the behavior of labor during the occupation which diminished the 
importance to Germany of the acquisition of France: 
 
The study of individual industries and the relative failure of German policies of exploitation 
suggests that that failure was due not only to the contradictions of German policy but also to the 
falling rates of labour productivity in the French economy. It is the behaviour of the French 
labour force during the war, and, indeed, the whole history of the French resistance movement, 
which assert that the economics of conquest cannot wholly be calculated in terms of cash.
71 
 
Indeed, Alan Milward was one of the first to make the distinction between the Resistance 
movement, which he did not consider had made a significant contribution to the outcome of 
the war, except in a few isolated cases, and the passive resistance of French labor which led 
to the general decline in French productivity particularly in 1944.
72 This distinction is one 
among  many  now  accepted  by  historians  who  refer  to  ‘passive  resistance’  as  dissent  to 
distinguish it more clearly from ‘Resistance’ as a political movement.
73 In using the term 
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‘resistance’ to apply to both dissent and organized opposition, Alan Milward left himself 
open to considerable criticism. Kindleberger was quick to challenge him for sidelining the 
role of the resistance: ‘How much was the German eventual military defeat’ – he asked Alan 
Milward – ‘a result of invasion on the one hand, or the impossibility of holding down a 
conquered people on the other?’
74 Another reviewer was frustrated because Alan Milward did 
not investigate ‘the cost of conquest and the far greater cost of subjugation’ with as much 
emphasis and energy as he ‘applied to the calculation of [conquest’s] benefit.’
75 
What Alan Milward sought to assess in his hard-headed treatment of the contribution of 
the resistance to the defeat of Germany was the military value of the resistance. He had an 
opportunity to debate the issue with the recipient of one of the highest military honors which 
the French state could give, the Croix de Guerre, bestowed on the historian Michael R.D. 
Foot, Professor of Modern History in the University of Manchester, for his activities in the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) in France in 1944. Since Foot had subsequently written 
extensively about the positive role played by the Resistance during the Second World War 
Alan Milward suggested to him that  
 
[t]he wealth of historical study on the resistance movement in all countries, including Germany, 
has usually tended to dodge the issue of whether or not resistance was effective. That resistance 
was widespread, brave and well organized has been demonstrated over and over again. [...] of 
course  there  must  come  a  point  where  resistance  is  the  only  conceivable  strategy  and  the 
obvious example is that of a state or community, such as Poland or the Jews in 1939, face to 
face with virtual annihilation [but] does it necessarily follow that such resistance will have any 
strategic value however inevitable it may be?
76 
 
And he went on to argue: 
 
The choice of resistance both as a tactic and a strategy, except in the extreme example of the 
threat of annihilation, is also a decision against other tactics and strategies. The correctness of 
the choice can be judged by, in the widest sense, its opportunity-cost; resources invested in 
resistance could always be deployed in a different way. But in this case the calculation of 
opportunity–cost must be more than a merely financial one. It must involve as far as possible 
all the factors including the psychological and social ones which go into the choice of a correct 
strategy. The history of the Second World War illustrates this excellently. There were in fact 
very few situations in those years when resistance was the correct strategy if the choice is 
assessed  on economic  grounds; in  almost  every  case  the  resources  could  have  been  better 
invested elsewhere. But the social and psychological value of resistance was so strong as to 
make its choice sometimes the correct one.
77 
                                                 
74 Kindleberger (1971), 161. 
75 Wenden (1972), 313. 
76 Milward (1975b), 188-189. Contrast with Foot (1975) which provided a much more favorable appreciation of 
the Resistance’s contribution. 
77 Milward (1975b), 190.   22
 
He  gave two examples  where  resistance had clearly made a difference. The first was in 
sabotaging the mining of wolfram in France and the second was the attack on the heavy 
water  plant  in  southern  Norway.  Both  acts  of  resistance,  he  asserted,  struck  in  areas  of 
strategic importance and short supply for Germany. But his general conclusion was that ‘as 
an individual act resistance was liberating, satisfying and necessary; on a coordinated level it 
seems  to  have  been  seldom  effective,  sometimes  stultifying,  frequently  dangerous,  and 
almost always too costly.’
78 By 1986, as François Bédarida made it clear in summarizing 
what  he  saw  to  be  the core  of  the  Foot-Milward  controversy,  Alan  Milward’s  efforts  to 
distinguish between economic, political, and military factors in order to clarify why Nazi 
Germany had been defeated had not been appreciated in France: 
 
On  an  economic  level,  A.  Milward  believes  that  neither  the  German  war  machine  nor  the 
wartime  strategy  were  seriously  affected  by  the,  albeit  very  costly,  opposition  of  resistance 
organizations, except in the case of some very specific and timely operations. In fact, to reduce 
the  effectiveness  of  the  resistance  solely  to  its  military  dimension  is  to  completely 
misunderstand  the  very  nature  of  the  Second  World  War.  In  a  conflict  in  which  the 
psychological, ideological, and political factors are closely intertwined with the military and 
strategic factors, the confrontation between the Allies and the Axis must be analyzed in its 
entirety, without artificially compartmentalizing the various elements. If no one can deny that it 
was the defeat on the Eastern and Western battlefields that caused the collapse of Nazi Germany 
and its allies and that on their forces alone the clandestine movement would have been quite 
incapable of destroying the war potential of the enemy, such evidence can not devalue either the 




In  the  years  following  the  publication  of  The  New  Order  and  the  French  Economy  a 
considerable amount of research was published which proved conclusively that the Vichy 
state officially collaborated with Nazi Germany, but the focus was almost entirely on the 
political aspects of that collaboration. According to the well-known business historian from 
the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, Patrick Fridenson, the ‘considerable 
gap in historical research’ between the politics and economics of the Vichy period is mainly 
due to ‘the feeling that this shameful moment in French contemporary history did not deserve 
research  which would necessarily  undermine  French prestige.’
80 Outside  France the most 
recent research carried out by a team of neoclassical economic historians into the German 
occupation of France has confirmed Alan Milward’s conclusions that the occupation was of 
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considerable importance to Germany economically. What Filippo Occhino, Kim Oosterlinck, 
and Eugene N. White argue is that the extent to which conquest can be made to pay depends 
on the degree of cooperation from the defeated country. France, they reaffirm, collaborated 
willingly,  offering  much  more  to  Nazi  Germany  than  was  required,  in  the  belief  that  a 
German-dominated Europe was preferable to one dominated by Great Britain. ‘The economic 
support of the Reich’s vassal states was crucial’, they argue, on account of Germany’s severe 
shortage of foreign exchange reserves to pay for vital imports of raw materials and labor 
shortage.
81  However,  while  they  confirmed  Alan  Milward’s  argument  that  the  economic 
value of the occupation of France to Nazi Germany was very considerable, they stopped short 
of agreeing with his conclusion that ultimately the occupation could not have been sustained 
because of the falling rates of labor productivity in French industry and agriculture when the 
policies of occupation changed. 
 
4. The Fascist Economy in Norway (1972) 
 
If  the  Nazi  occupation  of  France  was  ultimately  unsustainable  because  of  the  actions  of 
French labor, was the occupation of Norway, a country which the Nazis felt was racially 
closer  than  France,  any  more  successful,  he  asked.  The  Fascist  Economy  in  Norway, 
published in 1972 and based mainly on the archives of the Economic Department of the 
Reichskommissariat – the highest governing body of the Third Reich in Norway –, as well as 
on  those  of  the  German  Ministry  of  War  Production  which  he  had  already  consulted  in 
London,  in  addition  to  many  other  sources,  addressed  that  question.
82  One  immediate 
consequence  of  his  research  was  that  the  archives  relating  to  the  German  occupation  of 
Norway were moved from London to Oslo. 
But once again, as in the case of his previous book on France, the reception of The 
Fascist Economy in Norway was mixed. While reviewers were ready in general to praise the 
author’s capacity to illuminate the actual operation of the economy of occupied Norway, they 
were  reluctant  to  engage  with  his  wider  discussion  of  the  nature  of  National  Socialism. 
According to many, Alan Milward should have limited himself to detailing the facts, rather 
than elaborating on the theories supposedly underpinning them. ‘The word Fascist in the title 
is misleading’, wrote one reviewer, since what Alan Milward detailed was ‘the story of the 
Norwegian  war  economy,  1940-45,  mainly  as  it  served  or  (increasingly)  failed  to  serve 
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German  needs.’
83  A  French  reviewer,  Pierre  Mougenot,  commented  that  ‘we  feel 
uncomfortable because we would have preferred the term “Nazi” to “fascist” [...] we would 
have liked to see the book entitled The Nazi Economy in Norway.’
84 Michael F. Cullis struck 
the same note, regretting that Alan Milward had used the term ‘fascist’ in the title, rather than 
opting for something along the lines of ‘The New Order and the Norwegian economy’. He 
even suggested that Alan Milward’s insistence ‘point[s] to an underlying polemical, even 
ideological, purpose that is never made explicit’.
85 
Alan  Milward  was  in  fact  quite  explicit  in  his  argument  that  in  Nazi  Germany 
economics could not be separated from the political and ideological nature of the regime, just 
as the political nature of the regime could not be understood without recognizing the nature 
of the economic problems which it faced. The term ‘fascist’ in the title was deliberately 
chosen to emphasize that in his view National Socialism, although it was the product of a 
long history of social tensions in Germany, was not something unique to Germany. Since it 
had parallels elsewhere in Europe he considered that it was fundamentally a form of fascism 
and needed to be understood as such.  In the Preface to  The New Order and the  French 
Economy he had already stated that as he saw it, 
 
fascism was no cancer in the body politic but a normal stage in the historical and economic 
development of Europe, and that it cannot be ultimately comprehended on a merely political 
level.  Its  form  of  economic  expression  and  its  form  of  political  expression  cannot  be 
meaningfully separated, the final end of both was the New Order.
86 
 
The reorganization of the European economy into the New Order, on which ultimate safety 
for the National Socialist revolution depended, could only be imposed through force. The 
purpose  of  war,  Milward  insisted,  and  the  purpose  of  the  Nazi  exploitation  of  European 
economies, was to fit them into the broader framework of the European economy based on 
fascist ideology. 
Alan Milward’s argument in The Fascist Economy in Norway is straightforward. Even 
though Norway may have seemed better suited on racial grounds to be incorporated into the 
Nazi New Order this was misleading. Because it was, ‘of all occupied economies, the most 
open and the most dependent on international factor mobility’ it was in fact ‘the least suited 
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to  incorporation  in  the  fascist  system.’
87  The  invasion  of  Norway  on  9  April  1940  was 
prompted by certain strategic needs, particularly to assure the inflow of iron-ore supplies 
from Sweden during the winter months and to prevent the Royal Navy from finding safe 
havens along the Norwegian coast.
88 But once the country had been occupied it had to be 
administered. The ultimate intention of German occupation policy was to exploit the country 
in Germany’s interests and at the same time to force, ‘in the name of the fascist revolution’, 
its future pattern of economic growth to fit the needs of the Grossraumwirtschaft.
89 This was 
also the intention of some fascist theorists, chief among them the Reichskommissar Josef 
Terboven, who tried to impose fascist ideology on the Norwegian economy and society. One 
original feature of Alan Milward’s book is the striking contrast between the theoretical place 
reserved for Norway in a future New European Order and the reality imposed by the needs of 
the war, particularly after 1941. 
The evidence which he put forward was to prove the far-reaching nature of German 
planning  for  the  economic  and  social  restructuring  of  the  Norwegian  economy.  The 
expansion of agriculture and fisheries and the development of Norway as a producer of raw 
materials and basic metals benefiting from cheap hydro-electricity were designed to retain 
population in the primary sector as well as provide food and crucial raw materials to the 
German  population  (and  the  European  population  in  the  longer  term).  This  was  to  be 
accomplished, if necessary, at the expense of industrial expansion. The overriding aim was 
for  Norway  to  become  a  primary  producer  with  its  industrial  development  wholly 
subordinated  to  German  needs.  It  is  within  this  framework  that  German  plans  for  the 
industrialization of Norway are presented in the book. According to Alan Milward, 
 
the evidence from German policy in Norway confirmed that the New Order was an attempt to 
force a particular philosophico-economic view of the world on to [Norway] as on to other 
European countries. That view of the world was anti-materialistic, antagonistic to economic 
growth, concerned with the creation of a society which would be stable enough to resist the 
hitherto relentless pressures of social change.
90 
  
He exposed the tensions between the interests of German businesses and those of the Nazi 
state and between German and Norwegian business interests. In line with his previous work 
on the German economy during the war and the occupation of France, he also showed that 
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whatever original plans the Nazis may have had in occupying Norway, they had to change 
them due to the circumstances of the war and the experience of occupation. In fact,  The 
Fascist Economy in Norway is ‘a close and detailed analysis of what the Germans planned 
and what they actually did with their Norwegian conquest after 1940.’
91 The revolutionary 
National  Socialists  in  the  spirit  of  the  New  Order  were  more  concerned  with  social 
engineering, with an emphasis on (the much idealized) Norwegian peasantry (and fishermen) 
and with a more limited emphasis on industrial expansion under German control. They soon 
met  with  insurmountable  obstacles  in  trying  to  retain  these  ideological  priorities.  As  in 
France, labor productivity was the main problem. In the case of Norway, the labor demands 
that  the  Wehrmacht  requested  for  communication  and  defense  construction  diverted 
manpower from the primary sector and provided little room for social experimentation. From 
the winter of 1941-1942, with the end of the Blitzkrieg strategy, as elsewhere in occupied 
Europe, the Germans gave priority to the needs of a war of attrition against the materially 
much stronger Allies. ‘[A]fter the collapse of such strategy’, as Alan Milward had already 
established in the case of France, ‘the New Order could only be built by mobilizing the 
occupied economies […] in such a way as to change the shape of the New Order itself.’
92 
The study of the Norwegian aluminum industry revealed the gap between Nazi plans 
and the political and economic conditions in Norway. In view of the need to develop and 
expand the German air force, immediate Nazi plans assigned to Norway an output target of 
250,000 tons of aluminum when its actual production had been no more than 31,000 tons in 
1939. The Nazi aim of making Norway a major European producer of aluminum was not 
shared by the German aluminum and other light metal firms who feared future Norwegian 
competition  in  view  of  the  size  of  the  planned  investment.  Nor  was  it  shared  by  the 
Wehrmacht, which wanted immediate results even at the cost of depriving the Luftwaffe of its 
increased supplies of Norwegian aluminum in the future, nor by the Norwegian government 
which had its own economic demands. 
It was the lack of attention which Alan Milward paid to the interests of the Norwegian 
firms  themselves  which  was  the  main  point  of  criticism  of  one  reviewer:  ‘[The  Fascist 
Economy in Norway] shows only the occupying power’s policy, not that of the occupied 
state.’
93 Certainly, if judging by its title some readers might have been disappointed by the 
relatively  short  analysis  of  the  Norwegian  corporate  state  and  business.  As  Helge  Pharo 
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commented, Alan Milward’s research on Norway ‘should be able to provide the starting point 
for further detailed studies of German economic policy in Norway, and also for studies of the 
Norwegian business relations with Germany during the war, a heretofore neglected field of 
research.’
94 Norwegian scholars have focused in particular on the expansion of Norwegian 
aluminum  production.
95  They  show  how  the  Norwegian  firms  themselves  welcomed  the 
opportunity to expand aluminum output. Using Norwegian records to which Alan Milward 
did not have access forty years ago, they can document the willingness of Norwegian firms to 
exploit the opportunity which the Nazi plans seemingly offered them, an opportunity which 
included protecting themselves against any future competition in the sector. 
 Ultimately,  as  Alan  Milward  showed,  the  Nazi  occupation  of  Norway  failed  since 
Norway  produced  few  commodities  that  were  of  value  to  Germany  and  had  been  too 
integrated  into  the  international  economy  to  survive  in  a  German-directed  European 
economy. He maintained that ‘[t]here were only two possible ways of carrying out such an 
enormous project as the aluminium plan. One was to do it with the full and free consent of 
the conquered territory, the other to do it by ruthless and total subjection of it.’
96 The peculiar 
situation of Norway, occupied but ruled by its own fascists who very much depended upon 
their German counterparts while at the same time disagreeing with them, allowed for neither 
option. 
Notwithstanding the failure of Nazi planning to make Norway contribute to German 
needs in the long term, it is evident that Norway had to pay a high price for meeting the 
German wartime needs in the short term:  
 
The German exploitation of occupied Norway, like that of occupied France, was successful to a 
degree  which  most  western  economists  would  have  denied  was  possible.  The  level  of 
exploitation in each case was very similar and in each case very high. The standard of living of 
the occupied country was drastically reduced and its resources, capital, land, and labour were all 
ruthlessly  diverted  to  German  use.  Seen  in  this  light,  German  policy  in  Norway  was  a 
remarkable example of how far such policies can be carried out.
97 
 
German plans for Norway’s future represented for Alan Milward the evidence which testified 
that the New Order was ‘more than windy rhetoric’.
98 The problem which he faced and for 
which he was criticized by reviewers was that because the New Order never became a reality 
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his research attributed to the German occupation policy a degree of rationality which was 
greater  than  seemed  to  be  merited  by  a  policy  characterized  by  local  improvisation.
99 
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the purpose that Nazi planners pursued in France and 
Norway, the conclusion of Alan Milward’s research into the occupation of Norway was that 
‘[t]here was very little in fascist economic policy in Norway which offered much chance of 
converting the population to support for the fascist regime’.
100 
At  the  time  economic  historians  showed  little  interest  in  the  issues  raised  by  Alan 
Milward’s work on the Nazi occupation policies. This may be due in part to the fact that it 
was  many  years  before  economic  historians  became  interested  in  the  study  of  war  at  all 
(abnormal periods of economic activity). Economic history as a discipline, beginning in the 
United States in the 1960s, was increasingly moving in the direction of cliometrics. With the 
expansion of what was then called the ‘New Economic History’, economic historians became 
increasingly interested in applying econometric techniques to the wealth of new economic 
data covering long time periods which was being generated. Their exclusive dependence on 
neoclassical economic theory to explain historical change left little room for the study of a 
period  in  recent  history  when  neoclassical  theory  was  of  little  use.
101  In  Britain  and 
continental  Europe  where  the  New  Economic  History  was  slower  to  develop,  historians 
focused on the politics of war and occupation but showed little appetite for following what 
was seen to be the politically dangerous path opened up by Alan Milward of assessing the 
occupation of Europe in the economic and ideological terms defined by the Nazis. 
 
 
5. The Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain (1970) 
 
Alan  Milward  started  his  career  as  an  economic  historian  in  Britain  at  a  time  when  the 
subject, along with all the social sciences, was expanding. In fact in the boom years of the 
1960s the British government decided to invest in building six new universities. It was in one 
of these new universities, the University of East Anglia (UEA) that he sought to advance his 
academic career. Within a few months of arriving in 1965, however, he received an invitation 
from  Stanford  University  to  spend  the  1966-1967  academic  year  in  the  Economics 
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Department there. On returning to UEA, he was happy to accept an offer from Stanford to 
become a tenured associate professor of economics starting in 1969. 
While he was at UEA and working on The New Order and the French Economy he 
received an invitation from his former colleague in Edinburgh University, Professor Michael 
W. Flinn, to write a pamphlet on the effects of the two world wars on the British economy. 
This was to be part of a new series which The Economic History Society was publishing to 
present the results of the ever-expanding research in the subject in an accessible form. The 
invitation provided Alan Milward with an opportunity to think about the impact of war from 
the perspective of a victor in both world wars. The short pamphlet, published in 1970 with the 
title The Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain, was the first time that he focused his 
writing  on  the  British  economy.
102  Despite  the  fact  that  the  aim  of  the  initiative  was  to 
provide ‘a balanced summary rather than an exposition of the author’s own viewpoint’, many 
of  the  issues  raised  in  this  short  pamphlet  (only  42  pages  long)  provide  us  with  an 
understanding  of  Alan  Milward’s  personal  approach  to  the  history  of  twentieth  century 
Europe: ‘What changes in the economy have historians and economists laid to the account of 
the two world wars? And what changes may justly so be laid?’
103  
With the argument that the system of state control or intervention in the economy in 
Britain had already been dealt with adequately for both wars, he was to focus on the long-
term changes produced by the two wars on Britain. This justification fitted well with his own 
interpretation that it was the long-term changes generated during the two wars which were the 
more significant. His conclusion was that the large scale transformations which the world 
wars  produced  on  Britain,  and  particularly  on  the  international  framework  in  which  the 
national economy was to operate after both wars, could not be properly assessed by focusing 
only on the ‘cost’ of war.  
The starting point of Alan Milward’s analysis was the liberal theory of war. To those 
who had read The German Economy at War and The New Order and the French Economy 
this  was  familiar  territory.  As  he  explained,  the  liberal  theory  of  war,  the  child  of  the 
Enlightenment, saw war as ‘an almost unmitigated disaster’ and as ‘a loss to the economy, of 
cash, of production, of capital and of people’ the consequences of which were not limited to 
the  duration  of  the  war  but  also  impacted  years  later  in  terms  of  depression  or  the  late 
adjustment  to  the  inflationary  tensions  inevitably  produced  by  war-time  financing,  as  in 
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1920.
104 That the theory was also seen to have a moral dimension was illustrated by him in 
quoting  the  budget  speech  made  by  the  then  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  William 
Gladstone, in the British House of Commons on the eve of the Crimean War: ‘The expenses 
of a war are the moral check which it has pleased the Almighty to impose upon the ambition 
and  the  lust  of  conquest  that  are  inherent  in  so  many  nations’.  This,  however,  as  Alan 
Milward with his customary irony pointed out, ‘did not absolve the public from the duty to 
suffer the same moral chastisement when resisting an aggressor.’
105 Leaving conventional 
morality aside, the challenge for those upholding the liberal theory of war was to measure the 
extent  of  the  loss  in  terms  of  output,  people,  cash,  and  capital  caused  by  the  war  and 
ultimately to make the vanquished pay for the cost of the war. 
The most difficult calculation for the cost of war was to fix a financial figure to the 
millions of people killed and maimed in war, in other words to the ‘human capital’ lost. This 
was a debate which after the Second World War, because of the holocaust of the Jews, could 
not  be  confined  within  the  boundaries  of  rational  accounting  since  it  turned  out  to  be 
considered,  essentially,  a  moral  dilemma.  How  could  anyone  dare,  Wieland  had  already 
asked  Milward,  to  measure  the  costs  of  the  war  in  terms  of  human  beings?
106  As  Alan 
Milward explained, it was a French actuary, Alfred Barriol, who, on the eve of the First 
World War, had devised a method of calculating the cost of war which came to be adopted in 
the final reckoning after that war. Barriol had quite dispassionately worked out the different 
value  of  a  dead  soldier  from  many  countries  basing  the  differences  on  the  cost  of  his 
education and training as well as his future productive capacity. ‘The differences in value’, 
Alan  Milward  explained,  ‘represent  roughly  the  differences  in  the  level  of  economic 
development of the countries concerned, the general conclusion being that the effect of war 
on a highly developed country such as Britain was likely to be much more serious than on an 
under-developed  country.’
107  Although  Barriol’s  methodology  was  adopted  after  the  First 
World War in Britain and elsewhere, it was found to be flawed in so far as it ignored the very 
wide differences in class which existed in the British armed forces and which made all the 
assumptions about average cost of education, training, life expectancy, future employment, 
and productive capacity quite suspect. Also, the wide changes in purchasing power and in the 
relative prices of the different currencies, apart from the very concept of ‘war expenditure’ in 
budgetary terms, made it very difficult to calculate the exact cost of a war. But it was not only 
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an academic problem since the demands for reparations from Germany after the First World 
War, which were to have such disastrous consequences for Germany  and the  rest of the 
world, rested on making just such a calculation. 
In Britain, it was not the total cost of the war but the differential impact of the wars on 
the British economy and society which, Alan Milward observed, was to dominate academic 
debate.
108 By measuring the impact of the wars on different industries and on different groups 
in society, war was not seen only as a loss but, in certain cases, as producing some gains: 
 
Indeed the events of the First World War, more than anything else, dealt a death-blow to the 
classical liberal tradition. The introduction of conscription, the full-time employment of a large 
part of the population that had not previously experienced regular employment, the beginnings 
of aerial bomb attacks on civilians, the Allied blockade and Germany’s unrestricted submarine 
warfare directly involved a far larger proportion of the population in the war than in other 
modern wars. In this light, the liberal interpretation seemed insufficiently comprehensive to 
explain satisfactorily the impact of war on the economy. War was not only a loss, it was also a 
force for change, change which in some cases might be construed as gain.
109 
 
He was to contrast how war was perceived and interpreted in Britain with the United States in 
this respect. Whereas in Britain, after the First World War, social scientists began to show a 
greater concern with groups and with society as a whole than with individuals, and social 
thought moved away from ‘mechanical accounting’ to ‘less strictly defined aspects of the 
human condition’, in the United States, the prevailing view as late as 1940 was to consider 
the main effect of war to be ‘its tendency to promote economic instability and to produce 
either a downturn in the trade cycle or a severe crisis outside the normal oscillations of that 
cycle.’
110 Some credit for the change in British perceptions of war was, he suggested, due to 
the careful statistical analysis of the economist Arthur L. Bowley whose work on the effects 
of the First World War ‘are a fine example of the superiority of research over opinion.’
111 It 
was this belief in the overwhelming value of research which underpinned Alan Milward’s 
unflagging commitment to it and his contempt for opinion which  was not backed up by 
research. Bowley was interested in measuring the effect of the First World War on income 
distribution and savings and identified three trends in particular: the tendency of the war to 
eliminate ‘remediable poverty’, to diminish ‘excessive wealth’, and to lead to ‘a more equal 
distribution of incomes’. ‘Wise words’, said Alan Milward, but he felt that  
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Bowley made little of one force which has since received much attention, which was certainly 
present during the First and Second World Wars, and which operated in such a way as to cause 
a permanent change in the structure of jobs within the factory and thus in the structure of the 
wage pattern. This force was the tendency of certain industries to move to a much higher level 
of productivity than in peacetime.
112 
 
Not only did the two wars stimulate scientific and technological discovery and lead to the 
development of new industries, such as the whole of the aircraft industry which had scarcely 
existed in 1914, but the pressure of producing on a much greater scale than in peacetime ‘led 
to  new  methods  of  doing  old  jobs,  new  methods  of  factory  layout,  new  methods  of 
management and more intensive mechanisation.’
113 It led to unskilled workers and women 
replacing skilled and semi-skilled workers. Women, he concluded, became a new industrial 
proletariat.
114 
If Alan Milward drew on the work of economists to measure changes in the British 
economy caused by the wars, he looked to sociologists, Stanislaw Andrzejewski and Richard 
M. Titmuss in particular, to explain the major changes in British society.
115 Here the debate 
focused on whether the two wars had drawn British society closer together, creating a new 
degree of social unity which found its expression in the establishment of the welfare state 
after the Second World War, or whether different groups participated in the war effort to 
varying degrees and therefore had different amounts of influence over policy after the war. 
Titmuss, for example, argued that the provision of social welfare for all, as opposed to the 
restriction  of  provision  to  specific  groups  such  as  widows  or  orphans,  was  a  direct 
consequence  of  both  the  greater  needs  of  the  state  in  the  Second  World  War  and  the 
democratic effect of war on society. If the population as a whole shared the war suffering – 
‘[t]he bomber did not discriminate’ among particular groups or classes –, the population as a 
whole should benefit after the war from a more democratic and cohesive society.
116 This was 
a view to which the social historian Arthur Marwick subscribed. For Marwick the two world 
wars had created greater homogeneity between social classes in Britain, a trend which was 
reinforced by technological developments in methods of communication, such as the motor 
car  and  public  broadcasting  in  the  interwar  period,  all  of  which  tended  to  draw  society 
together.
117 On the other hand Andrzejewski emphasized the differential impact of war on 
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society.  In  his  Military  Organisation  and  Society  he  developed  the  idea  of  a  ‘military 
participation ratio’ based on the theory that there was some specific connection between the 
number of people required to fight in a war and the degree of social welfare provided by the 
State.
118 
These  views  did  not  go  unopposed.  Philip  Abrams,  for  instance,  argued  that  the 
‘military participation ratio’ did not imply any automatism in social change: any social group 
involved in the war would have to make sure to force upon policy-makers its demands for 
change and reform.
119 In line with Abrams, Alan Milward’s own view was that certain groups 
whose services became much more important in war were able to use this opportunity to 
improve their position more rapidly than it had been improving in peacetime and to retain 
their advantages in the long run after the wars. The change in the position of the farming 
sector was one such example. In general he felt that both Titmuss and Marwick exaggerated 
the extent of social unity produced by the wars, citing as evidence the fact that ‘it was during, 
not after [the Second World War], that the practice of rearranging financial affairs so as to 
pay as little as possible of the tax burden developed on a large scale.’
120 
However what struck him most forcefully was that the social and economic effects of 
both wars on Britain were not very great, and were certainly not on the scale of the changes 
experienced in other European countries. Indeed he went even further and argued that it was 
only by recognizing the nature of the changes which the world wars had produced outside 
Britain that the impact of the wars on Britain could best be understood. The international 
indebtedness that Britain suffered as a consequence of the foreign loans which it received to 
finance  its  war  efforts  both  in  1914-1918  and  1939-1945  produced  more  far-reaching 
consequences than any of the internal changes that the world wars had produced on Britain. It 
changed the relationship between Britain and the rest of the  world, including the  United 
States and India, as much as it disrupted the central role played by Britain in the international 
economy since the mid-nineteenth century. The readiness to impose import-controls during 
the Second World War and, most particularly, to retain them long after the end of military 
hostilities ‘reflected as much as anything else the greatly changed position of Britain in the 
international economy’ that had occurred since 1914.
121 Perhaps the most drastic effect on 
Britain of the two world wars was that Britain changed from being a structural creditor on a 
vast scale to being a structural debtor on the same scale. ‘The consequences of Britain’s 
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international  indebtedness  were  much  more  far-reaching  than  those  of  the  domestic 
indebtedness which [some authors] bemoaned.’
122 In 1970, Alan Milward asked rhetorically:  
 
Were not the effects of the world wars on the international economy more serious for the British 
domestic economy than their effects on the purely domestic scene? There has been very little 
historical discussion of this question. The explanation might lie in the still rather parochial 
nature of economic history studies in this country, or in the fact that many of the contributions 
to the debate here considered have been made from the sidelines by scholars pursuing some 
other discipline. The unfortunate result is that this particular aspect can be treated only very 




The changes, outside Britain, which he considered to have been the most significant were 
that:  
 
[t]he world of the gold standard could never be restored after 1918. The immense distortion of 
currency relationships, of which the British inflation was but a pale reflection, the movement 
away  from  liberalism  in  international  trade  and  domestic  policy,  of  which  the  similar 
movement in Britain was also but a pale reflection, the creation of numerous small states with 
high tariffs, especially in Europe, all led to the emergence of a new and less satisfactory pattern 
of trade and an inadequate system of international economic arrangements. [...] The ultimate 
result  was  the  emergence  of  an  absolutely  anti-liberal  economic  creed  in  certain  trading 
countries, Fascism, which led them to accept the final and most drastic implications of the 
difficulties in international trade caused by the First World War and its economically disastrous 
peace treaties and to deny any relationship between economic growth and trade. The Second 
World War was a war against this particular political, social and economic ideology, and one of 
its major results was that the victors established a set of quasi-liberal international economic 
institutions whose purpose was to bring order out of the supposed international chaos of the
inter-war period by re-establishing an acceptable system of international trade and payments.          124 
 
It was an understanding of the changes to the international economy resulting from both 
world wars, but particularly the Second World War, which was to capture his intellectual 
energy for many years. But it was to share space with another line of enquiry: how to explain 
the  nature  and  causes  of  the  economic  development  experienced  by  most  continental 
European countries in the nineteenth century. Here again the influence of a former colleague 
from Edinburgh University, the economic historian S. Berrick Saul, is evident. 
 
6. An economic history of continental Europe 1780-1914 (1973-1977) 
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It was while they were both teaching economic history at Edinburgh University that Berrick 
Saul, as a professor, and Alan Milward, eleven years his junior as a lecturer, were quite 
independently disappointed with the available textbooks. At that time all the books written in 
English about the economic development of continental Europe in the nineteenth century, of 
which there were few, were based either implicitly or explicitly on a comparison with the 
experience of either Britain or the United States.
125 And all, whether they were based on neo-
classical  or  Marxist  theory,  saw  nineteenth-century  capitalist  development  as  a  global 
phenomenon. Skeptical of the explanatory value of emphasizing the similarities rather than 
the differences in the nature of economic development, Milward and Saul set out together to 
write a text book which would analyze the nature of the European experience by focusing on 
each individual economy.  
The result of their collaborative effort was the publication of two voluminous studies of 
the ‘long’ nineteenth-century development of the European economies.
126 The two volumes 
could and should be taken as a two-volume textbook on economic development in continental 
Europe  covering  the  period  from  1780  to  1914.  The  purpose  of  what  was  unanimously 
recognized  as  a  daunting  task  was  twofold:  firstly,  to  set  down  a  factual  account  of  the 
process of economic development in those economies, about which so little then was known, 
and secondly, on the basis of those facts, to see whether there were common economic and 
social  patterns  in  the  European  development  process.  It  was,  therefore,  not  until  the  last 
chapter of the second volume that they drew their general conclusions about the nature of 
growth and development. The fact that the second volume was published four years after the 
first (due to editorial problems linked to the actual size of what was expected to be a one-
volume  textbook  for  students)  meant  that  the  readers  of  the  first  volume,  The  Economic 
Development of Continental Europe 1780-1870, were obliged to draw their own conclusions. 
Indeed, as Professor Saul confirms, this was, exactly their intention. Although the book was 
written entirely for students, it was to reach wider audiences, which included economists and 
many future representatives of the New Economic History for whom an underlying theory 
was seen as essential for explaining the evidence drawn from history. Since Milward and 
Saul deliberately avoided any such theoretical statement, they were left open to the sort of 
criticism leveled by Douglass C. North, the Nobel Prize winning economist, who complained 
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about  ‘the  vast  sea  of  facts  and  figures  only  loosely  organized  in  [a  not]  explicit 
framework.’
127 
The explicit emphasis of their research was on the impact on European societies of the 
great  changes  taking  place  in  national  economies  throughout  the  nineteenth  century. 
Convinced  that  economic  development  constituted  ‘the  very  basis  of  change  in  modern 
society’,  they  set  out  to  measure  the  increase  in  the  factors  of  production  and  their 
deployment in a more productive way, which produced sustained increases in income, output, 
and welfare.
128 Subscribing to no particular model of economic development, they wrote 
 
[w]e have deliberately used no single model of analysis because it was obvious to us that the 
variety of experience was so vast that to attempt to place the process of European development 




The  existing  models  of  economic  development  –  such  as  those  of  Marx,  Lenin,  and 
particularly Rostow and Gerschenkron – were seen to be relevant but inadequate for the task 
to which they were committed. In their view, there was no model of European economic 
development in existence which actually matched the rich and varied reality of the European 
experience. What they concluded was that each country followed its own unique path to 
development  based  not  only  on  its  particular  endowment  of  natural  resources  but  more 
importantly  on  its  social  and  institutional  structures  which,  they  argued,  determined  a 
country’s degree of receptiveness to change, including technological change:  
 
It is indeed the basic tenet of our work that processes of development would vary more widely 
in  accordance  with national  historical  backgrounds than  with  anything  else. Countries  with 
different structures, in different geographical circumstances, with different timing of change, 
were bound to have different patterns of development. It is for this reason above all that we 
have  paid  scant  regard  to  the  thesis  of  the  so-called  globalité,  or  unity,  of  European 
development. The fact that natural resources such as coalfields and forests spanned political 
frontiers gave an international dimension to the growth experience, but the differences were far 
more important than the similarities. Indeed, it might well be argued that eighteenth-century 
society was more pan-European than it was in the nineteenth.
130 
 
In their view, the almost exclusive emphasis of many economic historians on the role of 
industrialization in economic development did not fully explain the major changes which had 
taken  place  in  European  economies  and  societies  as  a  whole  since  the  late  eighteenth 
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century.
131  Their  insistence  on  the  importance  of  understanding  the  social,  political,  and 
institutional  context  in which  economic  changes  were  taking  place  was  to  distance  them 
increasingly from the direction in which economic history as a discipline was moving from 
the  1960s  onwards.  Located  in  departments  of  economics  in  the  United  States,  the  New 
Economic  History  was  using  the  tools  and  techniques  of  economics  rather  than  those  of 
history to explain the past. For Milward and Saul, quantitative data should both illuminate 
and  be  explained  by  the  social,  political,  and  cultural  context  of  each  single  historical 
experience.  In  other  words,  as  Rostow  himself  expressed  it,  ‘the  authors  belong  to  [an] 
intellectual tradition […] which, while using quantitative data, emphasizes the uniqueness of 
the historical cases in their political, social, geographic, and institutional settings.’
132 
  In Alan Milward’s view data compilation and quantitative sophistication should not 
be a substitute for socio-political explanations but should be placed within the framework of 
such  explanations.  His  dissatisfaction  with  developments  in  the  discipline  of  economic 
history was already apparent while he was at Stanford University, which he shared with his 
co-author Saul who was visiting on a one-year Ford fellowship. As Alan Milward prepared to 
leave  Stanford  and  the  United  States  in  1971  to  fill  a  new  chair  in  European  Studies  at 
UMIST, he set out his views in a long letter to the Director of the Center for International 
Studies: 
 
At the present moment economic history in the United States is undergoing a minor resurgence 
in the form of ‘The New Economic History’. This essentially consists in applying econometric 
methods to historical problems. [...] Its proponents sometimes tend to claim that it supersedes 
previous methods of teaching and research (a rather unsatisfactory attitude for historians). This 
is not at all the case, it is simply one more valuable research weapon amongst many in the 
economic historian’s armory. Unfortunately it is a weapon which is particularly pleasing to 
departments  ‘training’  professional  economists.  The  development  of  the  ‘New  Economic 
History’ can only improve the quality of research in the subject. But if the object of teaching 
economic history is to broaden the knowledge and outlook of students (particularly students of 
economics who are in some ways dreadfully ignorant) ‘The New Economic History’, however 
pleasing it may be to economics departments, is not especially satisfactory. Similarly, if high 
quality  research  in  economic  history  is  to  be  produced  it  will  not  be  produced  by  a 
concentration on these ‘new’ methods alone, especially if the graduate students who undertake 
it have previously only had the very narrow education which economics graduates receive. [...] 
The  teaching  of  economic  history  is  bound  to  prosper  where  economists  become  more 
interested in problems of the real world rather than their own mental world.
133 
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Notwithstanding Milward’s own views about the New Economic History revolution, one of 
its protagonists – as co-editor with Douglass North of The Journal of Economic History in the 
early  1960s  and  future  president  of  both  The  Economic  History  Association  and  The 
Agricultural History Association in the 1970s –, Professor William N. Parker, saw great merit 
in the Milward-Saul enterprise: ‘Others have talked about comparative economic histories; 
they have written them. Others have promised to link the new income and output data to the 
literary accounts; they have provided the integration. […] Surely economic historians should 
not complain.’
134 This was no little compliment coming from one of the chief pioneers of the 
systematic use of quantitative data and statistical methods; Parker shared with Milward, and 
Saul a view of the purpose of the new quantitative approach in economic history.
135 
  The choice of the year 1780 as the starting point of Milward and Saul’s economic 
history may have been ‘an arbitrary one’, but it served to describe European society and its 
modes of production before the French revolution.
136 The first chapter of the eighteen-chapter 
two-volume work is an analysis of the kind of European society – the ancien régime or the 
old regime – that was about to be subject to a profound change due to the French Revolution. 
But 1780 was also considered at the time to be the starting-point for another revolutionary 
process, the Industrial Revolution, which marked a turning-point in European economic and 
social history. ‘The coincidence in time’ between the economic, social, and political changes 
spreading from both revolutionary events ‘finally persuaded’ them to begin their analysis on 
the eve of both.
137 
If their main objective was to explain the process of change, the distinctive feature of 
their interpretation was to stress that change was a gradual and not a sudden revolutionary 
process,  that  it  was  not  limited  to  one  sector  of  the  economy,  as  the  term  ‘industrial 
revolution’  used  to  describe  the  changes  taking  place  in  England  implied,  and  that  each 
country had to find its own path to change and development. What they concluded was that 
there  could  be  no  economic  development  without  a  prior  or  concurrent  change  in  the 
agricultural  sector,  however  slow,  and  conversely  that  ‘the  simple  pressure  of  industrial 
development was never of itself enough to force significant change upon agrarian society.’
138 
Their reduced emphasis on the industrial character of ‘industrial revolutions’, which they 
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compensated  for  with  a  greater  insistence  on  the  significance  of  growing  efficiency  in 
agriculture and service activity, was convincing to many scholars.
139 
Milward  and  Saul  saw  the  continental  ‘industrial  revolutions’  more  as  a  long-term 
process  of  change  toward  economic  activities  involving  higher  productivity  than  sudden, 
abrupt, revolutionary phenomena. The speed with which this new form of economic activity 
was established in different European countries was seen to depend on their ability to respond 
to the forces of change and their willingness to meet the associated social costs. Social rather 
than technological factors ultimately determined the rate of growth in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth  centuries.  The  scholarly  approach  of  Milward  and  Saul  owed  little  to  the 
entrepreneurial approach of Joseph Schumpeter: 
 
The  historical  evidence  presented  here  […]  strongly  suggests  that  in  explaining  European 
economic development much more emphasis should be given to the role of demand. The role of 
inventiveness and of the heroic entrepreneur […] was of little importance compared to the 
development of the market. […] [T]he evidence suggests that differences in demand were more 
important  in  determining  the  nature  and  the  complex  pattern  of  European  economic 
development than differences in supply.
140 
 
A second distinctive feature of their work was their interest in the interaction of politics with 
economics. As they wrote  
 
[i]t  is  often  argued  that  the  most  powerful  dissolvent  of  the  eighteenth-century  economic 
structure was the tremendous social change which accompanied industrialisation. [...] Such an 
argument would suggest that it was the events of the industrial revolution in Britain which 




Such an argument, they complained, represented ‘a dreadful simplification of history.’ Many 
countries  resisted  adopting  the  new  technologies  simply  because  ‘their  societies  were 
incapable of assimilating such changes.’ In their view ‘[a] much more powerful dissolvent of 
the society of the old régime was the series of political events in France between 1789 and 
1815, the French Revolution, the counter-revolution and the reign, both as king and emperor, 
of Napoleon Bonaparte.’ Even if the French Revolution ‘did nothing to change the economic 
base  of  society  […]  it did  create  a  society  in  which  such  economic  changes  were  much 
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easier.’
142 Milward and Saul show this in their detailed analysis of France, of those countries 
which shared the French experience of industrialization (Germany, Italy, and Switzerland), as 
well as of those which combined industrial change with the institutional changes brought 
about during their occupation in the Napoleonic era. But what they showed was that whatever 
changes Napoleon imposed on continental Europe they were reversed after 1815. This led 
them to the further conclusion that change could not be imposed upon countries from outside 
either through force or by applying foreign institutions, laws, or models. 
The ‘continental system’ erected in 1806, after Napoleon’s conquest of Prussia was 
meant to become a protective system for French industry which would encompass most of the 
continental European market. ‘It was partly an automatic response to the loss of the colonial 
trade in wartime,’ Milward and Saul wrote, ‘partly a policy of economic warfare against 
Britain and partly a plan for the development and encouragement of French industry. […] [I]t 
is fair to categorise it as an attempt to reserve the whole of Europe for French manufactured 
goods while using it as the prime source of supply of raw materials to France.’
143 In similar 
language to that used by Alan Milward when referring to the Grossraumwirtschaft basis of 
the New Order in his earlier work, they continued their analysis of the continental system by 
saying:  
 
Military  occupation  by  the  French  was  primarily  a  form  of  economic  exploitation  of  the 
occupied  territories  for  the  benefit  of  the  French  treasury.  The  ties  of  political  sympathy 
between the small groups of revolutionaries who created the Helvetic Republic in Switzerland 
and the Batavian Republic in the United Provinces and the revolutionaries in France did not 
long survive the reality of a military occupation of this kind.
144  
 
After  the  pan-European  changes  introduced  by  the  French  Revolution  and  Napoleon’s 
continental system, it was the national framework, with its highly individual political and 
social systems which, they argued, determined  the nature of economic development until 
1914.  Economic  development  was  determined  by  the  different  ways  in  which  factors  of 
production were combined in each country. Development was a national rather than a global 
phenomenon. Because Milward and Saul were arguing against an entrenched body of opinion 
which saw capitalism as a global phenomenon in the nineteenth century they needed to prove 
through detailed studies of almost every country in Europe that each country had followed its 
own path to economic development. This is the reason why the Milward-Saul volumes are a 
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collection  of  country  case  studies  which  if  they  reveal  some  features  common  to  most 
countries they are even more revealing of the significant differences. 
Milward and Saul’s economic history of continental Europe 1780-1914 was above all 
‘an able synthesis’ of the stock of knowledge that economic historians had generated at the 
time.
145 Although there were other compilations, the Milward-Saul volumes were regarded by 
many as particularly successful, not only for the superficial reason that the style was more 
uniform than in other multi-authored projects but also because they often brought a fresh 
interpretation  to  existing  knowledge.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  France,  they  rejected  the 
commonly-held  view  that  the  nineteenth-century  French  economy  was  in  some  sense 
backward. Indeed, they argued that from a strictly continental standpoint, by comparing the 
French economy with the rest of the continental economies rather than with Britain and the 
United States, France appeared as the largest and most dynamic economic power on the 
continent, at least, up to 1870: 
 
More than other developed economies France revealed by 1870 the relentless force of historical 
change in promoting economic development while showing, in spite of the Revolution, over 
how long a time that historical change must necessarily take place. It was both this process of 
historical change and the Revolution itself that caused French institutions to be so much copied 
abroad. Other developing countries felt they could cheat history, or perhaps omit some of it, by 
borrowing from a land where so much social and economic change had taken place. By lifting 
institutions from France and incorporating them in their own structures they tried forcibly to 
modernize their own societies and speed up their own histories. Such attempts were seldom 
successful because to produce such institutions France had had herself to undergo so violent and 
profound a revolution. The temptation was still very great and it makes the economic history of 
France an integral part of that of all other European lands.
146 
 
And Milward and Saul were determined to cover all these other European lands. Parker was 
impressed by the scale of the undertaking which  
 
travels  not  only  through  England’s  neighbours  and  trading  partners  on  the  Continent,  but 
through  every  country  from  Lapland  to  Sicily,  and  the  Bay  of  Biscay  to  the  Urals.  Only 
Portugal, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Montenegro and Turkey in Europe have been left untouched. 
And this was done by a pair of scholars, not in an edited and uneven multi-authored collection 
or in a huge foundation-supported series but in a single two-volume work of dimensions and 
price that permit use as a text.
147 
 
They paid particular attention to the Low Countries and the main Scandinavian countries 
demonstrating that in small countries small-scale production in both agriculture and industry 
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had the advantage of being able to adapt quickly to changes in the international economy so 
that  despite  the  differences  in  resource  endowment,  access  to  transport,  industrial  and 
agrarian history, or the natural size of its domestic market, any nation could find ‘something 
to do’ in terms of income growth.
148 In fact as Simon Kuznets calculated, the rate of growth 
of national income of these smaller nations – Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Saxony and Würtemburg and Baden in Germany – was between 
fifteen and twenty-five per cent per decade in the period 1850-1900.
149 
In an essay written in 1979 Alan Milward discussed the importance of change in the 
agricultural sector for economic development in nineteenth-century Europe.
150 But although 
he could see a general pattern emerging in which the primary sector was able to respond to 
stimuli from other sectors and then interact with other sectors in such a way that productivity 
levels were driven up, he was very reluctant to define it as a model for development which 
could be copied in less successful economies. Indeed, Iceland made the mistake of trying to 
follow the very successful example of Danish agricultural change in the nineteenth-century 
but found that the Danish model did not travel.
151 
In spite of their considerable evidence that there was not one common path to economic 
development  in  Europe  but  many  different  paths  the  critics  were  not  convinced.  Many 
scholars continued to insist that the central feature of modern European history was the unity 
of the experience in terms of the development of nationalism along with industrialization 
which  marked  Europe  out  from  the  rest  of  the  nineteenth  century  world,  more  than  its 
diversity. This was a view shared by the Marxist historian Eric J. Hobsbawm, who thought 
that ‘[p]erhaps there is more to be said for seeing capitalist development as a global process 
than this book allows.’
152 Nevertheless, Hobsbawm saw certain advantages in approaching 
the  subject  from  the  standpoint  adopted  by  Milward  and  Saul,  since  in  their  belief  that 
processes  of  development  varied  essentially  in  accordance  with  national  historical 
backgrounds, they could also stress ‘growing regional disparities within as well as between 
member states’. But for Hobsbawm the ‘compare and contrast’ method of Milward and Saul 
stopped them from seeking ‘general patterns of European or global economic change.’
153 
Striking the right balance between global, national, and regional approaches was as difficult 
then as it is today. Some, like Sidney Pollard, challenged the national approach arguing that 
                                                 
148 Parker (1991), 84. 
149 Kuznets (1965), table 2.5, as referred to in Parker (1991), 84. 
150 Milward (1979). 
151 Jónsson (1992). 
152 Hobsbawm (1978), 693. 
153 Hobsbawm (1978), 692 for both quotations.   43
economic development was a regional rather than a national process.
154 Milward and Saul 
agreed that regional inequality was a research question ‘of vital importance’ not only in the 
twentieth century, but also in the nineteenth century, when ‘examples of extreme regional 
inequality  […]  were  normal  rather  than  exceptional’;  but  they  argued  that  it  was  most 
probably  produced  by  a  pattern  of  national  economic  change  which  failed  ‘to  make 
substantial improvements in income in regions which remained essentially agricultural.’
155 
Thus in their view nation-states provided a better theoretical framework for historical analysis 
than regions. How, Milward asked years later, was a region to be defined? 
 
The  nation  defined  itself  in  history  as  the  social  unit  by  its  frontiers  with  their  attendant 
controls, by its government with its particular policies, and by collecting data relating to the 
territorial area defined by the frontiers. The collection or reconstruction of satisfactory regional 
data  relating  to  the  past  is  almost  impossible  and  for  both  the  past  and  the  present  the 
meaningfulness of such data is often questionable.
156 
 
If for most of the nineteenth century France represented a model for economic growth and 
modernization, however inappropriate that model was for other countries, ‘by 1914 Germany 
had  displaced  France  as  the  most  powerful  of  the  continental  economies’.
157  This  was 
certainly not without consequences for the entire continent: 
 
Seen in perspective the successful development of the German economy was the decisive phase 
in  the  development  of  the  continent.  By  its  geographical  situation,  by  its  close  economic 
connections with the neighbouring economies, by the relative unimportance until the last two 
decades  of  its  extra-European  connections,  Germany  was  the  most  European  of  the  major 
economies. The centre of the continent had now achieved the same level of development as the 
western periphery. What was more, by its size and power the German economy now dominated 
intra-European exchanges. The view was already widely held by liberal economists in Germany 
that the European economy would have to be dominated by the national German economy if the 
German economy was to find its own domestic equilibrium and that this would mean that a new 
European economic structure would have to evolve. Conservative and nationalist circles took 
the  view  that  this  ‘new  economic  order’  guaranteeing  Germany’s  economic  and  social 
equilibrium  would  have  to  be  created  by  force.  Few  believed  that the  future  nature of the 
German economy could now be determined without determining the nature of the economy of 
the whole continent. In our century this has proved to be so.  
It was not, however, only the fact that the development of the German economy demanded 
fundamental  political  and  economic  adjustments  by  the  other  European  powers  which 
commanded the interest of contemporaries and still commands the interest of historians and 
economists. It was also that the events in Germany seemed to indicate more clearly than those 
elsewhere what the future nature of European capitalist society would be. Whereas in the early 
nineteenth century economists, statesmen and social reformers in the less developed countries in 
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Europe sought for clues to the future of their own society by analyzing that of Britain and 
France,  by  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  this  interest  has  rightly  become  focused  on 
Germany […]. The locus of economic power and interest in Europe had shifted as decisively as 
it had during the sixteenth century.
158 
 
This was the beginning of the ‘German question’ which dominated twentieth century Europe 
and  beyond.  It  was  through  his  research  on  Germany  in  the  twentieth  century  that  Alan 
Milward was to develop his implicit theory of historical change. 
  The  pioneering  work  of  Milward  and  Saul  on  the  economic  development  of 
nineteenth-century Europe and their  fundamental thesis that there was not one pattern of 
development  but  patterns  of  development  was  to  stimulate  considerable  interest  among 
economic historians in the subject.
159 But it was not only  economic historians who were 
interested. When the theory of economic development became one of the primary spheres of 
interest for economists, an unusual dialogue between the two disciplines was generated. That 
such  a  dialogue  was  possible  was  explained  by  Kocka  and  Ránki  in  the  way  that  each 
discipline had changed in the postwar period: economics having ‘lost its image established in 
the nineteenth century as a purely abstract science, [while] history writing has changed its 
value system as well and moved slowly from ideographic descriptions to generalization and 
abstraction.’
160 Invited to comment on a set of articles on the character and role of theory in 
the research and writing of economic history, which had originally been presented as papers 
at the eighth international economic history congress in Budapest in 1982 (at which Alan 
Milward had also co-organized a session on agriculture and food supply during the Second 
World War), Milward remained critical of both disciplines:  
 
Any economic theory which is to be of general value in historical analysis must be dynamic. It 
must explain the process of change. Most economic theory does not. What is more, much 
economic  theory,  like  that  which  assumes  a  closed  economy,  as  well  as  a  large  part  of 
international trade theory, applies to situations so absolutely a-historical as to have virtually no 
value even as a methodological tool.
161 
 
It  was  clearly  the  task  of  economic  historians  to  explain  long-run  social  and  economic 
change. But here too he was critical of economic historians who used the logical propositions 
of neoclassical economics as a methodological tool for explaining the process of economic 
development.  In the final passages of The  Development of the Economies of Continental 
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Europe 1850-1914, which in fact was the concluding section of the Milward-Saul textbook 
on the economic history of continental Europe in 1780-1914, we read: 
 
The historical evidence […] suggests that there has been much too close an identification in 
European history between industrialisation, modernisation and economic development. At the 
heart of this misconception lies the idea of the ‘industrial revolution’, that the fundamental 
process of economic and social change in modern history is related to a cataclysmic change in 
the mode of industrial production. The greatness of Marx comes from the way in which he was 
able to elaborate the profound consequences of this change and in so doing develop a powerful 
analytical  tool  for  explaining  the  process  of  development  on  a  wide  but  unified  historical, 
political  and  economic  front.  But  subsequent  model  builders  have  been  unable  to  escape 
entirely from this view of economic development even when they have been mainly concerned 
to refute Marx’s conclusions.
162 
 
Within  this  category  of  ‘cataclysmic  change  theories’  which  he  rejected,  Alan  Milward 
referred not only to Marx but also to Rostow and Gerschenkron. His personal views on the 
matter had not changed ten years later: ‘Almost all the theories of historical change […] 
concentrated on a central transformational period in the history of the social unit in question, 
when  some  form  of  cataclysm  changed  irreversibly  its  economic  structure  and  social 
characteristics.’
163 All, he argued, failed to explain the process of historical change in many 
countries. Such a process, he maintained, was gradual rather than cataclysmic, depended on 
change in the agricultural rather than in the industrial sector as the motor for development, 
and  depended  on  central  government  action  to  remove  the  obstacles  to  change.
164  Alan 
Milward himself went on to consider other theories to explain economic change, considering 
the value of growth theory in particular: 
 
The  attraction  of  growth  theory  was  not  merely  that  it  set  aside  the  concept  of  a  central 
transformational experience and declared the whole time-span of historical change to be an 
equally interesting field for enquiry, but also that it allowed economic history, at least initially, 
to return to an explanatory base constructed by fitting together in different permutations the 
familiar ‘factors’ of neoclassical analysis.
165 
 
However without a very detailed historical analysis on a case-by-case basis he found growth 
theory unable to answer the most fundamental question of why factors were combined in such 
a way as to lead to economic growth. Indeed, he argued, had growth rates in the developed 
world not been so high in the 1950s and 1960s, growth theory would not have exerted the 
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influence  which  it  did.
166  How  should  economic  history  fill  the  theoretical  stagnation  in 
which it found itself, he asked. Rather than join ‘that avidly-conservative school, now coming 
into fashion again, which regards history as no more than a genteel, humanistic exercise 
which tells us something about some people and some events, but can tell us nothing about 
society as a whole’, he felt that perhaps almost any theory was better than none.
167 It is 
interesting in this respect to quote North’s views ten years after Alan Milward had published 
his criticisms of neoclassical and Marxist theories: 
 
Economic  history  is  about  the  performance  of  economies  through  time.  The  objective  of 
research in the field is not only to shed new light on the economic past but also to contribute to 
economic  theory  by  providing  an  analytical  framework  that  will  enable  us  to  understand 
economic  change.  A  theory  of  economic  dynamics  comparable  in  precision  to  general 
equilibrium theory would be the ideal tool of analysis. In the absence of such a theory we can 
describe  the  characteristics  of  past  economies,  examine  the  performance  of  economies  at 
various  times,  and  engage  in  comparative  static  analysis;  but  missing  is  an  analytical 
understanding of the way economies evolve through time. 
A theory of economic dynamics is also crucial for the field of economic development. There is 
no  mystery  why  the  field  of  economic  development  has  failed  to  develop  during  the  five 
decades since the end of the Second World War. Neoclassical theory is simply an inappropriate 
tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will induce development. It is concerned with the 
operation of markets, not with how markets develop. How can one prescribe policies when one 
doesn’t  understand  how  economies  develop?  The  very  methods  employed  by  neoclassical 
economists have dictated the subject matter and militated against such a development. That 
theory,  in  the  pristine  form  that  gave  it  mathematical  precision  and  elegance,  modeled  a 
frictionless and static world. When applied to economic history and development, it focused on 
technological  development  and  more  recently  human  capital  investment  but  ignored  the 
incentive structure embodied in institutions that determined the extent of societal investment in 
those factors. In the analysis of economic performance through time it contained two erroneous 
assumptions: first, that institutions do not matter and, second, that time does not matter. […]We 
do not have […] a theory [of economic dynamics comparable to general equilibrium theory].
168 
 
That  neo-classical  growth  theory  continues  to  retain  its  influence  in  the  absence  of  such 
theoretical  breakthrough  is  evidenced  in  the  multi-authored  2010  Cambridge  Economic 
History of Modern Europe, funded by the European Union, in which the economic growth of 
Europe in the nineteenth century is seen as  a  pan-European process, and not as separate 
national paths defined by different national institutions and different national histories. While 
the authors accept the Milward and Saul argument that growth was a gradual process rather 
than a cataclysmic one by explaining it in pan-European terms they fail to provide adequate 
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explanations for the continuing backwardness in the nineteenth century of some countries on 
the periphery of Europe, such as Portugal and Greece.
169 
 
7. War, Economy and Society (1977) 
 
It was an invitation from Germany, where his research was of most interest, to write an 
economic history of the Second World War as part of the series of books on the ‘History of 
the  World  Economy  in  the  Twentieth  Century’  under  the  overall  direction  of  Professor 
Wolfram Fisher, which gave Alan Milward an opportunity to return to the subject of the 
Second World War and to consider its role as an engine of change.
170 Originally published in 
German, War, Economy and Society was to be a reassessment of his own research on the war 
in Europe combined with the research of those who had worked on the war in the Pacific.
171 
No single scholar had dared to write an economic history of the Second World War from a 
global  perspective  before  and  no  scholar,  apart  from  György  Ránki  whose  book  was 
published posthumously in 1993, was to dare to do so again.
172 At forty years of age, with the 
right combination of ambition, knowledge, and youth, Milward rose to the challenge. 
In his preface, Alan Milward openly admitted to doubts that it was possible to write an 
economic history of the Second World War, partly because of how little was known of the 
economic history of the Soviet Union (in spite of 15,000 Russian volumes written on the 
Second World War) or indeed of Italy during the period. But, in attempting to write about the 
Second World War from the perspective of all participants, he was unrepentant in his focus 
on the economics of war: 
 
If there are any as infuriated as myself by the seemingly countless works on military history in 
which  armies  and  navies  come  and  go,  commanded  by  greater  or  lesser  figures  deciding 
momentous historical issues, and nothing is said of the real productive forces which alone give 
such events meaning or, indeed, make them possible, they will surely sympathize with my 
attempt to simplify by looking at the war as an economic event.
173 
 
It was in his writing about Germany, the occupation of Europe, war as strategy, its impact on 
labor  and  on  agriculture  that  he  was  most  authoritative.  In  many  other  areas  he  was 
constrained by the absence of data or of sufficient research done by others. As a reference 
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work Milward’s survey was intended to remain provisional until further specialized studies, 
particularly on Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union would provide reliable data on which to 
build  a  new  and  more  accurate  historical  narrative.  It  was  over  twenty  years  before  a 
complete  multi-authored  reassessment  of  the  wartime  economic  experiences  of  the  major 
powers directed by Mark Harrison was to appear.
174 
One of the central questions which Alan Milward raised in his book was whether the 
Second World War would lead to the disaster which was widely predicted by the western 
powers and involve ‘a heavy loss of human beings and capital, acute and prolonged inflation, 
profound social unrest, and almost insuperable problems, both domestic and international, of 
economic  readjustment  once  peace  was  restored’  or  whether  ‘it  lay  in  the  hands  of 
government  to  formulate  strategic  and  economic  policies  which  could  to  some  extent 
determine whether or not a war would be economically a cause of gain or loss.’
175 This was 
very much how Keynes had formulated the question in his 1940 publication How to Pay for 
the  War  in  which  he  wrote  that  a  properly  managed  war  economy  could  generate  much 
beneficial social change to counteract the unavoidable cruelties and miseries. Years later, 
Milward would explain:  
 
The Second World War became for Keynes one more historical accident which he sought to use 
to further his mission to rescue liberal capitalism. The insights into the relationship between war 
and social change which this way of thinking offered changed the historiography of war. Out 
went public finance, battles, and the accountancy of loss as the prime subjects of scholarly 
attention. In came production planning, technological innovation, improvements in the living 
standard of particular social groups, and growth accountancy.
176 
 
This was the approach used by Alan Milward in War, Economy and Society but his objective 
was not to ‘rescue liberal capitalism’ but to understand the more profound ways in which the 
lessons of the war had led to the replacement of liberal capitalism in Europe after the war. On 
the one hand, he dealt with the traditional economic analysis of war (its cost and overall 
burden for postwar recovery, as well as the technological spin-offs) and, on the other, he 
presented  the  innovative  and  creative  effects  of  war;  the  ‘positive’  economic  effects  –  a 
controversial terminology which he retained even though he had been criticized for using it in 
The Economic Effects of the World Wars on Britain. His primary concern was with war as an 
economic process, an engine for change and in some cases for progress, and a turning point in 
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the  economic  and  social  history  of  many  countries.  Given  the  frequency  of  war,  Alan 
Milward refused to see it as an abnormality.
177 
His  initial  view  of  the  German  war  economy  remained  unaltered  by  the  histories 
subsequently written by scholars in the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Soviet 
Union which saw fascism as ‘a stage of capitalism in decline, when it can survive only by a 
brutal and determined imperialism and through a monopolistic control over domestic and 
foreign  markets  by  the  bigger  capitalist  firms  backed  by  the  government.’
178  Indeed,  he 
reaffirmed his argument that the National Socialist movement was  
 
driving towards a different horizon from that of the business world, a horizon both more distant 
and more frightening. It was in some ways a movement of protest against modern economic 
development and became a centre of allegiance for all who were displaced and uprooted by the 
merciless and seemingly ungovernable swings of the German economy after 1918. National 
Socialism was as much a yearning for a stable utopia of the past as a close alliance between 
major capital interests and an authoritarian government.
179 
 
Nor was he convinced by Timothy W. Mason’s argument that Hitler was forced to go to war 
in  1939  in  order  to  solve  a  domestic  political  crisis  arising  from  the  squeeze  in  living 
standards due to the expenditure on armaments: 
 
[I]t is hard to make out a case that the Nazi economy was in a greater state of crisis in the 
autumn  of  1939  than  it  had  been  on  previous  occasions  particularly  in  1936.  Most  of  the 
problems  which  existed  in  1939  had  existed  from  the  moment  full  employment  had  been 




Building  on  his  rejection  of  both  the  Marxist  (orthodox  and  revisionist)  and  the  liberal 
theories of fascism, he developed his own understanding of the Second World War, seeing it 
as  a  policy  based  on  a  ‘strategic  synthesis’  of  each  country’s  vital  interests  and  which 
ultimately brought both losses and gains:  
 
The construction of a correct strategic plan requires a correct assessment of the potentiality of 
the economy for waging war. But warfare is not simply an economic event and a strategic plan 
is a synthesis of all other factors which it is necessary to take into account, political, military, 
social and psychological. The more factors which are correctly assessed the greater its chances 
of success. […] The economy does not in wartime function in the vacuum in which it often 
seems to be considered by economists and strategists alike. It functions in a complicated mesh 
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of social, military, political and psychological considerations which are as much and perhaps 
more constraining in wartime than in peacetime.
181 
 
He drew a distinction between an ‘economy’s absolute potential for warfare’ and ‘a more 
useful and operative’ concept (in most cases), whereby such potential ‘may be defined as the 
extent  to  which  economic  priorities  must  be  re-ordered  as  to  attain  the  desired  strategic 
objectives.’
182  Therefore  the  ‘correct  strategic  synthesis  will  be  that  which  only  makes 
exactly  those  demands  on  the  economy  which  are  sufficient  to  achieve  the  strategic 
purpose.’
183 Thus Germany’s drive to war in 1939 took account of the political and economic 
situation in which National Socialist Germany found itself. As Alan Milward summarized 
this situation, the First World War had shown that long wars were self defeating; thanks to 
the Treaty of Versailles Germany was surrounded by a ring of weaker powers, which in 
Hitler’s view included the Soviet Union, which could be broken either through force or the 
threat of force; too thorough a commitment of the economy to war would have reduced the 
diplomatic and strategic flexibility which Hitler needed; the Blitzkrieg strategy, by reducing 
the amount of administrative friction, suited the working methods of the National Socialist 
party very well; it suited the domestic political situation and social policies of the party in as 
much as it could not count on the support of a majority of the population and therefore had to 
win its allegiance through bringing an improvement in its living standards; and finally it 
corresponded to the economic realities of Germany’s position since the Treaty of Versailles. 
This economic reality, as he spelt out was that  
 
within its post-Versailles frontiers Germany was no longer economically a great power in the 
sense in which the United States was and had control over less raw materials and labour than in 
1914.  Coal  was  the  only  raw  material  essential  for  war  with  which  Germany  was  well-
endowed. She had no natural rubber and no oil supply. Her armaments industry depended on an 
extremely high annual quantity of imports of iron ore from Sweden. She had practically no 
domestic supply of non-ferrous metal ores such as chrome, nickel, tungsten, molybdenum and 
manganese, essential for the manufacture of armour plate. Copper and tin supplies depended on 
imports. Many of these vital imports came from outside Europe, and could not be provided 
within the German trading bloc. A strategy which implied a continued high level of imports of 
such materials had to be avoided. The Blitzkrieg strategy however could be based on stockpiles 
of raw materials adequate for a short campaign [...] Where stockpiling could not serve the 
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Thus, as Paul M. Hohenberg summarized it, ‘the Blitzkrieg made sense in the context of 
Germany’s position, and it led to certain economic choices regarding the development and 
production of armaments and other matters, from material supply to labor mobilization.’
185 
These sets of choices proved dysfunctional after the Blitzkrieg failed, but at that point, as 
Milward argued, no alternative strategy held much promise to the German cause in any event.  
Alan Milward then applied the same ‘strategic synthesis’ argument to the other powers, 
omitting France and the Soviet Union since no research had been done on their rearmament 
or strategic planning. Thus, he showed that British strategy was based on giving 
 
priority  to  the  production  of  the  most  technologically  sophisticated  and  the  most  costly  of 
available modern armaments, the larger planes and warships. [...] it was a decision taken with 
an awareness that the economic resources of Britain could not match those of the possible 
aggressors and that an adequate defensive strategy could only be sustained by capitalizing on 




But it was always assumed that Britain would be able to draw on the resources of the Empire 
and  the  Commonwealth  and  ultimately  ‘within  financial  and  legal  limits  the  economic 
resources of the United States could also be drawn on.’
187 As far as the United States’ own 
strategic thinking was concerned, he argued that  
 
from September 1940 onwards the United States was moving towards acceptance of a strategy 
in which, if she were involved in war, the war would be won through industrial production. The 
strategic assumption was that over a long period of time the United States must ultimately be 
victorious if war came to a battle of production, however that production was deployed. And 
there were powerful arguments for deploying American production in the hands of the Allies.
188 
 
The detailed consideration of the strategies which the major belligerents pursued (or sought 
to  pursue)  showed  ‘how  wide  the  number  of  effective  economic  strategies’  was.
189  The 
choice of economic strategy made in 1940 was to have far-reaching consequences for the 
postwar world: 
 
The great increases of production in the United States, the changes in the world trading system, 
the revival of trade and production in the underdeveloped world, the structural changes in the 
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European economies, did not have their origins in 1945 but in 1940. They were the result of the 
particular economic strategic choices made by the powers in the face of war.
 190 
 
The  conclusion  therefore  was  that  there  were  ‘no  economic  priorities  peculiar  to  a  “war 
economy”’.
191 The range of options was wide and governed by a multiplicity of factors, some 
internal, some external. ‘Nevertheless certain common economic problems did emerge’ quite 
irrespectively of the strategic synthesis adopted and it was to the role of each of these – 
production, bureaucratic direction and conduct of the economy, the economics of occupation, 
technology,  population  and  labor,  agriculture  and  food,  and  economic  warfare  –  that  he 
devoted specific chapters.  
In Alan Milward’s view the economic potential of the belligerents depended on output, 
and the battalions that counted most were those on the production line and in the fields. Total 
available resources came from domestic production and trade, or through the occupation and 
exploitation  of  conquered  land.  He  maintained  that  the  contribution  made  by  conquered 
European  countries  to  the  German  productive  effort  was  considerable.  Even  if  not  every 
conquered  territory  was  profitable  he  showed  that  ‘the  conquered  territories  as  a  whole 
were.’
192 Their value lay both in the cash which they transferred to Germany, as well as the 
production  of  strategic  materials  and  agricultural  output  which  they  were  able  to  offer. 
Ultimately,  though,  the  occupation  was  unsustainable  with  Nazi  Germany  collapsing 
economically before it was defeated militarily. 
If the National Socialist racial policies distinguished the Second World War from the 
First, making it very difficult to talk about any positive aspects of the war, he did nonetheless 
argue that the impact of the war on employment and on the movement and productivity of 
labor did have a positive dimension. As he showed, in all the western countries, the prewar 
unemployed were now employed ‘not short-term as in the First World War’ but in activities 
linked to ‘an economic change which would last for a quarter of a century.’
193 The United 
Kingdom, which was the only country where the government took full powers to conscript 
women,  was  also  the  country  in  which  women  accounted  for  the  largest  increase  in 
employment. This contrasted sharply with Germany where in spite of ‘the insatiable demand 
for  labour  [...]  the  social  ideas  of  the  National  Socialist  party  prevented  any  fuller 
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mobilization of women’.
194 Because of the Nazi attitude to women, Germany’s labor demand 
could be met only by the employment of foreigners: ‘The war began the influx of immigrant 
labour into the central manufacturing core of Europe which was also to be one of the most 
economically significant aspects of the post-war world.’
195 
Another  lasting  effect  of  the  wartime  production  effort  was  the  increase  in  the 
productivity of labor and capital but, as he showed, this was true only in those industries 
where ‘substantial technological and organizational changes could be made.’
196 It was only 
then that the benefits derived from investment in new plant, economies of scale, the exchange 
of information and the will to win the war were able to come into play. But in sectors such as 
coal-mining, where labor productivity levels had been in decline, ‘no amount of goodwill 
could improve the position.’
197 The shortage of labor, a fact of life everywhere apart from in 
the United States where it was not apparent until 1944, led to increases in overtime pay and 
thus  income,  to  a  greater  concern  for  pay  differentials  within  the  workplace,  but  more 
generally to important shifts in social aspirations and political opinions. All these changes, he 
maintained, ‘went far towards making the post-war economic world a very different one from 
that of the 1930s.’
198 
One unforeseen consequence of the increases in earned income was that demand for 
food increased. The two countries, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, which faced the 
greatest challenge in organizing food supplies to meet this demand during the war on account 
of their dependence on imports, achieved in his view the most remarkable success. British 
success, which lay in increasing the total net output of calories from British agriculture from 
14,700 million in 1938-1939 to 28,100 million in 1943-1944, whilst conserving shipping 
space, was due, as he demonstrated, to the conversion from livestock to arable farming and to 
the new support prices and firm markets guaranteed by the state both during and after the 
war.
199 The situation facing German agriculture was very different: 
 
The National Socialist party had inherited a situation in which German agriculture, which still 
employed 26 per cent of the labour force in 1939, closely approached the desired goal of self-
sufficiency. But the strategy of territorial expansion meant that this goal had to be achieved for 
a larger area of Europe. Planning was not on a national but on a continental scale and where 
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agricultural production did not suffice to meet the future needs of Greater Germany the solution 
was sought in a restructuring not of Germany’s but of Europe’s agriculture.
200 
 
The purpose of the bilateral trade agreements which Germany had signed with the countries 
of south-eastern Europe in the 1930s were the foundations for guaranteeing strategic safety 
for German food supply. But since the foundations of the Grossraumwirtschaft were to be 
built in Russia ‘[t]he stage was already set for a profound clash of political ideas about the 
nature  of  human  society  to  be  fought  out  in  terms  of  agricultural  policy  as  collective 
agriculture  came  into  collision  with  the  National  Socialist  idea  of  a  society  of  peasant 
freeholders.’
201 It was the impact of the war on agriculture just as much as on industry which 
meant that the Second World War was a force for change. The full importance of the changes 
in agriculture which stemmed from the war and which in the Second World War were very 
different from the First World War was a subject which he felt was often overlooked by 
historians. In western Europe farmers 
 
realized after 1942 that the new marketing and price structures [imposed by the Vichy regime] 
were  only  temporary  because  Germany  would  lose  the  war.  The  investment  climate  for 
European farmers was very poor. They were being asked to change their operations to meet 
what they perceived as only a temporary situation and patriotism combined with commercial 
wisdom to make them resist German pressures. Their reluctance to invest was greatly reinforced 




Therefore, Alan Milward concluded that, in spite of 
 
the inherent tendency of war to raise both the output and the productivity of agriculture, the 
complicated realities of the war reduced both. One result of the Second World War was to 
reduce the world’s total available food supply and make it difficult for world agriculture to 
regain  its  former  output  levels.  Of  the  main  outputs  of  agriculture  only  grains  were  still 
produced in quantities close to the pre-war levels. The devastation of battles, the deterioration 
of capital equipment, the loss of labour (for large numbers of former agricultural workers were 
either unable or did not choose to return to their previous employment), the loss of draught 
animals and the delays in retooling factories to produce agricultural machinery all played their 
part. And even in countries where output had gone up, a certain percentage of this rise had been 
due to a concentration on short-term gains which, because of soil exhaustion, could not be 
sustained in peacetime.  
As incomes improved and people’s expectations rose it became clear that the war had been the 
turning point between the apparent food surpluses of the 1930s and a new situation in which, in 
terms of human expectations, food shortage was to become a permanent feature of the post-war 
world.
203 
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The opportunity to debate the impact of the Second World War on the agricultural sector at 
the International Economic History conferences held in Edinburgh in 1978 and in Budapest 
four  years  later  led  to  a  highly  acclaimed  book  which  Alan  Milward  edited  with  Bernd 
Martin.
204 The first comparative study of its kind, it revealed the very different impact which 
the  war  had  on  agriculture  in  the  western  and  eastern  hemispheres,  but  also  the  great 
differences  between  western  and  eastern  Europe.  It  was  the  further  knowledge  about  the 
impact of the war on agriculture in western Europe which was of greatest interest to Alan 
Milward in his search to understand the changes brought about by the war. 
In  western  Europe  the  increase  in  the  demand  for  foodstuffs  put  an  end  to  the 
agricultural stagnation that had characterized the prewar period. The war increased farmers’ 
incomes in almost every country, gave birth to forms of public intervention that were on the 
whole  perceived  as  successful  and  thus  difficult  to  put  aside  when  hostilities  ended, 
undermined the social position of elites opposed to the modernization of the primary sector, 
and speeded up the rationalization of units of landholding. When in the immediate postwar 
years the demand for food remained high and world production levels stayed low, the role of 
food  producers  had  to  be  recognized  by  policy-makers.  In  the  six  years  that  it  took  for 
agriculture  in  western  Europe  to  regain  prewar  levels  of  output,  farming  producer 
organizations were able to exploit their power over governments and to define the terms for 
intervention in west European agriculture which were to last for many years. The Second 
World War, both Martin and Milward wrote in their preface, accelerated the ‘speed of social 
and political change in the agricultural sector’.
205 
If agriculture provided an example of how state intervention in the economy could have 
positive results Milward drew the more general conclusion that in an economic sense, ‘the 
legacy of the war was a consciousness that the economy could be directed into the desired 
channels, some knowledge of how to direct it, and the acquisition of a great store of facts 
about the economy’.
206 A subtle argument underlying his wide comparative view was that 
democracies might well be unprepared to wage war, but once they are at war they are much 
more successful in organizing themselves in order to win the war. Germany and Japan, ‘the 
two belligerents who decided to use war as an instrument of economic gain’, concluded Neal 
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after reading War, Economy and Society, ‘found that the same political forces that led to the 
decision for war also prevented the rational organization of their wartime economies.’
207 
 
It was not until the 1980s that Alan Milward’s understanding of German policy during the 
Second  World  War,  particularly  his  interpretation  of  the  Blitzkrieg  strategy,  came  under 
attack from  a new  generation of historians in  Germany  and Britain.  In Germany,  Ludolf 
Herbst, arguing from a political standpoint, claimed that the Blitzkrieg was the invention of 
historians  and  had  never  existed.
208  At  the  same  time,  in  Britain,  Richard  J.  Overy  was 
arguing that from an economics perspective 
 
the concept of Blitzkrieg economics […] in most respects […] does not fit with the actual facts 
of German economic life between 1936 and 1942 […] Hitler’s plans were large in scale, not 
limited, and were intended for a major war of conquest to be fought considerably later than 
1939. The fact that the large armament failed to materialize was not due to any Blitzkrieg 
conception, but to the fact that economic preparations were out of step with the course of 
foreign policy; a dislocation that was exacerbated after 1939 by a combination of poor planning, 
structural constraints, within German industry, and weaknesses in the process of constructing 
and communicating policy. The intention was large-scale mobilization. Hilter’s object, in the 
long run, was European conquest and world hegemony.
209 
 
Where Milward argued that Hitler chose to launch a war in 1939 because it fitted the strategic 
synthesis of Blitzkrieg, Overy denied that the Blitzkrieg as a strategy had ever existed; it had 
been invented a posteriori by historians.
210 Instead of a synthesis between economic and 
political objectives, Overy argued that there was in fact a disjuncture. The crux of the matter 
thus lay in the explanation of Alan Milward’s early-1942 turning point. According to Overy, 
the increase in arms production after 1942 was not due to any specific decision but to the 
natural maturity of the heavy investment in war-related industry since 1936. 
But Overy’s views failed to convince many historians. Harrison and Mark Roseman 
continued  to  accept  the  Blitzkrieg  thesis.
211  So  did  Marwick  and  Clive  Emsley,  while 
lamenting that ‘[l]ike most historians challenging an orthodoxy Overy does tend to make his 
target appear rather less substantial than it was: Alan Milward’s original research in this area 
was  both  pioneering  and  persuasive.’
212  Ránki  also  agreed  that  the  Blitzkrieg  strategy 
‘corresponded to the economic realities of Germany’s position. I regard this’, he wrote, ‘as 
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the most decisive point in the discussion.’
213 Ian Beckett considered that the Milward-Overy 
debate was unsettled.
214 As far as Alan Milward himself was concerned, Overy’s arguments 
could not be proven: ‘If, in order to give a definitive answer to this problem, we must know 
exactly what Hitler’s personal intentions were,’ he was to write in 1995, ‘then the debate will 
never end, for it is unlikely that we will discover much that is new.’
215 Indeed, in spite of the 
new research produced  after the publication of  War, Economy and Society 1935-1945 in 
1977, he did not feel the need to update the volume for its paperback editions in 1979, 1984, 
or 1987 (see Appendix Two of this volume) or, by the mid-1990s, to alter any of his main 
theses on the war economies.
216 At that time, Alan Milward concluded that greater accuracy 
in production indexes for the major combatants had permitted refined comparisons of their 
strategic choices leading to the minor change that  
 
the long-running historical argument over whether there was a sharp contrast in the period 
1938-42  between  Britain’s  commitment  to  total  war  and  Germany’s  avoidance  of  that 
commitment through the choice of a more flexible Blitzkrieg strategy ought properly to be 
limited to the years 1940-1.
217 
 
In  1998  Werner  Abelshauser  pronounced  that  both  Milward  and  Overy  were  wrong. 
Characterizing  Milward’s  Blitzkrieg  synthesis  as  a  ‘peacetime  economy  in  war’ 
(friedensähnlichen  Kriegswirtschaft,  a  term  coined  not  by  Milward  but  by  Speer’s  chief 
statistician, Rolf Wagenführ) was just as misleading, he said, as Overy’s ‘war economy in 
peacetime’.
218  The  National  Socialist  economic  system,  according  to  Abelshauser,  had 
elements  of  both  wartime  and  peacetime  economies.  The  war  economy  had  to  contain 
elements of a peacetime one in order to stabilize the political system, but they were not 
intentional. In fact, he argued, a decision for a war economy was taken early on but it was not 
implemented until 1942. ‘This explains’, he said, ‘for one thing, the “production miracle” 
under the auspices of Armaments Minister Albert Speer after 1942, which was made possible 
by stepping up the war economy.’
219 In 2001, Raymond E. Frank Jr., contrasting Milward’s 
and Overy’s theses, concluded that making sense of their conflicting views is ‘difficult for 
those less familiar with the subject’ since their ‘disagreements as to facts and differences of 
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interpretation’  remained  unsettled.
220  One  of  Alan  Milward’s  former  students,  J.  Adam 
Tooze,  who  had  written  his  doctoral  thesis  on  official  statistics  in  interwar  Germany, 
challenged  Abelshauser’s  conclusion  by  analyzing  the  economic  statistics  compiled  by 
Wagenführ, which Alan Milward in his 1964 EHR article had cautioned would probably have 
underestimated the scale of armaments production in the period 1938-1942 and overestimated 
them after that date. Tooze showed that his supervisor’s caution was justified and that the 
statistics grossly understated the level of armaments production in 1939 and the level of labor 
productivity  in  armaments-producing  industries.
221  Rejecting  the  argument  of  Overy  and 
Abelshauser that Hitler had not planned to go to war in 1939, Tooze, like Milward, argued 
that the decision to go to war in 1939 was planned. 
In the most recently published work on the topic which we have found, Jonas Scherner 
maintains that at least two questions, namely ‘How well was the German economy prepared 
to wage war at the end of the 1930s?’ and ‘How fast did it mobilize at the beginning of the 
1940s?’  remain  controversial.
222  Even  though  Scherner  questions  ‘the  older  Blitzkrieg 
account’, it is apparent that the new statistical evidence which he produces, which was not 
available to Alan Milward in the early 1960s, does not invalidate his conception that the 
economic policy designed in Germany in the 1930s was derived from the specific nature of 
the Nazi party and the German economy. The fact that the new statistical evidence proves 
that the investment boom beginning in 1936-1937 was higher than Alan Milward was able to 
acknowledge  at  his  time  of  writing  and  consequently  reduces  the  gap  between  the 
‘armaments miracle’ of 1942-1944 with respect to 1938-1939 production levels, confirms 
rather  than  questions  the  crux  of  Alan  Milward’s  argument  that,  however  extensive 
Germany’s preparations for war were in 1939, the intention of Hitler and the Nazi party 
leadership  was  not  to  increase  it  substantially  in  order  to  avoid  the  social  and  political 
disturbances that a total-war effort would have provoked.  
It seems that a basic disagreement between Alan Milward and other scholars revolves 
around  the  question  of  whether  rearmament  was  conceived  for  total  war.  Alan  Milward 
argued that the level of German rearmament reflected the structural limitations of the German 
economy and the political limitations of the Nazi state. By planning a series of wars which 
would expand the territorial base and provide new resources, Germany would not necessarily 
confront the combined might of the USSR, the United States, and the British Empire at the 
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same time. Where many see Nazi Germany as an evil power intent on provoking an irrational 
world war, Alan Milward described a strategy which in the ideological vision of National 
socialism was a comprehensible answer to the socio-economic problems facing Germany but 
one which turned out to be unworkable. The strategy which had led to German control over 
most of continental Europe by 1941 had to be changed in view of the unexpected resistance 
of the population of the USSR and the unexpected military power that the Soviet Union was 
able  to  generate  after  the  German  invasion.  Once  it  was  changed  it  lost  its  ‘strategic 
synthesis’ so that Nazi Germany collapsed economically before it was defeated militarily. 
These  differences  in  how  the  Second  World  War  was  interpreted  were  to  lead  to  very 
different interpretations of the postwar period as well. Those who argued that Nazi Germany 
had to be defeated militarily because it did not collapse economically were to argue that the 
postwar arrangements to integrate west Germany into Western Europe were primarily about 
security because the Nazi occupation of Europe had been an economic success. Germany 
could unite Europe by force unless it was prevented from doing so by integrating it into the 
institutional structure of a united Europe. Alan Milward argued that the Nazi occupation of 
Europe, while initially quite successful, had ultimately failed because the Nazi system was no 
more successful than the liberal system which it replaced in addressing the socio-economic 
problems of continental Europe. The lesson of the Second World War was that Germany 
could not unite Europe by force. 
 
Alan Milward concluded War, Economy and Society by arguing that the most serious legacy 
of the war, the one which made the problems of economic reconstruction ‘so difficult to solve 
in  spite  of  the  rapid  recovery  of  output  in  the  separate  national  economies’,  was  its 
‘redistributive effects […] not its “cost”’.
223 In the United States economic activity increased 
by  more  than  fifty  per  cent  between  1939  and  1945  (expressed  in  1939  values)  –  an 
unprecedented increase over so short a period of time – and consumption by twelve per cent, 
which  altogether  led  to  an  historically  high  standard  of  living.  That  country  suffered  no 
physical damage and the loss of life, while to be regretted, was comparatively low (around 
three  hundred  thousand  lives  as  opposed  to  over  twenty  million  in  the  Soviet  Union). 
Average levels of industrial productivity rose by twenty-five per cent due largely to the fact 
that factories were operating, for the first time since 1929, at full capacity. In the United 
Kingdom national income expanded by sixty-four per cent; in Germany it had expanded by 
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ten per cent until 1943 and then declined. It fell in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan. In full 
recognition of all the difficulties of defining  and then calculating that  part of production 
which was specifically for war purposes, Alan Milward suggested that in Britain and the 
United States it was between forty-five and fifty-five per cent, in Germany and the Soviet 
Union between sixty and seventy-five per cent, and in Japan between thirty-five and forty-
five per cent. Ultimately, the Allied victory was due to the fact that the Allies were able to 
produce more armaments than the Axis powers. This was achieved not through any major 
changes of political or economic power but simply by the modern bureaucratic state clearly 
defining its priorities and assuming sufficient controls over the domestic economy and over 
trade to achieve those priorities. The rapid transformation during the war of the economies of 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  showed  what  could  be  achieved  in  advanced 
economies over a short period of time. 
  But Allied victory was also due to the United States transferring to Britain and the 
Soviet Union, under lend-lease arrangements, armaments on a scale which was never fully 
admitted. It was the Allied counterpart to what Nazi Germany had forcibly extracted from its 
occupation of European countries. Even though Germany had benefited considerably from its 
occupation  of  western  European  countries,  particularly  from  France,  the  Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Belgium, its occupation of eastern European countries, which were to have 
provided  Nazi  Germany  with  its  Lebensraum  or  ‘living  space’,  had  not  been  beneficial 
economically. In some cases, most notably Greece, the cost to Germany of the occupation 
was greater than the benefit. Finally, it was due, as Alan Milward argued, to the Allies being 
able to mobilize their domestic populations by offering them the hope of a better world after 
the war, one of increased employment opportunities, higher living standards, and a system of 
social protection organized by the state in contrast to the racist and paternalistic family model 
of Nazi Germany. In both Britain and the United States, he said, ‘[p]eople’s new aspirations 
were built on nothing more than a job and more money, because for most people in both 
economies these had been the real economic changes in the war.’
224 Winning the allegiance 
of the population was of paramount importance. 
  Whether there was any automatic connection between the demands made by the state on 
its citizens during a war in which human resources were fully mobilized and social change 
after the war, Alan Milward was more cautious: 
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It  is  tempting  to  argue  that  the  consequences  of  ‘total  war’  must  always  be  to  produce  a 
significant volume of social change because the state must retain the allegiance of its citizens, 
and the greater the demands it makes on them the more they will seize the opportunity to make 
demands on it. But this process depends on the governmental arrangements and it would be 
nearer the truth merely to say that the economic, social and psychological experience of war 
produces a change in the climate of social consciousness. […] [S]ocial equality was now more 
widely accepted as a desirable end.
225 
 
For the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom fulfilling their domestic 
objectives in the postwar world was seen to depend on the reconstruction of an international 
economic system which would increase the level of world trade and, as Alan Milward said, 
avoid ‘[t]he self-adjusting mechanisms of the pre-1914 gold standard [which] had operated 
through  creating  periodic  deflation  and  unemployment.’
226  The  main  outlines  of  such  a 
system were finally agreed at an Allied conference which took place in Bretton Woods, a 
small town in New Hampshire, in July 1944. What was to become known as the ‘Bretton 
Woods system’ was an international exchange system which, like its two predecessors, the 
gold standard and the gold exchange standard, was based on the principle that currencies 
should be freely convertible into gold at a fixed rate of exchange. One innovation was that 
governments should have the facility to borrow over the short term from a newly created 
international  pool  of  currencies,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  which  would  in 
principle  mean  that  they  would  not  have  to  deflate  domestic  demand  or  devalue  their 
currency in the event of a deficit in their balance of payments. A second innovation was the 
creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) which had a 
double task, the immediate one of financing ‘reconstruction’ – without knowing exactly what 
that actually meant – and the longer term one of financing development projects in poor 
countries. Keynes, negotiating on behalf of the British government, had argued that, given the 
huge imbalances in the international economy caused by the war, in order for the system to 
work  as  intended  it  would  have  to  be  symmetrical,  requiring  corrective  action  by  both 
creditor and debtor countries, while providing funds on a sufficiently large scale to cover the 
needs of debtor countries without forcing them to deflate their economies. 
  Britain and the Soviet Union had both incurred considerable debts to the United States 
during  the  war,  under  lend-lease,  while  Britain  also  had  debts  with  the  countries  in  the 
sterling area. That countries incurring a structural surplus in their balance of payments should 
bear the same burden of adjustment in the international payments system as that traditionally 
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attributed to countries running a deficit would have meant in practice that the United States, 
expected  to  be  the  main  surplus  country  in  the  postwar  period  in  view  of  its  dominant 
economic position at the end of the war, would have to take measures to reduce its surplus, 
either through an expansion of imports or allowing discrimination against its exports, whilst 
being the main contributor to a large IMF. Harry Dexter White, negotiating the agreement on 
behalf  of  the  U.S.  government,  preferred  the  burden  of  adjustment  to  fall  on  the  deficit 
country, thereby necessitating a much smaller IMF. The largest obstacle to the operation of 
White’s system was the British Empire and the Commonwealth whose members conducted 
their trade in sterling,  which was not freely  convertible into gold or  dollars, and offered 
Britain preferential tariffs on trade. The whole thrust of the commercial policy of the United 
States had since 1936 been to reduce all forms of discrimination against U.S. exports of 
which Commonwealth preferences were the most objectionable.
 On the other hand, these 
preferences were seen to be critical to the British government not only to protect the British 
balance  of  payments  and  therefore  the  value  of  sterling  but  also  to  protect  its  domestic 
manufacturing industries from foreign competition. Keynes, as Alan Milward was to argue, 
defended  protectionism  for  both  reasons.
227  Unable  to  reach  agreement  over  the  issue  of 
Commonwealth preferences or sterling convertibility, the two issues were postponed in July 
1944 at the time of the Bretton Woods conference. All that Keynes would concede in the 
subsequent difficult negotiations with White to wind up lend-lease was that, in return for a 
postwar loan from the United States to the United Kingdom, the British government would 
make sterling convertible into dollars within one year. With no resolution of the issue of 
Commonwealth preferences the United States refused to ratify the terms of the International 
Trade Organization (ITO) in 1947. This meant that the liberalization of international trade, to 
which both governments were nominally committed, was left to be negotiated within the less 
binding framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 
 The Soviet Union chose not to ratify the Bretton Woods agreements in 1944. Victory in 
the  Second  World  War  was  interpreted  as  a  vindication  of  the  Soviet  Union’s  model  of 
economic  planning  and  autarky.  The  agreements  which  it  reached  during  the  wartime 
conferences at Yalta and Potsdam with the United States and the United Kingdom to settle 
the terms of the peace in Europe rapidly disintegrated in the growing hostility over many 
issues including the future of Germany. The U.S. government did not extend its lend-lease to 
the  Soviet  Union  into  a  postwar  loan.  Therefore,  by  1947  ‘[i]nstead  of  an  epoch  of 
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universally expanding trade what emerged […] was an epoch dominated by the two greatest 
military powers facing each other with an implacable economic and political hostility.’
228 If 
the Cold War marked the end of the wartime alliance between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the failure to restore the convertibility of sterling in July 1947 marked, as Alan 
Milward saw it, the end of the plans to create a multilateral order, based on a system of fixed 
exchange rates and progressive trade liberalization worldwide, on which depended the hopes 
of a new world based on full employment and greater social equality. 
  
8. The Reconstruction of Western Europe (1984) 
 
What was missing from the last chapter of War, Economy and Society was any mention of 
western continental Europe. This was itself a reflection of the two most important features of 
the  postwar  period,  firstly,  that  the  planning  for  the  postwar  international  economic 
settlement was a purely Anglo-American affair, and secondly, that the continental European 
countries were in a relatively weak political and economic position. But Alan Milward was 
already thinking about the postwar and the conflicting explanations for the unprecedented 
period of economic growth and prosperity enjoyed by Western Europe.
229 According to the 
prevailing  liberal  historiography,  at  the  end  of  the  conflict  a  short  restocking  boom  was 
followed by an economic recession, as had been the case after the First World War, from 
which Western Europe was saved by two separate but related initiatives: the idealistic offer of 
material assistance from the United States and the ideas of creating a federal Europe held by 
enlightened individuals in Europe. A combination of American and European idealism thus 
put Europe on a new path toward peace and prosperity based on liberal economic principles. 
Marxist  historiography,  following  the  official  analysis  offered  by  the  Soviet  Union’s 
leadership, saw the assistance program that the U.S. Secretary of State, General George C. 
Marshall, offered on 5 June 1947 and the creation of integrationist institutions in western 
Europe as the product of American imperialism in the context of its struggle against the 
Soviet  Union.  In  the  Stalinist  perspective  Marshall  aid  served  to  secure  markets  for  the 
United States and the survival of a reactionary capitalism which stifled the hopes for radical 
social and economic change after the war.
 The drive to create a federal Europe was thus 
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generally  seen  as  a  self-serving  initiative  of  the  United  States  designed  to  achieve  its 
economic and political objectives in Western Europe. 
  As  War,  Economy  and  Society  went  to  press  Alan  Milward  was  to  receive  another 
invitation  from  a  German  historian,  this  time  to  write  about  the  history  of  European 
integration. It came from Walter Lipgens, the first professor of modern European history at 
the EUI, the academic institution financed by the European Community and its member states 
to  provide  postgraduate  teaching  and  research  in  the  four  social  science  disciplines  of 
economics, history, law, and political science as they related to the European Community, 
which opened its doors to students in September 1976 in Fiesole (Florence).
230 A committed 
federalist and Catholic opponent of Nazi Germany, he had devoted his professional life to 
explaining that the roots of the European Community lay in the federalist thinking of the non-
communist resistance to Nazi Germany. By 1977 he had traced and documented the various 
strands of federalist thinking in the Resistance during the war and up to 1947.
231 It was in that 
year,  Lipgens suggested, that governments in both Europe and the  United States became 
interested for the first time in the idea of uniting Europe. To help him explain these changes 
at national governmental level, Lipgens invited a group of historians from all nine member 
states of the European Community (EC) to a meeting in Florence in March 1977 at which he 
proposed that they would collaborate with him in writing the next stage in the history of 
European integration. According to Professor Donald Cameron Watt from the LSE, who had 
been invited to the meeting along with Alan Milward, 
 
[Lipgens] demanded that all present subscribe to a collective declaration on the desirability and 
inevitability  of  the  establishment  of  a  federal  united  Europe.  The  British  representatives 
[Milward and Watt] […] resisted the idea as both inappropriate and limiting in that it would 
enable the inclusion or exclusion of themes, incidents, ideas and fields of study which were 
certainly germane to the study of European development, but which Professor Lipgens regarded 
as heretical. The declaration was in fact issued, but the dissenters were not excluded.
232 
 
Nonetheless,  Alan  Milward  accepted  the  invitation  and  chose  to  write  the  history  of  the 
response of European governments to the offer of Marshall aid in 1947, which was to form 
part of his next book about the history of the postwar European economic boom.
233 The one 
condition  nominally  attached  to  Marshall’s  offer  of  aid  was  that  the  European  recipients 
would cooperate with each other to produce a coordinated response which, by breaking down 
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national barriers, would lay the basis for them to establish a United States of Europe, along 
federal lines. Alan Milward’s approach, as it had been throughout all his earlier writing, was 
to  base  his  research  on  the  recently  opened  government  archives  in  multiple  countries, 
including  the  United  States,  as  well  as  on  the  statistical  economic  record.  He  set  out  to 
understand  each  country’s  position  in  terms  of  its  own  history,  emphasizing  national 
differences rather than seeing all countries as part of a global system, indistinguishable one 
from  another.  Although  he  no  longer  used  the  term  ‘strategic  synthesis’  to  explain 
government policy this was in fact how he continued to analyze policy – as a synthesis of 
domestic economic objectives and foreign policy, the means by which national governments 
tried to achieve domestic objectives within an increasingly interdependent world. 
  Alan Milward’s understanding was that Marshall’s offer was motivated by politics and 
not economics; that it was a product of the Cold War and not of a much longer lineage. The 
Marshall plan was ‘in the first place a practical response to Washington’s perception of the 
danger to its own strategic interests, whatever genuine chords of idealism it might cause to 
vibrate  in  America  and  Europe.’
234  That  its  motivation  was  primarily  political  and  not 
economic was because, as Alan Milward was to argue later, not only was there no economic 
crisis or depression in western Europe in 1947 but it was questionable whether the European 
Recovery Program (ERP, the official name of the Marshall plan), met the wider needs of the 
U.S. economy. The challenge facing U.S. policy makers was how to reconcile the strategic 
objectives  of  ensuring  that  western  Europe,  including  the  western  zones  of  Germany, 
remained under the influence of the United States rather than falling within the Soviet sphere, 
with  the  economic  objectives  of  a  multilateral  international  system  as  set  out  at  Bretton 
Woods in 1944: 
 
[T]he  extraordinary  growth  of  output  and  exports  during  the  war  in  the  United  States  had 
convinced American governments that a thriving post-war world and a prosperous America’s 
place in that world depended on the creation of an efficient multilateral trade and payments 
system in which the international debts and surpluses of countries could be offset against each 
other in a comprehensive world balance, much as they had been before 1914. Such a system 
would alone permit American foreign trade and domestic output to exist at the new, much 
higher levels they must maintain in order to support the prosperity which the war had brought. 
As  the  plans  for  a  peaceful  post-war  world  order  collapsed,  these  ideas  were  still  seen  as 
fundamental to a prosperous Western bloc.
235 
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Whether Marshall aid would lead to the coming into force of the Bretton Woods system and 
to that comprehensive world balance, he very much doubted. This was because by focusing 
exclusively  on  the  western  bloc  the  U.S.  government  had  undermined  the  possibility  of 
reestablishing a dynamic and balanced world economy as it had existed before 1914. This 
issue of whether Marshall aid was a step toward the multilateral system of Bretton Woods, as 
the majority of historians and economists maintained, or a step toward quite a different world, 
as Alan Milward argued, continues to be disputed. It was his view that the U.S. goal of using 
Marshall aid to enable Western Europe to reach an equilibrium in their trade and payments 
with the dollar area within four to five years, when Western Europe’s deficit with the United 
States represented only half of the world’s dollar shortage, was losing sight of the true causes 
of  the  fundamental  structural  imbalance  in  the  international  economy  of  which  Europe’s 
dollar shortage was a mere reflection. Recycling dollars through Marshall aid was, first and 
foremost, an acknowledgement of the global dollar shortage but was an insufficient response 
to  the  problem.  The  United  Kingdom,  the  only  economy  in  Europe  which  carried  out 
considerably more of its trade with the rest of the world than within Europe, was particularly 
aware  of  the  global  nature  of  the  problem.  The  U.S.  attack  on  imperial  preferences  and 
Washington’s refusal  at the same time to reduce its own tariff levels, combined with its 
willingness to construct a purely Western-European bloc for strategic reasons, did not offer 
the United Kingdom much relief to its financial difficulties.  
  The new strategy of the United States represented by Marshall’s offer posed a different 
set of problems for France. The plan to replace the original Potsdam agreements on the level 
of  industry  in  Germany  –  which  the  French  government  considered  to  be  its  ‘level  of 
security’  –  with  a  higher  level  of  industrial  output  in  specific  sectors  in  the  Bizone  and 
ultimately to incorporate ‘western Germany’ into an integrated Western Europe, was already 
clear  by  the  time  of  Marshall’s  speech.  The  French  government  saw  as  its  main  task, 
according to Alan Milward, to oppose and delay the process as much as possible while at the 
same time working toward defining the conditions and terms of a possible solution to what 
was referred to as the German question. This was to enable it to accommodate the many 
interests involved while defending France’s fundamental security interests in both economic 
and defense terms. The response of the French and British governments to Marshall’s offer 
was to take joint control over the European organization created under American pressure to 
coordinate the European response. Both governments were determined to lead the recovery of 
Western  Europe  but  according  to  their  own  broad  interests  rather  than  concede  to  U.S. 
pressure to unify Western Europe. Alan Milward’s careful archival reconstruction led him to   67
conclude  that  ‘before  the  [Paris]  conference  began  the  stage  was  set  for  a  fundamental 
opposition between the far-reaching hopes of the United States and the machinery of the 
conference [on European Economic Cooperation], which had been designed to thwart these 
ambitions.’
236 The significance of the Paris conference was that ‘[f]or the first time questions 
about the reconstruction of Europe were to be handled outside the framework of the great-
power conferences.’
237 Furthermore, for the first time the United States was to listen to the 
views not only of the British and French governments but of all the European governments 
that had accepted the offer of aid. It was, he argued, the belated recognition that different 
countries had different interests which meant that ‘[f]rom the moment the conference met 
there began a learning process in Washington which was to forge a more realistic set of 
political aspirations there.’
238 As he explained: 
 
When sixteen countries ultimately sent delegations to Paris on 12 July [1947] for the conference 
which took to itself the name Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), their 
heterogeneity must surely have impressed at least as much as the similarities in their position. 
Five had colonial empires, two had less than one million inhabitants, two had important armies, 
one was occupied by two of the others, and two had been neutral powers for more than a 
century. Two  had  per  capita  national incomes  clearly  exceeded  only  by  that of the  United 
States, four were still underdeveloped economies. Some had based their recovery on planning 
and  stringent  controls,  others  had  been  ardent  advocates  of  decontrol  and  a  laissez-faire 
economy. Some had a world-wide pattern of trade and investment, for others their international 
economic connections were overwhelmingly with the European Continent. The one country 
[Germany] whose affairs had more than any other been responsible for the conference was not 
represented there at all.
239 
 
Without attending the Paris conference, Germany occupied the center of the stage. France, 
which had not been invited to either the Yalta or the Potsdam conferences, left no one in any 
doubt that  
 
any settlement in Germany had to be by agreement with France, and any progress towards a 
joint European agreement on the use of American aid in reconstruction had to depend on the 
settlement in Germany. […] The Franco-German problem at last occupied the centre of the 
stage; European integration would only become a part of the play in so far as it was related to 
solving the dilemma of the main actors and the main plot.
240  
 
The differences over what should happen to Germany divided western European countries 
just as much as it divided the four powers occupying Germany. As Alan Milward went on to 
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explain, the exclusion from all decision-making about Germany was resented by many of the 
small western European countries. The Benelux countries wanted a rapid increase in German 
output and  
 
the Italian delegate supported the Benelux position on the grounds that Germany was the major 
market for Italian exports as for Benelux exports. Even the Norwegian representative, while 
insisting  on  restrictions  being  maintained  on  those  areas  which  competed  directly  with 
Norwegian interests – fishing, whaling, shipping, and shipbuilding – spoke in favour of an 




Since  it  was  clearly  isolated,  all  the  French  government  could  do  was  to  insist  that  any 
recovery of German output must not endanger French security. The crux of the problem lay 
in  how  Germany’s  industrial  heartland  in  the  Ruhr  would  be  controlled.  Alan  Milward 
summed up the three possibilities for control which were discussed in mid-1947: 
 
Would it be an international board with direct management powers in the works themselves, or 
a  remote  international  control  board  with  few  direct  executive  powers?  There  was  a  third 
possibility  which  briefly  emerged  in  these  talks  and  which  was  eventually  to  provide  the 
solution after three more years of dispute, viz. an internationally supervised cartel which would 
include the French and Benelux firms.
242 
 
This was his first reference to the origins of the French plan which would eventually lead to 
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), although it was an 
interpretation which he was to modify subsequently in the light of further research. What he 
did not find in any of the debates within European bureaucracies and governments, between 
them and the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) – the body set up by the U.S. to 
oversee  the  implementation  of  the  Marshall  plan  –,  within  the  CEEC  and  its  permanent 
successor, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was any evidence 
that political movements in favor of European unity had anything other than an insignificant 
impact  on  international  political  and  economic  agreements.  Those  gatherings  of  officials 
acting on behalf of the governments were not building a unified Europe but solving what they 
perceived as being their most immediate problems. Furthermore, the evidence which he had 
been able to gather while collaborating with Lipgens showed that the ‘committee system’ as 
conceived  and  agreed  upon  by  the  British  and  French  when  they  set  up  the  CEEC,  was 
designed to split the main issues into technical details, each one of which would be dealt with 
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by separate teams of experts so that ‘[w]ider questions of European unity would be entirely 
out of place’.
243 Participants in the technical committees, as some federalists argued at the 
time, by working together in such enterprises  
 
acquired a wider comprehension of the common nature of European economic problems and 
even developed not only a certain feeling of affinity with each other, but also a degree of 
solidarity against their own national governments at moments when these governments did not 
show the same comprehension.
244 
 
The problem as Alan Milward noted, was that these participants had little power or direct 
influence over their governments. With the exception of the Italian representative, the other 
governments  appointed  as  their  representatives  ‘senior  civil  servants  who  were  already 
closely involved in the formulation of national reconstruction policy, but who remained only 
the executants and advisers of their ministers.’
245 
  Ultimately, Alan Milward’s research method and findings were so much at odds with 
those of Lipgens that he did not contribute to Lipgens’ further publications (Documents on 
the history of European integration). Whereas Lipgens saw weak states whose hold on power 
was to be weakened still further, Milward saw many discredited states in western Europe, 
apart from the British, determined to rebuild their strength and legitimacy by extending their 
control  over  the  economy.
246  In  spite  of  their  differences,  Wilfried  Loth  maintains  that 
Lipgens and Milward shared a number of assumptions about the nature of the nation-state in 
postwar Europe.
247 While Alan Milward did not reject the evidence of federalist thinking 
which Lipgens produced, he was more interested in understanding its significance for the 
course of postwar European history. What he wanted to know was  
 
through what political mechanism the idealisms which supported western European integration 
actually influenced governmental policy-making in the nation states, unless it be through the 
vague suggestion that men like Adenauer, Schuman, Sforza, and Spaak, who themselves shared 
these enthusiasms, were able to override the massed cohorts of government and bureaucracy 
whose task it was and is to define and uphold the national interest before all else.
248 
 
Skeptical of the role played by the Resistance in helping to defeat Nazi Germany during the 
war, he was equally skeptical that the federalist ideas held by the Resistance groups had had 
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anything more than a marginal impact on government policy in western Europe after the war. 
The emphasis placed by Lipgens and others on the role of the resistance, in his view, 
 
strengthened the pervasive political myths in some countries, especially France and Italy, that 
moral and physical resistance to Nazi Germany had laid a new moral foundation for post-war 
republican  governments  and  thus  given  them  a  particular  political  legitimation.  […]  The 
inability to demonstrate that political movements in favour of European unity had anything 
other than an insignificant impact on international political and economic agreements leads, 




Not only did Alan Milward reject Lipgens’s argument that it was the ideas discussed by 
federalist individuals and groups active in wartime resistance which explained the creation of 
supranational  institutions  in  western  Europe  after  the  Second  World  War  but  he  also 
questioned the central role attributed to the United States, firstly, in saving Western Europe 
from  economic  collapse  in  1947,  and  secondly,  in  providing  vital  support  for  European 
integration. The conclusion of the first documented history of the Marshall plan written by 
Immanuel Wexler and based entirely on U.S. sources was that the Marshall plan was ‘one of 
the great economic success stories of modern time’.
250 Milward disagreed completely and 
instead  of  writing  his  next  book  about  the  great  European  economic  boom  he  focused 
exclusively on the period of the Marshall plan.
251 
 
As he announced boldly in the opening chapter of The Reconstruction of Western Europe 
1945-51,  Marshall  aid  did  not  rescue  Western  Europe  from  an  economic  crisis  in  1947 
because Western Europe was not experiencing an economic crisis at the time. Making the 
distinction between an economic crisis and a payments crisis, he explained that what Western 
Europe  was  experiencing  in  1947  was  a  temporary  payments  crisis  for  four  interrelated 
reasons. The first was the fact that the dollar, as the only currency which was convertible into 
gold at a fixed price at that time, was in great demand; the second was the surge in imports of 
investment goods to western Europe from the United States in the first half of 1947; the third 
was that since the traditional supplier of such goods, Germany, was operating at very low 
levels of economic activity (not because of wartime damage but due to the restrictions placed 
by the Allies on its industrial output), those investment goods had to come from the United 
States; while the fourth was that in the absence of a functioning international system of trade 
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and payments European countries had no means of earning in third  countries the dollars 
necessary  to  pay  for  imports  from  the  United  States.  The  payments  crisis  was  therefore 
caused by the strength and vigor of the recovery of European economies and was not an 
indication that they were on the verge of collapse. 
  Since  European  reconstruction  plans  had  not  been  conceived  simply  in  terms  of 
recovery from the war and occupation but as ambitious programs of industrial modernization 
able to sustain the new social obligations for full employment and comprehensive welfare 
programs, the western European states continued to encourage imported capital goods even 
after prewar levels of production had been reached. By the end of 1947, the whole of Western 
Europe, except for Austria and Germany, had completed their recovery in terms of reaching 
prewar output levels. In view of such an achievement, it was wrong, Alan Milward argued, to 
describe  as  an  economic  crisis  a  time  when,  in  every  West  European  country  except 
Germany, investment was higher absolutely and as a ratio of GNP than in any year since 
1919, and when production was rising more rapidly everywhere than it had for twenty years. 
The so-called 1947 crisis was limited to the temporary difficulty of paying for dollar imports 
caused  by  the  vigor  of  the  economic  recovery  rather  than  by  any  fall  in  production  and 
consumption levels. ‘It was the success and vigour of the European recovery, not its incipient 
failure’ which had caused a payments problem with the United States.
252 There was thus no 
economic need for western European economies to be rescued by the United States. 
  While Marshall aid allowed the recovery to be continued it was not, he insisted, the 
primary cause of the strength of the European economic recovery which had begun in 1945, 
well before Marshall’s offer of June 1947, and well before the arrival of dollar aid. Had the 
United States not supplied dollars through Marshall aid he calculated that it would only have 
been in France and the Netherlands that recovery would have been slowed down at least until 
west Germany resumed its role as a supplier of capital goods to western Europe. But, he 
insisted, France would not have collapsed economically had there been no Marshall aid, since 
over the whole ERP period France spent a larger proportion of Marshall aid on importing 
machinery and vehicles than any other recipient, while going to great lengths to switch its 
food imports to the franc zone. The main contribution of Marshall aid was to pay for those 
imports  necessary  for  industrial  modernization  rather  than  for  staving  off  hunger,  social 
revolt, and political collapse. ‘Indeed’, as one reviewer of The Reconstruction of Western 
Europe asserted, ‘Milward contends that if sheer economic recovery from the war had been 
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the only issue, most European countries could have done without Marshall Plan assistance as 
early as 1948.’
253 
  Where  his  critics  argued  that  in  the  absence  of  Marshall  aid  western  European 
governments would have had to deflate the level of economic activity which, in the tense 
political climate of the Cold War, would have caused coalition governments to collapse, Alan 
Milward argued that not only was there no evidence that any government apart from that of 
Italy was prepared to deflate but more importantly they did not need to do so. It was the 
governments of the United States and the Soviet Union which, each for their own political 
reasons,  wanted  to  present  the  countries  in  western  Europe  as  being  on  the  verge  of  an 
economic crisis. It was important in the United States in order to win Congressional approval 
for  a  program  of  assistance  to  Europe  while  it  was  important  for  the  Soviet  Union  to 
encourage trade union opposition to the Marshall plan.
254 
  As Alan Milward maintained, the reason that no European government was prepared to 
deflate the level of economic activity in response to the payments crisis in 1947, as they 
would have done at any time before the Second World War, was because the balance of 
political power within western European states had changed after 1945.
 The effects of the 
Second  World  War  in  political  terms  were  the  most  important  factor  in  determining  the 
nature of the postwar economic recovery. The shift in political power was due to the fact that 
the restored national governments in western Europe – most of them multiple-party coalitions 
– needed to regain the political legitimacy which states had lost in 1940 or even earlier. What 
the speed of the capitulation to Nazi Germany demonstrated was how little allegiance many 
people in western Europe owed to their own liberal regimes. He saw this as the result of the 
failure of the liberal state in the 1930s to address the problems of unemployment and falling 
living standards. If the western European states were to restore their credibility after the war, 
they had to do more to regain the confidence of voters. This meant taking control of the 
economy,  administering  trade  and  capital  movements,  offering  agricultural  protection, 
increasing  wages,  subsidizing  industries,  and  generally  becoming  more  responsive  to  the 
wishes of voters. 
  Most  European  governments,  he  showed,  with  the  exception  of  Belgium  and  Italy, 
adopted extensive economic planning as a reaction against the failure of the laissez faire 
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policies of the interwar period.
255 Because the political parameters within which politicians 
could maneuver had been altered so much as a result of the war, had Marshall aid not arrived, 
most governments would have extended their controls over the economy even further in the 
short  term  rather  than  abandon  their  expansionary  programs,  he  maintained.  What  the 
European  governments  had  not  resolved  was  how  they  would  continue  to  pay  for  their 
domestic expansionary programs once dollar aid came to an end. At the start of the Marshall 
plan they did not necessarily agree that the rules of the Bretton Woods system were a good 
idea or that they could not be broken. In any case, since those rules were premised on the 
system  operating  internationally  with  countries  achieving  an  equilibrium  in  their  global 
balance of payments, it was not at all clear that the Marshall plan was preparing Western 
Europe  to  operate  within  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  Those  potential  problems  were 
postponed as the U.S. government focused on its new policy of preparing Europe to reach an 
equilibrium in its balance of payments with the dollar area alone: 
 
For the first three years of the ERP the United States was able to reconcile the existence of 
Marshall  Aid  to  American  ambitions  for  the  world-wide  multilateral  payments  system 
embodied in the Bretton Woods agreements by the argument that in promoting a recovery in 
Western Europe’s output, Marshall Aid was closing Western Europe’s dollar deficit with the 
United States and thus preparing the way for a re-establishment of the principles agreed at 
Bretton Woods. But the concentration of dollar outflows on Western Europe made it even less 
likely that this would be the case.
256 
 
 The country for which the new direction in U.S. policy was most damaging was Britain. But, 
as Alan Milward showed, the alternative way offered by Britain of recycling dollars via the 
sterling area in order to stimulate international trade would not have satisfied the strategic 
objectives of the United States in Europe: 
 
From the standpoint of the British government the Sterling Area was an expansionary force in 
world trade and a way of overcoming the international structural disequilibria. It offered the 
possibility of multilateral settlements to a group of nations representing a significant part of 
total world trade. British imports in 1947 were by themselves almost the equivalent of United 
States imports. What was  more, most British purchases of primary goods were carried out 
through  bulk  purchasing  agreements  over  several  years  and  Britain  thus  offered  what 
underdeveloped primary exporters most required, guaranteed longer-term markets.
257  
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It was not until 1949 when, following the recession in the United States’ economy, which 
affected British trade much more than the trade of the other west European economies, the 
British  government  devalued  sterling  and  threatened  to  retreat  into  the  sterling  area 
completely, that the United States realized ‘that its real interests were more affected by the 
world-wide  ramifications  of  British  and  sterling  area  trade  than  by  Britain’s  role  in 
Europe.’
258 It was only then that Washington finally recognized that  
 
[n]o durable reconstruction could have been possible unless the future terms of co-existence of 
the sterling area, Western Europe and the dollar trading zone had been defined. So long as they 
were defined in terms of dismantling the sterling area and forcing Britain into an integrated 
Western Europe nothing could be achieved.
259 
 
From this recognition came the acceptance that the United States would have to provide 
dollars to cover the inclusion of the sterling area in a new payments system in Europe – the 
European Payments Union (EPU) – and that the EPU would not be an institution for uniting 
Europe. By definition, the EPU represented a settlements mechanism among the seventeen 
OEEC member states extremely favorable to debtors, in a way which has never happened 
before or indeed since. In terms of its automatic settlements mechanism, it was closer to 
Keynes’ wartime proposals for an international fund than to the rules of the IMF. The EPU 
allowed participating European countries to discriminate against dollar exports while giving 
incentives to debtor countries to continue to run domestic expansionary programs on the basis 
of foreign and automatic credits rather than correct those deficits through domestic deflation. 
It could not have worked, Alan Milward argued, had the United States not been forced to 
recognize  that  no  multilateral  clearing  mechanism  in  Europe  could  operate  successfully 
without the inclusion of the sterling area, and had the views of the U.S. State Department not 
prevailed over those of the U.S. Treasury. For both reasons, he insisted, the EPU was not a 
step toward the convertibility of European currencies within the framework of the Bretton 
Woods system: 
 
The Union [the EPU] was unable to eliminate the disequilibrium in intra-Western-European 
trade and payments not merely because it lacked the power over national monetary and fiscal 
policies to do so. An equilibrium in intra-Western-European payments could only have been 
achieved at the expense of the expansion of world trade. The same applies to another goal of 
the  Marshall  Plan,  a  payments  equilibrium  between  Western  Europe  and  North  America. 
Disequilibrium within Western Europe and between Western Europe and North America had 
always existed and always been resolved in a worldwide framework. It was a serious inherent 
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weakness of the regional emphasis of the Marshall Plan that it ignored the previous hundred 
years of the history of international trade. […] The account of Britain’s ultimate adherence to 
the EPU fails to emphasize that this could only be obtained by sacrificing most of the ECA’s 
further hopes and ambitions. It was partly for that reason that the agreement was so fiercely 
attacked  elsewhere  in  Washington.  In  that  struggle,  too,  even  a  liberal  French  minister  of 




Thus, at the end of the ERP, it was neither the Bretton Woods system nor a purely European 
system which was responsible for regulating payments within western Europe but the EPU, 
an institution partly funded with Marshall aid for financing (on generous terms) deficits in 
intra-OEEC trade and between Western Europe and the sterling area. 
  Nor was the United States any more successful, as he showed, in using dollar aid to 
encourage the West European governments to dismantle their barriers to trade and create one 
large market. In his view, since the Marshall plan was primarily an instrument of the Cold 
War,  the  liberal  economic  theory  which  it  drew  upon  was  to  provide  an  ideological 
justification, although it was of very dubious relevance to the western European countries 
themselves: 
 
as America’s needs for a militant ideology of its own became so acute from 1947 onwards, the 
theoretically greater economic efficiency of a large market and a multilateral payments system 




But for western European countries the crux of the problem was how to earn dollars in third 
markets to pay for imports from the United States. Creating a large market in Europe would 
do little to solve that problem: 
 
The  American  view  that  a  fundamental  change  in  the  mechanisms  of  intra-European  trade 
would produce an immediate benefit in terms of increased European output […] ran directly 
counter  to  the  view  of  many  European  countries  that  such  changes,  although  no  doubt 
theoretically and practically desirable in the medium term, would in the short term be useless 
and  dangerous  unless  the  fundamental  structural  disequilibria  in  world  trade  were  first 
corrected, a responsibility which fell heavily on the United States and of which recycling dollars 
through Marshall Aid was but a first and insufficient acknowledgement.
262  
 
In any event, Alan Milward showed that the United States failed to achieve the liberalization 
of  trade  in  Europe  under  the  Marshall  plan,  contrary  to  the  claims  made  at  the  time  or 
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subsequently.
263 Such claims were based on a common misunderstanding of the rules of the 
OEEC trade liberalization program proposed by the British government in 1948. Rather than 
reflect that proportion of each member state’s overall trade with the rest of its OEEC partners 
which was entirely determined by market forces, the OEEC code measured the quantitative 
restrictions  on  private  trade  which  were  removed,  as  a  percentage  of  all  the  quantitative 
restrictions on private trade in 1948. It did not measure tariff protection and it did not include 
the  high  proportion  of  trade  which  was  under  government  control.
264  The  resulting 
percentages were therefore misleadingly high. In OEEC terms, for example, one hundred 
percent liberalization in 1959 meant in reality that only fourteen percent of west German 
imports from the rest of the OEEC in 1959 were liberalized. Furthermore the progress that 
was made in 1949-1950 was reversed in the face of an external payments problem: 
 
By the end of 1951 there were more quantitative restrictions than at the end of 1950. Tariffs 
remained little changed so that the levels of import penetration in most Western European 
countries in 1955 were not much higher than in 1950 and still lower than in 1913. The first and 
most vigorous ten years of Western Europe’s largest boom, in spite of all American efforts to 
change the world, were in fact experienced under a protectionist system.
265 
 
In focusing on the policies pursued by the governments of western Europe Alan Milward 
demonstrated that the United States through Marshall aid had no more than a marginal impact 
on the agreements reached in western Europe. ‘Marshall Aid’, he concluded ‘was not in fact 
important enough to give the United States sufficient leverage to reconstruct Western Europe 
according to its own wishes.’
266 It was the new institutional structure, in particular the EPU 
and the ECSC, put in place by some of the European governments themselves which, he 
claimed, was ultimately responsible for the success of the postwar settlement in Europe and 
for laying the basis for its unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. 
  Alan Milward thus concluded that not only did Marshall aid not need to save Western 
Europe from economic collapse, nor did it lead to the elimination of the dollar deficit and the 
operation  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  but  nor  to  European  integration  within  a  large 
monetary or free-trade framework. Quite apart from the payments difficulties which meant 
that the entire sterling area had to be brought into the EPU, ‘[t]he opposition between French 
policies  towards  Germany  and  those  of  Britain  and  America  were  so  profound  that  no 
worthwhile decisions about European economic co-operation, much less integration, could be 
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taken in the framework of the CEEC or its successor [the OEEC].’
267 But what Milward did 
accept was that the United States was able to put pressure on the French government to 
change its policy toward Germany in the direction of a Franco-German association. 
  Integration came about not from the original American promotion of a customs union in 
the OEEC but from a European solution to the German question, which at the same time 
solved specific European domestic problems. The French proposal of 9 May 1950 was a 
response to the U.S. pressure in favor of the ‘normalization’ of western Germany at a time of 
rising conflict with the Soviet Union, but it was also, as Alan Milward demonstrated, the 
outcome of over five years of attempts to address the reasons for France’s collapse in 1940. 
One  constant  element  of  French  policy  since  the  liberation  of  France  had  been  a 
determination to strengthen France as an industrial power by expanding and modernizing its 
basic  industries,  including  its  capital  goods  industries.  As  recognized  by  the  provisional 
government of France’s fourth republic headed by General Charles de Gaulle, this depended 
on France having access to certain German raw-material resources – above all coal and coke 
from  the  Ruhr  and  the  Saarland.  In  political  terms,  modernization  and  industrialization 
became synonymous with national security, territorial integrity, and economic independence. 
Modernization and industrialization were seen to be the only path for the future viability of 
France as an independent nation. In one of his last acts before leaving French politics for 
twelve years de Gaulle had, in January 1946, created a body to plan the reconstruction of 
France, the Commissariat général au plan under Jean Monnet’s leadership. Central to what 
became known as ‘the Monnet plan’ was the objective of expanding the industrial base of the 
French economy, and the steel industry in particular, using coal and coking coal from the 
Ruhr as well as imports of investment goods from the United States, financed with U.S. 
dollars.  It was a plan to make France rather than Germany the main industrial power in 
continental Europe but it failed to take account of the needs and aspirations of other West 
European countries which depended on a reconstructed German economy as a supplier and 
market, or of the British need to finance its zone of occupation in Germany which included 
the Ruhr. Following the breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union, it conflicted with the 
strategic  needs  of  the  United  States  to  strengthen  the  western  zones  of  Germany 
economically. 
  While the Marshall plan was designed to fund the expansion of the economies of both 
France and the western zones of Germany, it risked undermining the Monnet plan and by 
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extension French security by offering France no permanent guarantee of supplies of coal and 
coking coal from the Ruhr in sufficient quantities and at a price which did not discriminate 
against French industry. With the establishment of a unitary and independent west German 
state at the six-power London conference on Germany in June 1948, the French government 
was forced to begin the search for such a permanent guarantee which would be acceptable to 
the new German state: 
 
Until mid-summer 1948 […] France’s aims in European reconstruction were concentrated on a 
partition  and  permanent  weakening  of  Germany  and  on  acquiring  a  guaranteed  access  to 
German coal and coke resources. […] From June 1948 onwards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
began the task of moving ministers, governments, parliament and people towards the alternative 
policy of a Franco-German economic association.
268 
 
The result of this process was the innovative supranational concept announced to the press by 
Robert Schuman, the French minister of foreign affairs, on 9 May 1950. It was to take yet one 
more year of negotiations before the French were able to secure through the Schuman Plan 
and  the  ECSC  one  of  the  key  objectives  of  the  Monnet  plan.  Although  Alan  Milward 
provided a pragmatic rationale for the French policy which culminated in Schuman’s press 
statement, this did not mean that he did not appreciate the value, the revolutionary nature, and 
the  overall  importance  of  ‘supranationality’.  On  the  contrary,  he  considered  that  the 
supranational solution constituted the very last and crucial element in the reconstruction of 
Western Europe, the one that became a substitute for a peace settlement with Germany.
269 He 
showed that the new supranational structure was crucial, not only for the future of national 
planning in France, but for achieving the national objectives of the Benelux countries and 
Italy.  Instead  of  free  trade  or  the  recreation  of  the  prewar  industrial  cartels  run  by  the 
industries themselves, the European states were able to retain control over sectors seen to be 
vital for their national economic security. The form that European integration took was to be 
a highly regulated market not within OEEC, as Washington had expected, but among six 
countries and in the two sectors of coal and steel. 
The greatest contrast between what the United  States wanted to achieve in postwar 
western Europe and what the West European governments produced themselves was that 
whereas the United States looked for a liberal solution to Western Europe’s problems and to 
its own security concerns in the form of creating a single large market in Western Europe, the 
West European governments looked for a state-directed solution to a very specific problem. 
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The basis of the U.S. international economic policy-making was, in Milward’s view, ‘the 
unquestioning assumption that the history of the United States itself provided some higher 
guide  to  the  path  of  economic  development’.
270  In  other  words,  the  larger  market  of  the 
United  States  could  be  replicated  in  Western  Europe.  By  contrast,  western  European 
governments believed that their security needs could not be left to the market or to the most 
powerful private business concerns. If nationalization was perhaps an answer to the problem 
posed by the control which the most powerful industry, that of steel, had been able to exercise 
over the domestic economy in the interwar period, to have put the German steel industry 
under the control of the German state would have been seen to undermine European security. 
On the other hand, for Italy, which wanted to develop its own steel industry free competition 
within Europe was not possible. The problem of the coal industry was quite different. It was 
an industry in which productivity was in decline. Nowhere was this more serious than in 
Belgium. Managing that decline in a way which did not cause unemployment on a large scale 
was a challenge of a different sort. The solution to both challenges was negotiated by all six 
governments  which  signed  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  As  Tobias  Witschke  and  Charles  Barthel 
clearly show, the establishment of the ECSC, however supranational its High Authority was 
to be, did not mean that the European states intended to lose control or indeed lost control 
over the regulatory framework that affected their coal and steel industries.
271 The western 
European governments without exception were determined to maintain their sovereignty and 
their ambitions to pursue specific national economic strategies. Key to the successful pattern 
of institutionalized economic interdependence was, Alan Milward affirmed, that it served ‘the 
separate national interests of the countries concerned’.
272 
  Initial reviews of The Reconstruction of Western Europe were positive acknowledging 
its stimulating and provocative nature, but also its intrinsic complexity.
273 Apart from those 
who found the detailed arguments ‘rather indigestible’ there were others who criticized his 
focus on ‘bread and butter issues’ when they expected him to discuss the Cold War.
274 Alan 
Milward  accepted  the  Cold  War  as  the  historical  context  in  which  Western  Europe  was 
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reconstructed but argued that it did not explain the nature of that reconstruction. As Alan 
Milward was to explain later  
   
[t]he  greater  importance  which  western  Europeans  states  placed  on  social  and  economic 
recovery rather than very high levels of military expenditure as a barrier against Communist 
aggression meant that the United States had no choice but to accept that to press Europe for a 
contribution equal to its own to the military security of Europe was so divisive as to weaken 
rather  than  strengthen  security  in  both  senses.  This  conclusion  remains  supported  by  the 
historical evidence of the Marshall Plan period.
275  
 
David F. Good concluded, perhaps prematurely that ‘[i]n the end his arguments persuade. 
After this, who can doubt that it was the pursuit of national self-interest and not the heady 
idealism of European romantics that ultimately shaped the economic and political institutions 
of  reconstructed  Europe?’
276  We  believe  that  the  European  romantics  have  not  lost  their 
influence completely. 
  In the years following the publication of The Reconstruction of Western Europe Alan 
Milward’s views stimulated considerable research and debate toward the end of the 1980s.
277 
Milward  was  to  observe  though  that  many  historians  had  simply  not  understood  his 
arguments. He was particularly disappointed to see that in Michael Hogan’s scholarly history 
of the economic diplomacy of the Marshall plan, his arguments had been entirely rejected.
278 
On the basis of archival research in the United States and Britain, Hogan had argued that 
through  the  Marshall  plan  the  United  States  had  transmitted  the  politico-economic 
compromise of the American New Deal as amended by the Second World War to Western 
Europe; that this in turn had produced the stability and prosperity which characterized post-
1947 West European corporative neo-capitalism, and led to the integration of western Europe 
into one single market, and ultimately made the Bretton Woods system operable. Without 
Marshall  aid,  Hogan  affirmed,  ‘a  serious  crisis  in  production  would  have  come  with  the 
collapse of critical dollar imports’.
279 Without the Marshall plan, the economic recovery of 
western Europe and thus the favorable conditions for its transformation into a Golden Age 
would have not been possible. 
  In this Hogan was accepting the economic arguments of the Marshall planners at face 
value. When invited to write a review of Hogan’s book Alan Milward used the opportunity to 
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set out his arguments once again.
280 What Milward was at pains to demonstrate was that 
many  of  the  arguments  of  Marshall  planners  were  politically  motivated  and  had  no 
foundation in economic reality. Not only did he doubt that the ideology underpinning the 
Marshall plan originated in the New Deal but he was convinced that the political consensus in 
postwar western Europe pre-dated the Marshall plan and was ‘more the outcome of shifts of 
political power which imposed policies on frequently reluctant politicians and civil servants 
than the outcome of changes of intellectual outlook by policymakers or of any coordinated 
international attempt to overcome the manifest weakness of the international economy.’
281 As 
he had argued in The Reconstruction of Western Europe given the political and economic 
conditions in western Europe there was no evidence pointing to an economic collapse had the 
U.S. government not supplied dollars through Marshall aid. He went on to address the second 
claim made by Hogan, that the alternative policy options which the absence of the Marshall 
plan would have made necessary were ‘not available to the fragile coalitions that presided 
over many of the participating countries, none of which could retreat from already low levels 
of consumption and hope to survive’.
282 This argument, Milward elaborated,  
 
needs to be emended in one respect where Hogan has perhaps not understood the statistical 
implications of the contrary argument. No government needed to reduce the levels of food 
consumption of 1947 to implement the alternative policies, and most could have increased 
them. Of the six countries in question, four could still have obtained dollar capital goods and 
raw material imports in the same value as under the Marshall Plan and have had a margin of 
extra gold/dollars for food imports above the 1947 level. Only France and the Netherlands 
would have had to stay at that level.
283 
 
Accepting  that  emendation  Alan  Milward  presented  the  alternative  course  of  action  that 
several governments had considered when the conditions attached to U.S. assistance appeared 
initially as too intrusive. Considering the case of France, the country which perhaps best fits 
Hogan’s  ‘fragile  coalition’  definition,  Alan  Milward  insisted  that  the  French  government 
would not have collapsed for economic reasons had there been no Marshall aid. It was a 
convenient tactic for the government to warn of a political collapse. The country which was 
most dependent on Marshall aid was Britain, not an example of the sort of weak coalition 
government to which Hogan was referring. It was in Britain that the new direction taken by 
the United States in proposing Marshall aid and abandoning a global solution to the problem 
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caused by the dollar shortage could have been most damaging economically, had dollar aid 
not been extended belatedly to include the sterling area in the EPU. Was the Marshall plan 
necessary? On balance, Alan Milward’s answer was that, ‘eminently successful policy though 
it was, the postwar European world would have looked much the same without it.’
284 
  After  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  empire,  attention  in  the  United  States  focused  on 
whether a Marshall plan for eastern Europe would be an appropriate vehicle for introducing 
capitalist  methods  into  those  countries  and  for  closing  the  gap  in  economic  performance 
between eastern and western Europe. In 1993 J. Bradford DeLong and Barry Eichengreen 
concluded that in fact Milward was correct to argue that Marshall aid was not large enough to 
‘significantly  stimulate  western  European  growth  by  accelerating  the  replacement  and 
expansion of its capital stock’, nor to finance reconstruction which was completed by 1948. 
But they maintained that Marshall aid did make a difference to Western Europe and that 
difference was in altering the environment in which economic policy was made. In their 
view, the ERP meant a careful, managed return to markets after the market failures in the 
Great  Depression.  Had  it  not  been  for  Marshall  aid,  they  asserted,  western  European 
governments would have continued to control imports in order to cope with their deficit in 
external payments. Marshall aid therefore helped them to restore the market and to move to 
the multilateral system of Bretton Woods.
285 Alan Milward’s warning that historians should 
not assume that the period 1948-1958 was ‘only a journey back’ to the Bretton Woods system 
was rejected.
286 His demonstration that trade in western Europe continued to be controlled in 
the  1950s  was  also  dismissed.  Significantly  though,  the  United  States  did  not  offer  a 
‘Marshall plan’ to eastern Europe. 
  Alan Milward’s own view almost twenty years after he had first analyzed the ERP was 
that the Marshall plan 
 
cannot be said to have been economically necessary to the continuation of the boom, but it did, 
of  course  facilitate  its  continuation.  It  made  the  international  imbalances  of  the  European 
countries less acute in 1948 and 1949. More important than the Marshall Plan was the decision 
to divide Germany and to create the Federal Republic as a west European state. The role of the 
Federal Republic in the intra-west-European trade network became a major contribution to 
stabilising the international economy.
287 
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It was precisely the contribution of the west German economy to the trade and payments of western 
Europe in the 1950s and to the decision of the six ECSC member states to form a common market 
which was to occupy Alan Milward’s intellectual energies for the next few years. 
 
9.  The  European  Rescue  of  the  Nation-State  (1992)  and  The  Frontier  of  National 
Sovereignty (1993) 
 
In  writing  The  Reconstruction  of  Western  Europe  Alan  Milward  had  explained  that  his 
original intention had been to write a history of the great European economic boom. What he 
wrote instead was a history of the first seven years of that boom. Returning to his original 
question he now wanted to know what had enabled the postwar European boom to continue 
after 1951 and last for so long. Why, he asked rhetorically, had the economic recovery in 
western Europe not been thrown into reverse by  the  recessions originating in the United 
States in the 1950s and, as had happened in the 1920s, been transmitted to western Europe? 
Another puzzle was to explain the fundamentally contradictory tendencies whereby the state 
was  to  cede  some  of  its  enhanced  powers  to  the  new  supranational  institutions  in  the 
European Community. His search for explanations of the great European boom thus involved 
an analysis of the reasons for the further integration of Western Europe. 
  As ever he began his research just at the time when the governmental records for the 
period in question (in this case for the period leading up to the Treaties of Rome in 1957) 
were  being  opened  in  many  countries.  This  time,  however,  Milward  was  fortunate  in 
directing a research project ‘Challenge and Response in Western Europe: The Origins of the 
Treaty of Rome’  at the EUI, where he had been appointed to the chair in contemporary 
European history in 1983.
288 He was able to draw on the research of the many scholars either 
working on the subject at the EUI or invited there as visitors. In a number of publications 
(articles and chapters in collective works) Milward referred to the work of these scholars as 
providing the basis for further thought about the role of western European nation-states in the 
first decade after the end of the Second World War and, particularly, the motives behind their 
choices for interdependence and integration. In the preface to the 2003 paperback edition of 
The Reconstruction of Western Europe, which incorporated several important changes to the 
original edition, Milward paid tribute to this research group by announcing that 
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four more years of research [at the EUI] have convinced me that the historical evidence from 
the  1950s  demonstrates  that  there  was  indeed  an  imperative  towards  wholly  new  forms  of 
interdependence and to the transfer of national ‘sovereignty’ to non-national institutions, which 
the  nation-state  had  to  follow  to  make  itself  once  more  an  accepted  and  strong  unit  of 
organization. It would now be possible to replace the theories rejected in the last chapter [of The 
Reconstruction] and formulate a historically-convincing intellectual foundation for the process 




When he returned to Britain to fill a chair in Economic History at the LSE, he retained his 
links with the research project at the EUI, now directed by a former colleague from UMIST 
who had become Professor of Economic History at the University of Amsterdam, Professor 
Richard  T.  Griffiths.  On  the  occasion  of  Alan  Milward’s  resignation  from  his  chair  at 
UMIST, the Senate of the University of Manchester passed a lengthy resolution of thanks to 
their former professor, founder of the Department of European Studies and of the Bachelor of 
Science degree program in European Studies and the Master of Science degree program in 
European Community Studies, noting among other things that  
 
[h]is participation in staff seminars, whether hosted by the Department of European Studies or 
held elsewhere in the University, was always extremely stimulating, and revealed the breadth 
and catholicity of his academic interests and knowledge, often easily over-stepping artificial 
disciplinary boundaries. 
 
They went on to say that  
 
[h]e was always keen to foster good staff-students relations in the Department. One of the ways 
in which he did this was on the cricket field, where he was a fast bowler of fearsome appearance 
and awesome reputation, and was a member of the legendary European Studies X1 which, 
astonishingly for such a small Department (and one in which male students and staff are in a 
minority) won the UMIST inter-departmental knock-out a few years ago.
290 
 
The mid 1980s was a time of renewed popular and political interest in the historical dynamics 
of European integration stimulated by the ratification of the Single European Act in 1986. It 
was a time when the classical theories of integration were enjoying a resurgence of support 
and when the prospect of political union in Europe returned to excite and divide opinion. It 
was in Britain where Milward prepared his next book, The European Rescue of the Nation-
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State, which was to be published in the year in which the Treaty of Maastricht promising 
‘ever closer union’ was signed.
291 
  Alan Milward was one of the first historians to consider European integration to be a 
subject  of  sufficient  importance  to  merit  historical  investigation.  He  initially  based  his 
research on the theoretical explanations offered by other disciplines, most notably economics 
and political science.
292 In his view, most economic theory saw the integration of markets as 
the  direct  outcome  of  their  growing  interdependence.  Questioning  whether  European 
economies were any more interdependent in the 1950s than they had been under the gold 
standard between 1896 and 1914, he argued that there was nothing inherent in the nature of 
economic development which led to the erosion of the state and national frontiers in the 
interests  of  maximizing  profits  and  incomes.  Indeed,  as  he  pointed  out,  interdependence 
could also lead to the growth of separatist movements and the creation of new nation-states 
rather than the opposite. Although integration was generally considered to have a positive 
economic effect, economists had great difficulty in measuring those dynamic effects since 
their assumptions were based on static equilibrium analysis, he said. If he did not agree that 
there was any automatic connection between economic interdependence and integration, nor 
did he agree with the argument that ‘the growth of markets inevitably generated economies of 
scale  in  manufacturing  and  retailing  which  in  turn  generated  higher  rates  of  productivity 
improvement which in turn generated higher rates of national income growth, thus enabling 
governments to satisfy many of the stronger political pressures on them after 1945.’
293 This 
was an argument frequently advanced in the United States to justify the purpose of Marshall 
aid, and which spawned a number of European ‘productivity missions’ to the United States in 
the  late  1940s  and  early  1950s.  It  formed  the  basis  of  Maier’s  argument  that  it  was  by 
promoting the growth of labor productivity that western European governments were able to 
overcome  the  social  tensions  of  the  prewar  period.  But,  since  he  did  not  accept  the 
proposition that growing markets inevitably led to improvements in productivity, Milward 
found  Maier’s  ‘politics  of  productivity’  a  sophisticated  intellectual  argument  but  not  an 
explanation for the growth which occurred in Western Europe.
294 Not content with Keynesian 
explanations which focus on the role of the state in promoting high rates of economic growth 
in Western Europe, Milward wanted to know ‘[b]y what precise political mechanism did the 
organisational unit of the state, so  feebly incapable even of fulfilling its primary task of 
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protection in 1940, come to play such a role in the vast improvement in human life which 
took place’.
295 
  He  was  equally  skeptical  of  the  value  of  the  various  theories  which  had  been  put 
forward by political scientists to explain integration. There was no evidence he suggested to 
support Karl W. Deutsch’s theory that western capitalist economies were becoming more 
similar both in their economic policies and political objectives and had devised institutional 
methods of cooperating with each other which built on their common sense of purpose and 
community.
296 There was plenty of evidence of conflict between national objectives, Milward 
asserted, some of which was generated by the new institutions themselves and which required 
action  by  national  governments  to  resolve.
297  He  also  found  the  neo-functionalist  theory 
developed by Ernst B. Haas problematic for different reasons. Haas argued that if integration 
was chosen as a framework to permit a greater degree of interdependence between countries, 
since national governments would then have to compete with other interest groups for the 
loyalty of their citizens within the new integrated institutions, the common interest would 
prevail  over  national  interests  resulting  in  further  integration.
298  Even  though  Haas  had 
rejected the functionalist division between low-level technical issues and high-level political 
ones,  seeing  all  issues  as  political,  he  did  not  in  Milward’s  view  offer  a  convincing 
explanation as to why nation-states opted for integration rather than interdependence in the 
first place. And he disagreed, in the second place, that, having chosen integration, it would 
lead to further integration, citing the results of recent research into the history of the ECSC 
which suggested that ‘nation states actually weakened the integrative powers of the High 
Authority as soon as they began to operate inside its ambit.’
299 
  As  an  historian,  the  main  difference  which  he  saw  between  the  1950s  and  earlier 
periods when the degree of economic interdependence in western Europe was as high if not 
higher, was that in the 1950s states believed that they could further their national interests 
permanently through growing and state-controlled economic interdependence and looked for 
ways  to  ensure  that  the  arrangements  which  were  in  place  in  the  1950s  would  not  be 
dismantled.
300 It was thus to the changes in the nature of the state itself in postwar Europe, in 
political parties, and in national economies that Alan Milward turned first for explanations of 
the boom and of the integration of the European economies. At that time, for both supporters 
                                                 
295 Milward (1992), 24. 
296 Deutsch et al., (1957). 
297 Milward (1988), 4. 
298 Haas (1958). 
299 Milward (1988), 6. 
300 Milward (1988), 11-12.   87
and opponents of a federal Europe, the process of integration was seen as one in which the 
supranational institutions of the European Community were replacing those of the nation-
state. Milward, questioning whether such an antithesis between the two existed, was to reach 
the paradoxical conclusion that integration, far from weakening the nation-state, was a policy 
choice designed to strengthen it, enabling it to implement the domestic policies for which 
there was a consensus within and among states and which could not be implemented by more 
traditional  methods.  Starting  from  the  assumption  that  after  1945  the  governments  of 
democratic  western  Europe  considered  that  performing  those  policies  was  essential  to 
legitimate the new postwar nation-state and to regain the allegiance of their citizens after the 
capitulation of all but Britain to Nazi Germany, Milward applied the very visual concept of 
the ‘European rescue of the nation-state’ to the decision taken by European states to surrender 
a degree of sovereignty to supranational institutions in order to strengthen the power of the 
state over the market, when it was seen to be necessary for political, economic, and strategic 
reasons. As he explained  
 
[o]ne of the inherent instabilities of the political economy of the post-war nation was that it had 
to be internationalized at certain points if it was to survive. All history is movement, and in its 
rescue  the  European  nation-state  was  laying  the  basis  of  a  new  international  order  for  the 
continent. Yet the feasibility of that order was, and continues to be, determined by the evolution 
of national economic life. […] Although therefore the European rescue of the nation-state was 
necessarily an economic one, it is at the point where that economic rescue intersected with the 




He  strongly  believed  that  because  the  real  reasons  for  the  creation  of  the  European 
Community  had  been  misunderstood  by  those  who  saw  it  either  as  a  purely  diplomatic 
solution to the problem of European security or as a liberal solution to Europe’s lack of 
competitiveness, this misunderstanding was taking the European Union in directions marked 
most of all by a lack of humanity. It was to warn people that the European Union had not 
been built on an abstract idea of a united Europe, which could be applied indiscriminately to 
any issue, but was the result of creative decisions taken by the postwar state ‘to improve the 
material conditions and happiness of large numbers of people’ as well as providing security 
against a resurgent Germany, that he felt compelled to write The European Rescue of the 
Nation-State.
302 
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  Contrary to the prevailing political science theories which, he observed, focused on ‘the 
creation of the institution more than the nature of the problem with which it was supposed to 
deal’, he analyzed integration in terms of the challenges facing the postwar state in Western 
Europe.
303  His  starting  point  was  the  impact  on  the  west  European  state  of  defeat  and 
occupation in the Second World War. Drawing on his research into the Second World War, 
he  concluded  that  ‘[d]efeat  and  occupation  were  not  merely  a  collapse  in  the  face  of 
overwhelming  military  superiority;  in  most  cases  they  were  also  a  collapse  of  internal 
morale.’
304  As  he  had  previously  argued,  individual  acts  of  resistance  may  have  been 
important for restoring individual morale during the occupation, but, contrary to the national 
myths cultivated by postwar governments, they did not provide the basis for restoring the 
nation’s collective morale after the war. The basis of Milward’s argument, which he set out in 
a number of case studies in The European Rescue of the Nation-State, was that there was a 
recognition  among  the  ruling  élites  in  western  Europe  that  ‘the  post-war  state  had  to  be 
constructed on a broader political consensus and show itself more responsive to the needs of 
a greater range and number of its citizens if its legitimacy was to be accepted.’
305 
  Political parties had to change from being ‘clubs of like-minded individuals associating 
to vote together at the parliamentary centre’ to becoming ‘a machine for discovering the 
demands coming from below in society and transmuting them into policies’.
306 While he 
acknowledged that ‘force was to remain as it always had been the core of the state’, he 
concluded that ‘one of the characteristics of the new power structure of the post-1945 state in 
western Europe was that it needed to have less recourse to force than did its predecessors.’
307 
In place of repression, the postwar state was based on a much wider political consensus than 
before the war, responsive to the demands of labor, agricultural producers, and ‘lower and 
middle income beneficiaries of the welfare state’.
308 This resulted in  a much larger state 
commanding budgets in which expenditure on defense, housing, industrial modernization, 
and, in the 1960s, education, were all growing.
309 Not only was the effect less inflationary 
than its critics maintained, with rates of inflation in the 1950s lower than in the twenty years 
of anti-inflationary policy after 1973, but the contribution of government policy to growth 
was much less than the changes that occurred in western Europe independently of the state 
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and its activities. These changes were the great increase in manufacturing in western Europe 
which drew people in their hundreds of thousands out of the agricultural sector. It would 
come  to  be  seen,  he  predicted,  as  the  culmination  of  the  great  wave  of  European 
industrialization which began in the seventeenth century.
310 What characterized the period in 
western Europe both historically and in comparison with the experience in eastern Europe 
was the rapid increase in purchasing power which led to the very rapid growth of production, 
trade, and ownership of objects. It was, he maintained, the vast choice and ability to purchase 
consumer  goods  which  was  held  up  as  ‘the  superiority  of  Western  Europe  over  the 
undemocratic  governments  of  Eastern  Europe,  with  missiles  and  sputniks  but  without 
washing machines and cars.’
311 The fact that the postwar political consensus resulted in such 
rapid economic change was, he argued, ‘largely coincidental, both in thought and action.’
312 
He  was  therefore  arguing  that  the  origins  of  both  the  European  boom  and  European 
integration lay in the political priorities set by some national governments rather than being 
driven by purely economic factors or ideas about uniting Europe. 
  In  what Andrew Moravcsik was to describe as an ‘oblique research strategy’, Alan 
Milward drew the evidence for his explanation of integration from a number of different 
countries and sectors of activity in the 1950s which ranged from coal-mining in Belgium and 
trade in manufacturing in western Europe to the protection of agriculture and the British 
government’s unilateral plans to restore the convertibility of sterling.
 What Moravcsik found 
‘frustrating’ however was the lack of a single explanation of integration which applied to all 
countries.
313 Instead of a theory of integration he complained that Milward had offered a set 
of  observations  in  search  of  a  theory  and  by  referring  to  political  science  theories  of 
integration which were already ‘old hat’ Milward had ignored the more recent developments 
in political science. Moravcsik’s criticism strongly resembled the sort of comment made by 
economists when reviewing Milward and Saul’s interpretations of European development and 
growth in the nineteenth century. 
   
Even before The European Rescue of the Nation-State had gone to press Milward had already 
embarked on another book, in collaboration with some of his former research students and 
colleagues.
314 The introduction to the collective volume The Frontier of National Sovereignty, 
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which  he  wrote  with  one  former  student,  caused  some  outrage  by  describing  neo-
functionalism as a theory of the Cold War and ‘the intellectual foundation for a hegemonic 
foreign policy architecture’ in the United States.
315 The Cold War was, Milward and Sørensen 
argued, ‘first and foremost a war of propaganda’.
316 They likened the teleological theories of 
integration,  such  as  those  of  functionalism,  neo-functionalism  and  federalism,  which 
proliferated in the 1950s and 1960s with Rostow’s stage theory of economic growth, which 
Rostow  had  explicitly  called  a  Non-Communist  Manifesto.
  Such  teleological  integration 
theories, they claimed, were equally driven by ideology, but more covertly. They were, they 
maintained, ‘essentially models of social engineering for the containment of communism and 
the  promotion  of  economic  growth.’
317  When  the  end  of  the  Vietnam  war  punctured  the 
confidence  which  underpinned  such  integration  theories  in  the  United  States,  political 
scientists replaced them with interdependence theory, leaving Europeans without an adequate 
theoretical  explanation  for  the  creation  of  the  supranational  institutions  of  the  European 
Communities. Interdependence theory, even though it was to become popular as a description 
of  the  way  that  the  EC  operated  in  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  did  not  explain,  to  Alan 
Milward’s satisfaction, why interdependence had been replaced by a degree of integration in 
the 1950s or indeed in the 1980s and 1990s.
 He had set out to provide such an explanation for 
the  past,  but  also  one  which  would  predict  whether  the  degree  of  integration  would  be 
maintained in the future, extended or even reversed. It was a vital part of his implicit theory 
of historical change. It rested on his conviction that for integration to be successful it had to 
be based on consensus. Nazi Germany, as he had demonstrated in his previous research, had 
not  succeeded  in  uniting  Europe  by  force.  The  German  occupation  of  Europe  was  not 
working economically even before Germany was defeated militarily. Integration could not be 
achieved  through  force,  but  was  the  policy  chosen  by  European  nation-states  who  held 
similar  domestic  objectives  and  similar  concerns  about  protecting  themselves  against  a 
resurgent Germany. It had to be achieved through consensus from both within and among 
nation-states.  It  was  for  that  very  reason  that  all  member  states  had  to  be  democracies. 
Turning the federalist theory on its head he argued that the end of integration would mean the 
end of the nation-state. 
  What all six countries which signed the Treaties of Rome in March 1957 shared was a 
determination  to  ‘reassert  the  nation-state  as  the  fundamental  unit  of  political  life  as 
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vigorously and securely as possible.’
318 In order to regain the legitimacy in the eyes of voters 
which had been diminishing since the Great Depression and had evaporated completely in 
1940, they adopted a set of policy objectives some of which could be met through traditional 
channels and some of which required new structures outside the nation-state. Put another 
way,  some  of  these  policies  were  within  the  power  of  the  state  to  deliver  but  others, 
particularly if they were not shared by other states, risked being undermined by them through 
competition.  Although  in  general  terms  many  of  these  objectives  were  shared  by  all  six 
governments  which  signed  the  1957  Treaties  of  Rome,  such  as  the  provision  of  social 
welfare, agricultural protection, full employment, and the promotion of industrialization, the 
policies required to meet these objectives could and did vary enormously. In the case of 
Belgium, to which Alan Milward devoted an entire chapter of The European Rescue of the 
Nation-State, where ten per cent of total industrial employment was in coal-mining in 1950, 
full employment meant finding a way of protecting those jobs in the face of competition from 
the more efficient coal-mining industry in west Germany and the United States.
319 Whereas 
interdependence, in the form of trade liberalization, would have thrown the full cost of job 
protection  or  welfare  onto  the  Belgian  state,  integration  offered  a  means  for  the  Belgian 
government  to  negotiate  financial  assistance  through  the  new  supranational  institutions, 
which  in  fact  meant  that  the  west  German  government  was  the  main  paymaster  of  the 
declining Belgian coal industry. As Alan Milward was to calculate  
 
[w]ithout counting the opportunity costs of using high-price domestic coal instead of cheaper 
imports, the cost of preservation of so much employment in coal-mining in subsidies alone was 
$141.42 million between 1953, when the common market in coal opened, and 1958. But $50.08 
million of this sum was contributed by other Community members, mainly by the German 
Federal  Republic.  The  integrationist  solution  was  used  to  sustain  levels  of  welfare  and 




Belgium exemplified the way in which a small country could act to protect its vital interests. 
Again, by even considering the position of small countries within Europe he distinguished 
himself from the majority of scholars who focused only on the major powers, which in the 
case of continental Europe meant France and Germany. As Alan Milward had previously 
explained when writing about the reconstruction period, ‘[t]here is not much a small power 
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can do to influence the course of history. If the moment is well chosen and the interplay of 
national interests correctly judged, however, the small power is not helpless.’
321 
  For the Netherlands, a small economy which was highly dependent on foreign trade and 
on the sort of trading networks which had been instituted by Germany during the Second 
World War and on which its prosperity was increasingly seen to depend after the war, the 
priority was to ensure that the Federal Republic of Germany would not turn toward eastern 
Europe for its imports, as it had done in the 1930s. Its interests were therefore in creating 
some sort of institutional structure governing trade in western Europe which would lock the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  into  it.  Many  governments,  Milward  observed,  turned  to 
foreign trade as an engine of economic growth even though the macroeconomic evidence on 
which that was based was very uncertain.
322 Increasing trade liberalization too quickly could 
threaten some elements of the postwar consensus. For this very reason, Alan Milward argued, 
the  ‘insistence  on  policies  of  national  economic  development  through  industrialization 
produced a mixture of liberalization and protection of manufactured trade which was highly 
selective.’
323 The national tariff, which until the great depression of 1929-1932 had been the 
mechanism through which parliaments rewarded or penalized particular social groups, had 
come to be replaced by other forms of protection developed on an ad hoc basis in the 1930s, 
and  after  1945  on  a  much  more  coherent  and  systematic  basis,  enabling  governments  to 
combine commercial policy with industrial policy.
324 
  Integration was primarily the first choice of smaller European powers to ensure that the 
economic gains which they had made in the 1950s would be irreversible. In general, all five 
European governments shared a concern to lock West Germany into the pattern of trade and 
payments which had developed in western Europe since the division of Germany in 1948. As 
Alan Milward explained ‘the tendency of the pre-war Reich to form a trading web with the 
smaller trade-dependent economies of central and south-eastern Europe was replaced after 
1948 by the tendency of the Federal Republic to form a trading web with the smaller trade-
dependent economies of Western Europe.’
325 Whereas before 1939 the highly protectionist 
Third Reich was characterized by exporting manufactured goods in return for food and raw 
materials,  the  postwar  Federal  Republic  was  increasingly  engaged  in  an  intra-sectoral 
exchange of manufactures. The German economy proved to be a much more stable market 
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than that of the United States where fluctuations in demand and the arbitrariness of U.S. 
commercial  policies  affected  European  exports.  It  was  a  combination  of  long-run 
development  trends  and  the  new  policies  adopted  in  western  Europe  and  in  the  Federal 
Republic of Germany which made the latter essential for the stability of western Europe. The 
legitimacy of the European nation-state, he argued, 
 
had  come  to  depend  on  a  country  that  was  not  really  yet  a  country,  without  full  national 
sovereignty until 1955, an artificial creation whose future was highly uncertain, still the subject 
of  a  possible  deal  between  America  and  Russia,  and  still  deeply  distrusted.  […]  It  was 
commercially, as the pivot of West European trade that West Germany had to be bound in 
place, and it was this necessity, particularly as the trade boom accelerated after 1953, that gave 
increasing force to the idea of the customs union.
326 
 
After the Second World War the historical pattern, which had persisted since the late 1870s, 
of  a  low-tariff  group  of  small  countries  in  western  Europe  and  a  group  of  relatively 
protectionist larger  economies reemerged with,  as Alan Milward observed, the difference 
being  that  Britain  was  now  on  the  protectionist  side.
327  Low  tariff  countries  had  little 
bargaining  power  in  GATT  and  none  in  OEEC  where,  under  the  control  of  Britain  and 
France, trade liberalization took the form of reductions in quantitative restrictions on trade, 
not in tariffs. 
  The organizations which had been envisaged by Allied postwar planners, such as the 
IMF and the ITO (for which GATT was the substitute) ,were worldwide and lacking in any 
powers  to  determine  the  direction  of  trade  whereas,  as  Alan  Milward  showed,  the 
Netherlands and other European countries needed some precise mechanisms in Europe which 
would  link  the  expansion  of  foreign  trade  to  the  rapid  growth  of  national  income.
  The 
challenge for western European states was to find some means to safeguard their national 
development  policies  by  means  of  establishing  a  new  and  more  sophisticated  mix  of 
liberalism  and  protectionism  within  the  new  international  economic  order.
328  Rather  than 
seeing the decision to create the EEC as the result of the Cold War and the new strategic 
position  of West  Germany,  Alan  Milward  was  at  the  time  unique  in  arguing  that  it  was 
primarily the political economy of the postwar European nation-states which explained the 
need for integration. The Cold War and the division of Germany were the context in which 
decisions on integration were taken, but they did not explain those decisions. Under repeated 
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challenge to explain why he had completely ignored the role played by the Cold War in 
explaining European integration, he was to say that he had ‘deliberately under-emphasised 
[it]  for  purposes  of  creative  exaggeration’  because  ‘where  foreign  policy  considerations 
mattered – and in the cause of keeping our bit of Germany under control they certainly did – 
there could only be such consensus about them because of the similar political economies of 
the separate nations.’
329 
  If any clear starting date for the history of the EEC had to be chosen, he argued that it 
was when the Dutch foreign minister, Johan Willem Beyen, first proposed a customs union in 
1950 rather than the Messina conference in 1955, the date chosen by most historians.
330 Alan 
Milward maintained that  
 
[i]t was […] always the Dutch official position after summer 1950 that only supranational 
constitutional  machinery  with  real  executive  powers  could  in  fact  guarantee  that  the 
liberalization  of  the  international  sector  would  be  an  irreversible  process  (unless  by  some 
entirely unlikely event the United Kingdom changed its foreign policy and agreed on the same 
outcome enforced by OEEC).
331 
 
It  was  the  French  who  changed  their  policy  and  finally  agreed  to  a  common  market  in 
Europe. However, whereas diplomatic historians underlined the fundamental importance of 
international political crises, such as that of the Suez fiasco and the Hungarian uprising in 
1956 to explain the French decision to sign the Treaties of Rome, Alan Milward explained it 
in terms of the political economy of the French Fourth Republic.
332 It was the recognition in 
France, he argued, that the protectionist policies incorporated in the first two modernization 
plans had failed to limit the expansion of imports in the 1950s, that explained the decision to 
liberalize trade within Western Europe.
333 Although France had a much smaller share of its 
total trade with western Europe than most other European economies, the Federal Republic 
was its biggest outlet for the increase in its exports at a time when empire trade, the biggest 
share of total trade, grew only sluggishly.
334  It  was  also  the  Dutch  position,  as  he  showed, 
that  the  production,  price,  and  exports  of  the  agricultural  sector  should  be  regulated  in 
common rather than left to national control.
335 
                                                 
329 Milward (1996), 58. 
330 Milward (1992), 196. 
331 Milward (1988), 11. 
332 Milward (1992), 215. 
333 Milward (1992), 133. 
334 Milward (1992), 204. 
335 Milward (1992), 283.   95
  In his research into the origins of the common agricultural policy, Alan Milward was 
anxious to lay to rest many persistent myths, of which the two most prominent were, firstly, 
that it represented a Franco-German deal in which Germany, in return for a market for its 
industrial exports in France, conceded to France a market for its agricultural exports, and 
secondly, that it was based on the desire to retain the family farm as the model for European 
agriculture. Both myths, he argued, failed to take account of the very great changes in the 
position of agriculture and in French political priorities which the Second World War had 
brought about. To take the first myth, he argued that the priorities of successive postwar 
French governments, as exemplified in the first instance by the Monnet plan, had been to 
strengthen France as a modern industrial power in opposition to the romantic notion held by a 
section of the Vichy regime that France was and should remain primarily a producer of food 
surpluses. The EEC Treaty of Rome was to provide a framework which would secure the 
continuation  of  French  industrialization  within  a  wide,  protectionist  regional  framework, 
which would check somewhat the competition of German industry. France also needed a 
market for its agricultural surpluses, but would have been content with negotiating long-term 
purchase contracts for them, he argued.
336 The second common error, in his view, was to 
confuse the rhetoric of preserving the family farm and of farming as a way of life with the 
reality of European government policy toward the agricultural sector in the very changed 
conditions after the Second World War. His co-edited collection of research papers on the 
impact of the Second World War on agriculture across the world confirmed how different the 
position of agriculture was in western Europe in 1945 in comparison with 1918. After the 
First World War  
 
[l]ow  levels  of  world  demand  for  foodstuffs  and  other  primary  products,  low  levels  of 
investment in agriculture, high levels of protection for a low-productivity, low-income sector 
employing very large numbers of people at levels of marginal productivity close to zero, created 




In the aftermath of the Second World War rising incomes led to an increase in the demand for 
food which called for a rapid and persistent increase in investment and productivity in the 
agricultural sector. Because the defeat of Germany and Japan was followed by the largest 
continuous industrialization boom in modern history, the relative weight of the agricultural 
sector in most economies rapidly declined as people moved out of the sector. But because 
                                                 
336 Milward (1992), 283. See also Griffiths and Milward, (1986). 
337 Milward (1985), 5.   96
demand  for  food  expanded  this  was  to  increase  the  political  power  of  farmers  bringing 
agriculture into the postwar political consensus on which political stability depended. After 
the war governments adopted a whole series of measures designed to increase incomes in 
agriculture, but they did so in the context where the two acute problems of the interwar 
period, the low level of demand for primary products and the inability of political society to 
come to terms with economic change in the agricultural sector, had been cured by the war. It 
was the war which removed two serious obstacles from the way governments determined to 
raise per capita incomes by industrialization. The economic events of the war left agriculture 
in Europe, north America, and Asia in a position to contribute to the large increase in national 
product after 1945 in a way in which it could not have done before 1939. The Second World 
War thus undermined the position of those opposed to the modernization of the agricultural 
sector  and  accelerated  the  rationalization  of  units  of  land-holding.  If  governments  in  all 
developed economies continued to use the rhetoric of protecting the family farm as a way of 
life, it was in Alan Milward’s view, only to disguise the dramatic changes which were taking 
place  in  the  sector  worldwide.  A  combination  of  rapid  industrialization  and  subsidized 
investment  in  agriculture  in  the  context  of  rapidly  increasing  incomes  was  to  transform 
agriculture  into  a  profitable  sector  in  which  returns  to  capital  and  labor  were  increasing 
rapidly while the numbers employed in the sector shrank dramatically. The one thing which 
was certainly not protected was agriculture as a way of life with the family farm at its centre. 
  The  post-1945  world,  in  striking  contrast  to  the  pre-1939  world,  was  one  of  food 
shortage. The coincidence of high demand and low supply after the war naturally led to the 
persistence of the idea that some form of management of agricultural markets on the national 
and international levels was practical and desirable. By 1950 the first western European plans 
for the international management of agricultural markets through a ‘green pool’ were being 
discussed at the highest levels and there is a distinct connecting thread between intervention 
in the management of agriculture and food supply in the Second World War and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EEC, whose tentacles were soon to extend to the control of 
food supply into Europe from other parts of the world.  
  If the objective of preserving the family farm and of farming as a way of life was 
judged by Alan Milward to be part of a myth cultivated by national governments and then 
repeated  by  the  European  Commission  in  defense  of  their  common  sectoral  regulation 
another equally powerful myth, which he sought to expose, was that European integration 
was the result of a change in political thought. As an historian, he saw the need to establish 
‘in what way the political movements in favour of European unity had anything other than an   97
insignificant impact on international political and economic agreements’. Unable to establish 
any direct impact of such groups on the creation of the ECSC he viewed such explanations as 
‘no more than observations of a minor albeit interesting phenomenon.’
338 But in recognition 
of the continuing hold on opinion which ‘the idea of Europe’ had and of the influence of 
those who subscribed to it, he returned to the question in a chapter provocatively entitled 
‘The  lives  and  teachings  of  the  European  saints’.
339 Here  he  argued  that  the  ‘great  men’ 
commonly  acknowledged  as  the  ‘founding  fathers  of  Europe’  converted  to  the  cause  of 
European integration only when it was seen to be necessary to preserve the nation-state. 
Quoting  Robert  Schuman  ‘[o]ur  European  states  are  a  historical  reality;  it  would  be 
psychologically impossible to make them disappear. Their diversity is in fact very fortunate 
and we do not want either to level them or to equalize them.’
340 Of the German Chancellor 
Konrad  Adenauer,  he  said  ‘Adenauer  was  unswerving  in  his  idea  that  western  European 
integration must be the basis of the Federal Republic’s security and that it was ultimately the 
only  chance  of  German  reunification.’
341  Jean  Monnet,  as  he  reminded  readers,  was  the 
architect of French national economic planning and was initially opposed to the common 
market, seeing the atomic energy community (Euratom) as more important. Monnet was also, 
as Milward pointed out, the least democratic of the founding fathers, never having had to 
fight an election. It was due to Monnet’s influence, Milward said, that the EEC Treaty of 
Rome paid little attention to democratic accountability.
342 The challenge which Alan Milward 
threw down to those who continued to believe that it was the ‘idea of Europe’ itself which 
had determined postwar integration was to explain how an abstract idea came to be translated 
into  policy.
  ‘Was  the  idea,’  he  questioned,  ‘just  floating  in  the  air  around  the  élite  true 
believers, a bottle from which in deadlock they could take a swig of Eurospirit?’
343 However, 
it is evident that ‘ideational’ approaches have  become increasingly influential in political 
science since the mid 1990s, with one of the key issues being the role played by ideas in 
explaining political outcomes. 
  It was clear from the early reviews of The European Rescue of the Nation-State that 
what critics on both the right and the left found hard to accept was Milward’s focus on 
domestic politics in Europe as the mainsprings of integration rather than on the Cold War and 
the  support  given  by  the  United  States  to  the  unification  of  Europe.  Anthony  Hartley 
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defended the conventional view in asserting that ‘[t]o ignore the political motives of the 
“founding fathers” and, above all, of the United States for backing European integration is to 
fail to understand European politics in the 1950s and perhaps also in the 1990s.’
344 Roger 
Morgan found little new in Alan Milward’s argument about the primacy of the nation-state 
suggesting that it was what many political scientists had been arguing since Stanley Hoffman 
had first suggested it in the mid 1960s.
345 Derek Urwin was unconvinced by the ‘rescue 
thesis’, but for different reasons. More would need to be said, he thought, about why other 
European countries, particularly those in Scandinavia, played such a minor role in European 
integration in the 1950s.
346 
  The longest and one of the most thoughtful reviews came from an expert in European 
Community law for whom Alan Milward’s explanation of the origins of European integration 
made the current legal complexities and apparent contradictions of the European Union and 
of its law, intelligible for the first time.
347 Most lawyers, as Ian Ward explained, had been 
disappointed by the failures of the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty to resolve 
the perceived constitutional inadequacies of the Treaty of Rome: 
 
The  European  Constitution  […]  remains  somewhat  ill-defined  and  under-developed.  It  is 
clearly something more, at least in practice, than what is stated in the rhetoric of the Treaty 
framework. Yet, at the same time, as the European Court has reined back from its earlier more 
aggressive integrational impulses, the constitutional vacuum appears all the greater. It remains 
ill-defined simply because there remains a residual political uncertainty as to how the new 
Union  should  be  determined.  This  is  not  to  mean  that  the  individual  Member  States  are 
uncertain.  Everyone  has  their  own  opinions.  The  problem  is  that  there  is  a  corporate 




As far as Ward was concerned, Alan Milward had exposed as fiction the notion that the 
member states had ever wanted a genuine European constitution and it was the Community’s 
ideological  rhetoric  which  had  fooled  everyone.  The  one  measure,  he  maintained,  which 
‘could effect a genuinely free market and represent a corresponding economic and political 
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diminution in national sovereignty, tax harmonization, has remained strikingly absent’.
349 The 
conclusion that in the mid 1990s he extracted from Alan Milward’s work continues to be 
relevant today: ‘There will be no further progress towards a European constitution unless it 
becomes clear that such a step is unavoidable to the interest of the nation-states.’
350 
  Although Alan Milward was not the first to emphasize the resilience of the European 
nation-state, he was the first to argue that integration was a positive choice taken by EC 
member states primarily, although not exclusively, for domestic social and economic reasons. 
It was a non-liberal solution to a number of problems facing the European nation-states which 
neither governments nor markets could solve on their own. It was the challenge of many of 
his arguments which captured the interest of a leading Marxist intellectual, Perry Anderson. 
Marx, as Alan Milward pointed out, had not predicted that integration would be a stage in the 
development of capitalism. ‘When the European Community started in 1950-52 there was 
nothing in the dried tea-leaves of Marxist analysis that referred to it.’
351 Anderson’s own 
conclusions  were  fundamentally  different  from  those  of  Alan  Milward.  In  opposition  to 
Milward, Anderson argued that Nazi Germany had to be defeated militarily because it did not 
collapse economically and it was this fact which explained why France opted for integration. 
As Anderson wrote, 
 
It was the memory of this incommensurable record during the war – of the scale of German 
military supremacy, and its consequences – that shaped European integration quite as much as 
the commensurate tasks of rebuilding nation-states on a more prosperous and democratic basis 




While Alan Milward did not disagree with the importance of providing military security in 
the  postwar  world,  he  argued  that  it  did  not  explain  the  new  phenomenon  of  European 
integration. ‘There were other diplomatic arrangements by which an effort could have been 
made  to  bind  west  Germany  to  western  Europe’,  he  wrote.
353  The  creation  of  the  North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may have been a precondition for the Schuman plan 
but, in his view, the need to provide security against Germany did not entirely explain the 
decision to integrate the coal and steel sectors of the economies of the six signatory states of 
the Treaty of Paris. The lessons which western European states had drawn from their defeat 
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by Nazi Germany was that not only did they need to increase their levels of armaments to 
provide for the physical security of their populations but, even more importantly, they had to 
win the allegiance of their populations by providing for their economic security. If in order to 
provide military security economic security was undermined then military security would be 
without meaning. Controlling the coal and steel industries, including those of West Germany, 
through integration was a means of enhancing the economic security of Western Europe. Had 
Western Europe not enjoyed ten years of peace and prosperity by the mid 1950s, the Treaties 
of Rome would have been unimaginable. Whereas providing economic security required a 
degree  of  integration  military  security  did  not.  The  one  attempt  to  combine  military  and 
economic  security,  that  of  the  European  Defense  Community  (EDC),  ended  in  failure. 
Indeed, as Alan Milward reminded readers, to have integrated West Germany into a defense 
community was seen by many, particularly in France, as a threat to European security. But 
Milward’s insistence that it was the popular demands for economic security which explained 
national  governments’  choice  of  integration  was  rejected  by  Anderson  for  whom  ‘the 
federalist vision of a supranational Europe developed above all by Monnet and his circle, the 
small group of technocrats who conceived the original ECSC, and drafted much of the detail 
of the EEC’ was a more convincing explanation.
354 
  Alan Milward had a further difficulty in accepting the view of Anderson that at the 
center of the process of European integration was an agreement between France and West 
Germany based on military security, which incidentally was also the view of most British 
diplomatic historians. If this was so, why was the United Kingdom not a signatory to the 
Treaties  of  Rome  in  1957?  The  United  Kingdom,  as  he  pointed  out,  had  been  ‘closely 
involved with western Europe’s reconstruction and security throughout the war and also from 
the moment it ended. To judge from the volume of documentation in the Foreign Office 
archives,  no  question  was  considered  more  important  to  Britain’s  future  than  that  of 
Germany’s future.’
355 But since, as he also explained, the United Kingdom had many of the 
same  domestic  political  priorities  as  western  Europe  such  as  a  commitment  to  full 
employment, the welfare state, and protection of agriculture, the question which he needed to 
answer  was  why  the  British  state  did  not  perceive  the  need  to  surrender  a  degree  of 
sovereignty to ensure the implementation of these domestic policies as well as addressing the 
problem of Germany. Did his ‘rescue thesis’ not apply to Britain? 
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  In a final chapter of The European Rescue of the Nation-State he suggested that the key 
to understanding why Britain did not need the supranational Community institutions was to 
be found in the policies pursued after 1950: 
 
Just as it is the Beyen Plan which more than any other single event illuminates the common 
foundations supporting European integration, it is through the example of British attempts to 
establish the free convertibility of sterling into American dollars on international exchanges 
between 1952 and 1955 that we can most sharply perceive the incompatibilities separating 
British ambitions from European interests and American hopes.
356 
 
As far as the British state was concerned, the Bretton Woods system of which Britain was an 
architect,  had  been  put  to  one  side  temporarily  while  the  Marshall  plan  was  being 
implemented. After that, Britain’s over-riding interest was in reestablishing sterling as one of 
the two international currencies, even if that meant letting the exchange rate float in the early 
1950s rather than participating in the soft currency area of the EPU. For Britain it was more 
important  to  try  to  earn  dollars  directly  in  the  market  of  the  United  States  rather  than 
indirectly  through  exporting  to  western  Europe.  But  what  Britain  apparently  failed  to 
recognize was that, in the internal divisions within the U.S. administration, it was the view of 
the State Department prioritizing the need for European integration which had the support of 
the President and which better came to reflect the ambitions of the United States.
357 This 
meant that even though the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve remained committed to 
one-world multilateralism, this had to take a back seat as long as the majority of European 
participants in the EPU needed special support to achieve their domestic policy objectives. 
Indeed, had the British government implemented its policy of restoring the convertibility of 
sterling  when  most  other  European  currencies  remained  non  convertible,  it  would  have 
reduced western European trade substantially. In these circumstances, the United States was 
never going to give its support to a unilateral decision by Britain to restore the convertibility 
of sterling. ‘For all the Western European states any progress towards convertibility which 
might involve even a temporary loss of trade was to be rejected, and especially anything 
which  jeopardised  their  common  commercial  arrangements.’
358  In  retrospect,  Milward 
concluded, 
 
the view of the US financial authorities looks mistaken. The Bretton Woods agreements, while 
they had devoted much effort to making an international system of trade and payments which 
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was compatible with full employment policies, had taken no account of how the system of fixed 
exchange rates which they introduced could be maintained when so many other policies and 
policy instruments were going to be employed at will by national governments.
359 
 
He thought that the British government had made a policy error in assuming that the French 
government  and  industry  would  be  fearful  of  competing  with  German  exports  within  a 
European common market and would therefore never agree to sign the Treaties of Rome. 
‘The startling absence of genuine comparison with any other European country in the many 
memoranda  and  analyses  of  Britain’s  economic  position  gives  the  impression  of  a 
hermetically sealed system with so little outward vision that no understanding of European 
developments could be possible’, he concluded.
360 
 
10. Britain’s Place in the World. A historical enquiry into import controls 1945-60 (1996)  
 
In the second edition of The European Rescue of the Nation-State published in 2000, Alan 
Milward was more understanding of the reasons behind British policy in the 1950s.
 This was 
because in 1993, shortly after the publication of the first edition of The European Rescue, he 
had accepted an invitation from the British Cabinet Office to write the Official History of the 
Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community and its subsequent relations 
with the Community up to the mid-1980s. The work, commissioned in two volumes, was to 
be based on unrestricted access to British government records for the period in question. 
When  he  accepted  the  invitation  to  write  the  official  history  Alan  Milward  was  already 
working  with  George  Brennan  on  a  topic  which  he  felt  had  long  been  overlooked  by 
historians and economists – namely the impact of quantitative import controls, more often 
referred to as import quotas, on the British economy and on British policy-making in the 
fifteen years after the end of the Second World War.
361 As the title of the book indicated this 
was to be much more than a technical study about an unfashionable topic, but was to address 
a central question and one of Alan Milward’s long-term research interests, namely how trade 
should be regulated in the interests of the modern state. If tariffs had in the nineteenth century 
served as an instrument of state building in many countries, in so far as they provided the 
money for government expenditure, supported the objectives of foreign policy, occasionally 
protected  and  encouraged  manufactures  and  trades  that  were  considered  essential  to  the 
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state’s welfare, and served the constitutional purpose of balancing and compromising the 
economic and political interests of large and influential social groups, it was Milward and 
Brennan’s argument that many of these functions were performed by quotas in the twentieth 
century. Quantitative restrictions, in the form of import quotas or state-controlled foreign 
trade,  became  a  new  instrument  to  be  used  by  modern  states  to  achieve  a  number  of 
economic, political, and social objectives. 
  One  big  disadvantage  of  quotas  was  that,  unlike  tariffs,  they  were  not  a  source  of 
revenue for the government but their one big advantage was seen to be that they could be 
imposed  quickly  in  response  to  an  economic  crisis  without  having  to  endure  lengthy 
parliamentary debates. Whereas it had taken almost twenty years before the Méline tariff, 
imposed  on  imported  grain  from  North  America,  was  passed  by  the  French  National 
Assembly, quotas on imports of food from central and eastern Europe were imposed within 
two years of the 1929 crisis.
362 Furthermore, at a time when prices were falling steeply, they 
proved to be a more effective form of protection than ad valorem tariffs. Their proliferation 
across  Europe  in  the  1930s  and  1940s  coincided  with  the  increasing  refinement  of 
government statistics, and along with a plethora of other controls over the economy, they 
became difficult to dismantle after the war. In fact, as Milward and Brennan showed, many 
countries based their postwar national reconstruction plans on the retention of quotas, thereby 
posing a direct challenge to the U.S. government’s ambitions of creating a non-discriminatory 
multilateral regime of trade and payments. Even though the United States insisted in 1947 
that quotas should be permitted only in exceptional circumstances when justified on grounds 
of national security, to protect domestic agriculture, or to correct a temporary crisis in the 
balance  of  payments,  it  was  clear  that  the  west  European  governments  interpreted  the 
exceptions more widely.
 In early 1950 Hugh Gaitskell, soon to become the British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, insisted that import controls would be needed to ensure full employment 
and economic reconstruction.
363 Indeed in Britain, as they showed, quotas served a variety of 
purposes  ranging  from  national  defense,  regional  policy,  and  macro-economic  policy  to 
straightforward protectionism. Because they did not have to be debated by parliament their 
specific  purpose  could  be  kept  secret.  But,  in  spite  of  their  secret  nature,  Milward  and 
Brennan found only one instance where private interests were able to influence government 
policy on quotas; that exception was the British car industry.
364 It was in the United States 
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where tariffs retained their importance because, as they suggested, imported goods accounted 
for such a small part of domestic consumption. Since tariff levels had to be agreed by the 
U.S. Congress one problem which this posed for western European governments was that in 
negotiating  tariff  reductions  in  order  to  boost  their  exports  to  the  United  States,  any 
concessions made by the U.S. negotiators could be reversed if a two-thirds majority in the 
Congress demanded it. 
  Faced with the U.S. enthusiasm for the creation of a customs union in western Europe 
which, in the opinion of the British government could only hurt the British economy, the 
British government looked for alternative ways to take a leadership role in integrating Europe 
which would not undermine its central objective of restoring a one-world trade and payments 
system: ‘Only a worldwide, multilateral, commercial and payments framework offered the 
United  Kingdom  the  chance  to  pursue  a  common  commercial  policy  towards  the 
Commonwealth, the USA and Europe, the three areas on which its central place in the world 
was thought to depend.’
365 The British government wanted to reduce trade barriers between 
western European economies, but only as a step toward reducing them between Europe and 
the United States. Since the tariff that the British government most wanted to force down was 
that of the United States, it wanted to retain its existing tariff levels in Europe in order to be 
able to use them as a future bargaining counter in tariff negotiations with the United States. 
At that time British tariffs were among the highest in Western Europe, capped only by those 
of the two most protectionist states, France and Italy.
366 Since any tariff reductions, unless 
they formed part of a customs union, would have to be negotiated through GATT, it would 
not be possible for the United Kingdom to present them to the United States as a European 
initiative. The advantage of proposing that the liberalization of European trade should take 
the form of a widening of import quotas was that it would extend to all the countries in OEEC 
and make it harder for them to reduce tariffs or remove them altogether in a customs union.
367 
If  a  ‘non-discriminatory’  world  meant  for  the  United  States  the  end  of  the  preferential 
arrangements of the Commonwealth and the sterling area, the British tried to prove that a first 
step toward that world was the gradual removal of quantitative restrictions on OEEC trade. 
  Initially, the strategy seemed to work as Britain intended. Whereas with the cushion of 
import quotas west European governments had agreed to a first round of tariff reductions 
within the new framework of GATT in 1947, there were to be no further reductions in tariffs 
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within western Europe or between it and the United States after Britain took the lead within 
OEEC to organize the widening of import quotas. But the United Kingdom soon found itself 
in a very weak position, since any relaxation of import quotas on intra-European trade, in line 
with  the  OEEC-sponsored  trade  liberalization  program  and  facilitated  by  the  EPU’s 
automatic credit facilities, almost invariably resulted in balance of payments difficulties and a 
new postponement of the ultimate goal of sterling convertibility. This was to change after 
1957 when, strengthened by the boom in intra-European trade, six European governments 
agreed to reduce tariffs and widen quotas within the regional arrangement of the EEC and to 
contemplate for the first time weakening their quota protection against imports from North 
America,  ‘although  their  demands  for  reductions  in  American  tariffs  were  incessant  all 
through the decade.’
368 Trade liberalization, Milward and Brennan stressed, followed rather 
than caused the great expansion in European trade which had taken place in the 1950s. Even 
when quotas became less important in trade between developed countries, they reappeared as 
a  way  of  protecting  indigenous  manufacturing  industry  against  imports  from  developing 
countries. The EEC Treaty of Rome,  as they pointed out, was deliberately vague in this 
respect. Britain was left with little option but to form the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) which gave it little bargaining power with Washington. By contrast, the six EEC 
member states were able to control tariff bargaining with the United States through the new 
European Commission.
369 
  In comparison with all of Milward’s previous books, apart from The Economic Effects 
of the Two World Wars on Britain, the reviews of Britain’s Place in the World were few in 
number.  As  so  often,  reviewers  found  the  detailed  complexity  of  the  arguments  quite  a 
challenge. This time it was Andrew Gamble, a professor of political science, who was most 
stimulated by the arguments of the book. In his view the essential question which it raised 
was whether British governments were ever correct to believe that they could protect British 
interests outside a regional arrangement in Europe. As Gamble put it, 
 
[i]f Milward and Brennan are right the failure of the British economy to modernise successfully 
in the 1960s and 1970s and to perform as well as the other European economies was directly 
related to the policy mistake of backing liberalisation in the 1950s and shunning the protection 
which would have been provided inside the EEC.
370 
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Alan Milward, anticipating perhaps the conclusions which he was to reach in his official 
history,  explained  in  his  reply  to  Gamble  that  Brennan  and  he  had  deliberately  avoided 
specifying such an argument since ‘it seemed to us that many other things were at stake, 
some  of  them  still  waiting  for  good  historical  analysis.’
371  The  crux  of  the  problem  for 
Britain, as he saw it, was that the period 1948-1956 represented a time, perhaps, he thought, 
the  last  time,  that  Britain  had  a  coherent  framework  for  its  foreign  policy  and  foreign 
economic policy. That framework was the one-world system, a goal which Britain would find 
it impossible to achieve. The best hope for Britain was that the alternative of the EEC would 
prove to be equally impossible to achieve. 
 
11. The United Kingdom and the European Community. The Rise and Fall of a National 
Strategy (2002) 
 
In agreeing to write the Official History of Britain’s relations with the European Community, 
Alan Milward looked forward to explaining why, despite being a victor in the Second World 
War, Britain ended up in a much weaker position than other western European countries.
372 
His  conclusion  to  the  first  edition  of  The  European  Rescue  of  the  Nation-State  was  that 
Britain had made a mistake in withdrawing from the negotiations which led to the Treaties of 
Rome for which it was to suffer both economically and politically.
373 His exasperation with 
the policy-makers and the universities which had produced them was palpable. Determined to 
explore every nook and cranny of the British state which might help to explain Britain’s 
policy toward Europe,  he looked not only  at the by-then  familiar  records of the Foreign 
Office,  Cabinet,  and  Treasury  but  also  at  those  of  the  ministries  of  Transport,  Fuel  and 
Power, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Northern Ireland Public Record Office, the 
Dominions  Office,  and  the  Free  Trade  Office,  which  had  not  been  much  disturbed  by 
diplomatic historians. He also had privileged access to the notes written in shorthand by the 
Cabinet Secretary which identified who said what in Cabinet discussions. 
  The tone throughout the five hundred pages of volume one of the Official History was 
carefully measured and impartial. He made it clear at the very beginning that he did not 
accept the view of many historians, that it was the British government’s deluded ambitions to 
remain a global power, when it no longer had the resources to underpin such ambitions, 
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which explained why it had not participated in the moves to integrate western Europe in the 
1950s. Although he had argued in the first edition of The European Rescue that the British 
government had made a mistake, in the revised second edition he concluded that ‘[l]ooking at 
the evidence for the 1950s it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise.’
374 The 
argument, which he finally reached after many years of research, was that the state in postwar 
Britain did have a realistic national strategy which it pursued consistently, but it was one 
which did not work. As he explained, 
 
the UK emerged from the war with many great but short term advantages. Adjusting to 
the post-war world meant cashing in those advantages while they were still there in 
return  for  a  stable  international  framework  which  would  guarantee  the  two  main 
objectives of post-war governments, military security and domestic prosperity. By and 
large that was the strategy pursued, with remarkably little difference by the two great 
political parties when they were in office[.]
375 
 
He set out to explain why that national strategy had not worked. This involved understanding 
how policy and economies changed in Western Europe, the United States, across the British 
Empire, the Commonwealth and beyond in the years after 1945. In terms of its global reach it 
was a sequel to his earlier work on the Second World War, but in terms of the requirements 
of writing an official history, it was a very different type of history. While he had unrestricted 
access to British government archives, he did not have similar access to the archives of those 
countries whose actions affected British policy. 
  What Milward was required to do was document and explain the evolution of Britain’s 
relations with the European Community and their pre-history. That he chose to do so within 
the framework of a national strategy was no surprise. His unique approach to writing the 
history of twentieth-century Europe was to view the role played by the state in terms of its 
seeking to fulfill the twin objectives of military security and domestic prosperity. He used the 
term ‘national strategy’ as he had used that of ‘strategic synthesis’ to analyze the interplay of 
domestic and foreign policy: it was how he viewed the modern state’s attempt to secure its 
place in the world. Where better to view British policy toward the European Community than 
from the Chair in the History of European Integration at the EUI which he had helped to 
found and to which he returned in 1996 
  The advantages which he demonstrated that the United Kingdom enjoyed at the war’s 
end included  
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its ability to build its own nuclear weapons with their independent delivery system; its 
tariff preferences on extra-European Commonwealth markets; the former importance, 
which it hoped to restore, of London as an international capital market; its strategic 
usefulness to the USA as an offshore European naval- and air-base more secure against 
invasion than anywhere on the continental mainland; its large colonial empire, which 
gave it political influence over extensive areas of Africa and the Caribbean; its large 
armed forces, which were seen from the Pentagon as the only large […] force on which 
the USA could rely for help as an ally.
376 
 
British strategy, Alan Milward insisted, was not based on a will to exercise worldwide power 
but rather as ‘a medium-sized materialist democracy’ to provide both military and economic 
security for its population.
377 Military security was seen to depend on a continuation of the 
wartime alliance with the United States, strengthened by NATO and Britain’s own atomic 
weapons, while economic security was seen to depend, among other things, on a return to an 
older world, the world of the pre-1914 gold standard when western Europe had provided the 
largest market for British exports. The recourse to many forms of trade protection in both 
western Europe and the United States as a way out of the Great Depression of 1929-1932 had 
led to a redirection of British exports to the markets of the Empire and the Commonwealth 
where they enjoyed preferential tariffs. These trade flows had persisted during the Second 
World War, with the result that in the postwar period a much higher proportion of British 
exports went to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand than to western Europe or the United 
States.  In  1951,  for  example,  Australia  was  the  largest  market  for  British  exports  taking 
twelve per cent of its overall total in comparison with 5.1% of exports going to the United 
States and 1.9% to the Federal Republic of Germany.
378 The challenge facing British policy 
makers was to find a way of using imperial preferences to force down tariffs in western 
Europe and the United States. Indeed, as he stressed, ‘it is as a part of that adjustment to the 
post-war  world  at  which  national  strategy  aimed  that  relations  between  Britain  and  the 
European Community should be understood, rather than in the framework of the simplistic 
question of whether the United Kingdom should have joined the European Communities or 
not.’
379 
  It  was  the  Foreign  Office  official,  Orme  Sargent,  who,  in  Milward’s  view,  clearly 
expressed Britain’s position and objectives in July 1945: ‘The United Kingdom could make 
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itself treated as an equal in the post-war world by the two emergent superpowers if and only 
if it also retained the leadership not only of the Commonwealth but of western Europe.’ As 
Milward  put  it  ‘[t]o  be  a  leading  influence  in  each  of  those  areas  –  Washington,  the 
Commonwealth, and western Europe – depended on retaining a leading influence in the other 
two.’
380 The essence of the strategy pursued by the United Kingdom until it finally had to be 
abandoned in 1962 was to steer some sort of European block along with the Commonwealth 
into  a  trading  world  with  the  United  States  in  a  way  that  would  guarantee  military  and 
economic security at home. It was ‘the one-world policy’, in the jargon of British officials. 
The country whose policy Britain most needed to influence was the United States. Although 
the Americans had made a commitment in the agreement reached at Bretton Woods in 1944 
to the restoration of a liberal world order based on free trade and currencies freely convertible 
into gold, dollars, and sterling at a fixed rate of exchange, their failure to ratify the ITO and to 
make a serious commitment to reduce their tariffs in order to enable Britain and the rest of 
the  world  to  earn  dollars  by  exporting  to  the  United  States  was  seriously  undermining 
confidence  in  Britain  that  the  United  States  was  indeed  committed  to  the  multilateral 
principles agreed in 1944.  
  British confidence in the credibility of that commitment had already been shaken by the 
insistence of the U.S. Treasury that in return for a postwar dollar loan Britain should remove 
all capital controls and restore the convertibility of sterling in August 1947 without regard to 
whether  the  recovery  of  the  British  economy  had  been  completed  or  not.  The  offer  of 
Marshall aid, which Milward had already argued in The Reconstruction of Western Europe 
was an instrument of the Cold War motivated by the political necessity of ensuring that the 
western zones of Germany and western Europe would remain in the United States’ sphere of 
influence, was not a step in the direction of Bretton Woods, and nor was it intended to be.
 But 
if its motivation was political, Marshall aid in itself did not commit the United States to the 
defense of western Europe. Indeed, in his view, it was not until December 1950, almost two 
years after the agreement to form NATO, when General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, that the U.S. commitment to defend western Europe 
took  on  any  operational  meaning.  Until  then,  as  Alan  Milward  wryly remarked,  ‘the  only 
true impediment which the North Atlantic Treaty raised against an attack by the Soviets was 
the number of committees in their way.’
381 
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  It was one thing to define the grand strategic objectives, as Sargent had done, but quite 
another, as Milward showed, to work out what the practical international policies should be to 
realize those objectives. Obtaining consent to them in Washington was hard, but ‘[f]itting 
France, with its own national ambitions, into this framework was […] impossible.’
382 The 
British government was trying to use the political and economic weight which its temporary 
leadership over the Empire and the Commonwealth gave it to end the protectionism of both 
the United States and western Europe, in a way which did not undermine its own domestic 
economic interests, and at the same time persuade the United States to make a long-term 
commitment  to  defending  Britain  and  its  interests  worldwide.  It  took  seventeen  years  to 
recognize that such a national strategy had failed. By 1962 it was clear that the EEC had 
become a preferential trade bloc which, particularly through the CAP, would discriminate 
against the food exports of the most important countries in the Commonwealth and against 
the poorest countries in the world. 
  Could Britain have played its hand better when faced with a series of initiatives from 
the  United  States  and  France  which  undermined  its  long-term  objective  of  restoring  a 
multilateral world order based on domestic full employment? Sparing no detail and refusing 
to gloss over the full complexities of the issues, Milward documented the internal debates 
within the British government which followed every shift in tactics by the United States and 
France over the period 1945-1963, as they too sought to implement their national strategies. 
Critical  turning  points  with  their  possible  implications  for  British  strategy  such  as  the 
announcements  of  the  Marshall  plan  in  June  1947,  the  Schuman  Plan  in  May  1950,  the 
Pleven Plan for a European army in October 1950, the creation of the organizational structure 
of NATO in December 1950, and the plans to create Euratom and the EEC which resulted in 
the  Treaties  of  Rome  in  March  1957,  were  all  assessed.  He  made  few  references  to  the 
secondary literature except where they related to key issues of political debate in the United 
Kingdom.  He  also  examined  critical  issues  which  politicians  and  historians  should  have 
debated,  such  as  that  of  national  sovereignty,  but  did  not.  Internal  policy  debates  and 
international negotiations were set in the context of a changing international economy, in 
which levels of production, investment, and trade affected and were affected in turn by those 
debates. 
  Starting in 1945, he underlined how Britain was the only partner of similar weight to 
the United States on the Security Council of the United Nations, with a currency used in trade 
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across  the  world  and  which  shared  the  U.S.  strategy  of  reconstructing  an  international 
economic order  along the lines of the  Bretton  Woods agreement. This was to mean that 
Britain would have to dismantle its own system of preferential tariffs on trade with its Empire 
and Commonwealth which had been introduced in response to the Great Depression and was, 
as a condition of a dollar loan negotiated with the United States in 1945, to make sterling 
freely convertible into gold and dollars in August 1947. As Milward showed, ‘[u]ntil summer 
1947  British-American  relations  were  dominated,  not  by  the  question  of  European 
reconstruction, but by that of the reconstruction of an international economic order.’
383 On 
the other hand France was seen to be the only partner in Europe capable of assisting in the 
defense of Britain once the United States had withdrawn its troops from the continent as soon 
as the occupation of Germany had come to an end: 
 
At  the  best,  common  action  with  France  in  reconstructing  Europe  might  offer  alternative 
strategic possibilities to succumbing to American pressures which might preclude any choice of 
an international commercial and economic framework other than one dictated by the USA’s 
own national strategy, as had happened with the USA’s absolute insistence, against all evidence 
that it would not succeed, on the over-hasty move to sterling-dollar convertibility.
384 
 
What Britain needed to do in order to attain its national strategic goals was use its leadership 
of the Commonwealth in order to strengthen its bargaining position with the United States 
and ensure that the latter would make a greater commitment to restoring an international 
order,  most  notably  by  reducing  its  own  tariffs,  while  at  the  same  time  exploiting  its 
leadership of western Europe in order to ensure that the United States would make a more 
effective commitment to the security of Britain than was possible through the United Nations. 
This was how Milward explained one question which had long puzzled historians, namely 
how to interpret Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s call in January 1947 for a study into the 
implications for the United Kingdom of forming a customs union with France, or with the 
French Union or with western Europe. Did this represent a recognition that Britain’s future 
might lie in a closer association with Western Europe rather than with the United States? 
Milward was clear that Bevin’s intention was to bind Western Europe more closely to the 
United  Kingdom  ‘as  part  of  an  Anglo-American  duumvirate’.
385  It  was  thus  motivated 
primarily by foreign policy considerations: 
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From mid-1946 onwards, with de Gaulle gone from office and centre-left coalitions in power in 
Paris and as yet with little to indicate that US policy would change from the course Roosevelt 
had  set,  Foreign  Office  eyes  turned  increasingly  towards  the  prospects  of  Franco-British 
association as the core of security and stabilisation in Europe, although economic ministries 
showed little enthusiasm for what they thought might prove a burden.
386 
 
Many in the British economic ministries feared that a possible customs union would be ‘a 
road  to  nowhere,  starting  with  discrimination  against  the  USA,  perhaps  involving 
discrimination against the Commonwealth and in favour of Europe, and ending with loss of 
control over instruments of domestic policy.’
387 
  This remained their position even when it became the policy of the United States to 
promote the formation of a customs union in western Europe backed with Marshall aid. A 
wiser course of action, which was agreed upon after two years of further deliberation, was 
seen to be the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade in OEEC while maintaining tariffs 
as  a  future  bargaining  counter  with  the  United  States.  The  proposal  to  liberalize  intra-
European  trade  by  widening  quotas,  to  which  Milward  had  devoted  an  entire  book,  was 
‘intended to be the limit of the United Kingdom’s commitment to the leadership of western 
Europe. It was not an act of cooperation with France but more an attempt to prevent any 
French leadership of western Europe by exposing the protectionism of the French state.’
388 
As he showed, it remained the position of the United Kingdom that the support of the United 
States  was  vital  for  the  security  of  Britain,  the  Commonwealth,  and  Western  Europe.  In 
October 1949, as a discussion in Cabinet confirmed, the Commonwealth was ‘not a strategic 
unit’ and ‘it must be clear to other Commonwealth members that their defence cannot be 
assured without United States support’.
389 The same was to hold true for western Europe: 
 
the fact remains that the military and economic situation of the Western European nations is 
now such that there can be no immediate prospect of welding them into a prosperous and secure 
entity without American help; and even with American help it is uncertain whether this can be 
achieved for some time to come.
390 
 
Britain’s military security could only be guaranteed by the United States. For Britain itself, 
the installation of U.S. bases in the United Kingdom for the U.S. Strategic Air Command 
nuclear bomber ‘introduced a brutal demarcation between the United Kingdom’s national 
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security and that of its continental neighbors. One objective of national strategy, the physical 
security of the national territory, had been attained.’
391 
  The announcement of the Schuman Plan, which in retrospect has been seen to have 
changed the course of European history, did not greatly alter the way in which the pursuit of 
British national strategy was perceived. It was not, Milward insisted, a Machiavellian plot to 
exclude Britain, as some politicians and historians were to argue. Nor were either Schuman or 
Monnet third-force neutralists. With the nationalized coal industry opposed to it and the steel 
industry broadly in favor, the British government’s interest was in one way or another to find 
a  way  of  living  with  it.  One  thing  seemed  certain,  a  future  European  supranational 
organization would be preferable to the International Authority for the Ruhr, which was so 
opposed  by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  British  ministers,  he  revealed,  were  not 
opposed to the principle of giving up some power over the coal and steel industries to an 
international body if it would benefit the British economy, but they were not in favor of doing 
so for a foreign policy which did not fit into Britain’s national strategy.
392 Of course that 
strategy could be changed but, as he showed, the argument of the Foreign Office at the time 
was that for Britain joining what was to become the ECSC ‘would reduce its independence 
from, and thus its status and influence with, the USA, while at the same time weakening its 
links with the Commonwealth and thus even further reducing its influence over the USA.’
393 
The speedy decision which the government was forced to make by the French on 2 June 1950 
was  not  the  ‘fatefully  wrong  step  in  Europe  for  which  it  was  to  suffer  politically  and 
economically for twenty years.’
394 But, as he made clear, to have accepted Schuman’s offer 
‘would have meant a commitment of political support over the long run to a reconstruction of 
the pattern of political power in Europe in which the United Kingdom, unless its strategy 
changed,  could  not  share.’
395  There  was  no  compelling  need  to  make  such  an  important 
decision in 1950 and, moreover, it would not have meant that Britain would necessarily have 
signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957. 
  Instead of joining the ECSC the British government was eventually to sign a Treaty of 
Association with it in September 1955. That treaty, as Milward showed, produced only two 
results: ‘a UK/ECSC agreement on iron and steel tariffs which did not come until November 
1957 and a 1959 agreement to widen German coal import quotas in favour of the United 
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Kingdom.’
396 The point of devoting over forty pages to an analysis of the steps leading to 
such  an  inconsequential  treaty  of  association  was  to  demonstrate  how  poor  a  model  it 
provided for  any future relationship between Britain and the EEC. Nonetheless, it was a 
model which was proposed (but never successfully implemented) for the plans for an EDC, a 
European Agricultural Community, and a European Political Community (EPC) which were 
debated by the six ECSC member states in the period 1950-54. The general issue which all 
such proposals was seen to pose for Britain was whether it would be possible to form some 
sort of association with whatever organization materialized, without being part of its political 
machinery. Harold Macmillan, who later as Prime Minister was to take the decision to apply 
for British accession to the EEC in 1961, was, as Minister for Housing in 1952, certain of 
what the British position should be: ‘Britain’s ties with the Commonwealth and with the 
United States make it impossible for her to join a [European] Federation. She could, however, 
become  a  full  member  of  a  Confederation,  organised  on  Commonwealth  lines.’
397  He 
opposed the plan of Anthony Eden, the Prime Minister, which was nonetheless accepted by 
Cabinet  in  March  1952,  which  was  to  associate  the  United  Kingdom  with  the  emerging 
supranational institutions in Europe of the ECSC, the EDC, and the emerging EPC by placing 
them all under the Constitutional Assembly of the intergovernmental Council of Europe, of 
which Britain was an enthusiastic member.
398 
  The collapse of the EDC in the summer of 1954, and with it the EPC and the Dutch plan 
for a customs union, the Beyen plan, left Britain’s program for liberalizing trade in Europe by 
widening import quotas intact. By 1955, as Milward showed, 
 
quotas on intra-European foreign trade became more liberal than at any time since 1934, and 
even as eyes in the Treasury and the Bank [of England] focused on 1955 as the year for the re- 
introduction of sterling-dollar convertibility and a leap to the one world system, the customs 
union of the Six, regional, regulated and Eurocentric, emerged unscathed from the débris of the 
European Political Community into which Beyen had inserted it.
399 
 
How  should  Britain  have  responded  to  the  challenge  posed  by  the  continental  common 
market, Milward asked. Although it was a question which would divide opinion in Britain for 
many years, and on which consensus still proves elusive, at the time that the decision to 
withdraw from the negotiations which were to lead to the Treaties of Rome was taken, it was 
not even debated in Parliament and scarcely discussed in Cabinet or noticed in the press. 
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Clearly the advice from the Foreign Office that France  would not sign up to a common 
market with Germany proved to be wrong. On the other hand, in providing some details of 
the secret offer made to the British government by the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, in 
September 1956, on the eve of the Suez invasion, that France and Britain should form an 
economic and payments union with the sterling and franc areas to keep France out of the 
common market with West Germany, the great difficulty facing the Foreign Office advisers 
was  made  more  understandable.  Yet  Milward  remained  critical:  ‘It  was  the  business  of 
diplomats to make accurate forecasts.’ Because British policy toward the common market 
was based on the false premise that the EEC, like the EDC and EPC, would not be agreed by 
the French government ‘[t]here seems good reason to say […] that the existing policy was 
mistaken, irrespective of the question whether Britain should have been pursuing membership 
in a European customs union.’
400 Unlike most historians, who argue that it was the different 
foreign policy reactions of both the French and the British governments to the defeat of the 
Suez invasion which explained their different response to the common market, Alan Milward 
showed that, even had their Middle eastern policy been successful, the British government 
did not see it as being in its interest to form a protectionist economic bloc with France and the 
payments area using the French franc. Suez was irrelevant. 
  In dissecting the reasons for the failure of policy in the mid-1950s he pointed to the way 
that decisions were made within the British state. As an example, he referred to the divisions 
within  the  British  Treasury  which  meant  that  currency  convertibility  and  the  commercial 
policies linked to it were the responsibility of the Overseas Finance Division. Currency came 
first in that division and commercial policy was only the consequence of decisions made 
about convertibility.
401 But the dilemmas faced by those responsible for making commercial 
policy, even had they been the top priority of the Treasury were stark: ‘The United Kingdom 
did  not  have  such  an  obvious  commercial  interest  in  joining  a  European  customs  union, 
although it faced obvious danger in being excluded from it if it came into existence.’
402 In the 
mid-1950s the three richest Commonwealth countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, 
with their comparatively small populations, took nearly twenty per cent of all British exports, 
whereas  Europe  of  the  Six  took  just  over  eleven  per  cent.
403  With  the  countries  of  the 
Commonwealth opposed to Britain’s participation in a European customs union Britain had 
to continue to try to find a means of leading both Western Europe and the Commonwealth 
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toward a world of non-discriminatory trade. There was, as Milward clearly documented, no 
way left of associating with a European customs union which would be acceptable to the Six, 
the Commonwealth, and the United States. Neither a Free Trade Area between the rest of 
OEEC  and  the  EEC  nor  a  free  trade  area  independent  of  the  EEC  (EFTA)  solved  the 
dilemma. Consequently, on 21 July 1961 the decision was taken to apply for membership in 
the EEC, since the government saw it as the only way left to open negotiations and persuade 
the EEC to recognize the claims of the Commonwealth.
404 
  ‘It was not the potential loss of parliamentary sovereignty and independence of national 
policy, but rather the effort to preserve the United Kingdom’s political and economic links 
with  the  Commonwealth,  and  through  those  links  its  continuing  influence  in  the  world’, 
which  Milward  was  to  show,  dominated  most  of  the  negotiations  for  accession.
405  At  a 
meeting in the Prime Minister’s country house, Chequers, in June 1961, ministers insisted 
that exports from the three most developed Commonwealth countries should not suffer as a 
result of Britain joining the EEC. In return for losing their preferential access to the British 
market they were to be assured of ‘comparable outlets’ in the markets of the EEC. Over the 
period 1958-1961, for instance, between seventy and seventy-five per cent of New Zealand’s 
food exports went to Britain. But at the same time Britain was not to give up its preferential 
access  to  the  markets  of  the  Commonwealth.  They  were  to  be  reserved  as  a  bargaining 
counter for something more important than access to the Community, to be exploited when 
the United States returned to active tariff bargaining in GATT, as it was to do after the 
Congressional passage of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act in 1962 which authorized the White 
House  to  conduct  mutual  tariff  negotiations  and  eventually  led  to  the  Kennedy  round  of 
GATT in 1964-1967.
406 
  The nature of the preferences was, as he showed, as varied as the economies in the 
British Commonwealth. On the Australian market, which next to that of the United States 
was the most important one for British exports, the preferences given to the car industry 
enabled British cars to dominate the Australian market. Canada gave preferences only to 
those  goods  which  it  did  not  produce  itself.  Pakistan  and  Nigeria  offered  Britain  no 
preferences at all.  
 
Beset by the condition that they  must try to maintain the agricultural exports of Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand even with Britain inside the Common Agricultural Policy, and under 
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strong pressure to safeguard the European market for Canadian manufactured products and raw 
materials, they faced a negotiating task with few, if any, chances of success. On to that was 
superimposed the problem of persuading the Six to commit themselves to a trading policy 
which would help in the economic development of the world’s largest and one of its poorest 
democracies. To that was added the obligation to provide also for the economic development of 
newly  independent  ambitious  and  quarrelsome  African  states  the  more  important  of  which 
already regarded the Treaty of Rome’s arrangements for francophone Africa as mere window-
dressing for French colonialism and two of which, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), were governed by white minorities and were in open political conflict with other 
Commonwealth states. And behind all those great territories with their unforeseeable futures 
came a large flotilla of colonial mini-territories, scattered in poverty across the world and four 
richer ones, three of them in Europe, Cyprus (scene of a bitter ethnic conflict and a guerrilla war 
against British occupation), Gibraltar (claimed in its entirety by another west European country) 
and  Malta.  There  was  also  a  Chinese  city,  Hong  Kong,  whose  manufactured  exports  were 
among the most rapidly expanding in the world and which had already aroused western Europe 
and the USA to impose non-tariff barriers against them.
407 
 
It  was  to  be  a  difficult  task  to  negotiate  on  behalf  of  such  a  collection  of  economies, 
particularly since some of the exports for which the British were to find ‘comparable outlets’ 
in the EEC were for the most part directly competitive with European agriculture. Edward 
Heath,  the  conservative  minister  delegated  to  lead  the  negotiations,  set  out  to  achieve  a 
general solution for all Commonwealth trade as a way of preventing individual countries 
from trying to negotiate on their own behalf: 
 
While for Britain the Commonwealth and empire had to be considered as an entity, to the Six 
they were only a loose bundle of third countries, some butter exporters, some grain exporters, 
some meat exporters, and so on. Moreover, the three that were obviously in question were rich. 
While governments of the EEC member-states no doubt saw advantages to the West in retaining 
the Commonwealth as a political association, they did not believe that to be any particular 
responsibility of the Treaty of Rome.
408 
 
Moreover they made it clear that they were not going to discuss what if any preferences they 
would give to agricultural exports from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada until they had 
reached agreement on the terms of their own agricultural protection. Only once agreement on 
the principles of the CAP had been hammered out in December 1961-January 1962, could 
discussions begin on the price and the terms on which the EEC would accept imports from 
the  three  Commonwealth  countries.  By  early  August  1962  when  it  appeared  as  if  some 
agreement might be within reach with the other five EEC member states, the French sprang a 
trap which made it obvious to the British that de Gaulle, who had returned to power in France 
in  May  1958  as  a  consequence  of  the  Algerian  crisis  and  become  president  of  the  Fifth 
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Republic in December 1958, would never accept the British terms. It was clear that they had 
come to the end of the road with their national strategy of creating a one-world system.
409 It 
would not be possible to reach an arrangement between the EEC and the Commonwealth 
acceptable to both. It would not be possible to use British membership in the EEC and the 
Commonwealth  to  strengthen  its  bargaining  position  with  the  United  States  in  the 
forthcoming round of tariff bargaining in GATT. Five months later de Gaulle brought the 
negotiations to an abrupt end.  
  The question which the British government raised at the time and which historians have 
subsequently debated at some length was why exactly de Gaulle had exercised his veto. What 
had gone wrong? Did de Gaulle oppose the British application because of the economic terms 
demanded by the British government particularly those relating to imperial preferences? The 
conclusions  reached  by  the  team  led  by  Christopher  Audland,  who  carried  out  the  post-
mortem analysis for the British government, was that de Gaulle’s veto had nothing to do with 
the economic issues. No economic concessions offered by the British negotiators would have 
altered the outcome, since de Gaulle opposed British membership for political reasons. The 
reason why he allowed the negotiations to continue for so long were entirely due to his need 
to consolidate his position domestically by settling the future of Algeria, which he did by 
putting the question of its independence to a referendum in France and then in Algeria, and 
then securing his own reelection. Alan Milward, while acknowledging the limitations of an 
official  history  which  was  about  Britain’s  relations  with  Europe  based  only  on  British 
government archives, did not accept the conclusions of the Audland report. But nor did he 
accept the alternative explanation, more popular with historians and which accorded more 
closely with the timing of the veto. This was that de Gaulle was reacting to the announcement 
of the nuclear deal reached between Britain and the United States in Nassau in December 
1962 and communicated to France one week before he announced his veto. Not only was the 
U.S. government agreeing to supply Britain with Polaris nuclear missiles, but it was also 
taking its proposals for creating a multilateral nuclear force to the North Atlantic Council 
without discussing it with de Gaulle beforehand. Notwithstanding the recognized hostility 
between de Gaulle and the United States, which was to lead to France’s withdrawal from the 
military command structure of NATO in 1966, that the close military ties between Britain 
and the United States were the reason for de Gaulle’s veto of the British application to join 
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the EEC, thereby ignoring three years of deadlock between Britain and France in economic 
negotiations, seemed to Alan Milward to be ‘perverse’.
410 Rather, in his view, 
 
[t]he essential point of difference between Britain and the Six remained that which the French 
had relied on to keep their treaty partners on their side when they broke off the free trade area 
negotiations. France and its partners had conceived of the EEC as a European preference area. It 
was not possible for them to amalgamate that conception with a Commonwealth preference 
area. Too large a part of Commonwealth exports to the UK competed with the Community’s 
intended market for its own agriculture.
411 
 
The decision of the Six to form a preferential trade bloc in western Europe marked their clear 
rejection of Britain’s one-world policy.  
 
With the Treaty establishing a common market between the Six, the fundamentals of the United 
Kingdom’s post-war strategy were directly repudiated by its European neighbours. Through its 
economic objectives and its longer-run political purpose a European common market had to be 




It was disappointing for Alan Milward that no-one in the rest of Europe reviewed his major 
reassessment  of  Britain’s  relations  with  western  Europe.  It  was  confirmation  of  the 
parochialism of the EEC which he had criticized and which Barry Supple picked out in his 
review.
413 Quoting Alan Milward: 
 
The  United  Kingdom’s  application  arrived  still  wrapped  and  garlanded  in  Britain’s  long 
international mercantile and imperial history, the history that had made it briefly a world power. 
Before  it  could  succeed,  Britain  would  have  to  become  as  parochial  as  the  European 
Community, without particular intimacy with the Commonwealth, with no significant colonies, 
with only the last dying vestiges of a Sterling Area. The pity is that the awareness of and 
sensibility to the wider world which the United Kingdom brought into the negotiation did not 
rub off onto the European Community.
414 
 
In Britain the only aspect of the argument which left some reviewers unconvinced, because it 
was not backed up by documentary evidence, was his interpretation of European policies and 
particularly those of France.
415 However until such time as the French open all their archives 
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for the postwar period the debate about French policy will continue. Sadly for everyone, Alan 
Milward did not live to complete the second volume of the official history.
416 
 
12. Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union (2005) 
 
Alan  Milward’s  work  as  Official  Historian  and  his  research  on  the  United  Kingdom’s 
relations with the Community was pursued in conjunction with two other projects which he 
carried on at the EUI after his reappointment there, in 1996, to the chair of the History of 
European Integration. One was an interdisciplinary research project to study allegiance to 
nation  and  ‘supranation’  in  western  Europe;  the  other  was  a  study  of  each  successive 
expansion of the European Communities/European Union. The first project, which explored 
the political programs – welfare, high employment, social security, agricultural protection – 
by which postwar European states reestablished themselves, led him to propose an ambitious 
Europe-wide research program which he announced in 1995 in the inaugural article of the 
Journal of European Integration History, a journal edited by the European Union Liaison 
Committee of Historians.
417 The cool reception of historians and political scientists to Alan 
Milward’s proposal is explained by Mike Newman.
418 Because it was launched at a time 
when popular support for the European Union was in decline the concept of allegiance was 
not seen by many scholars as a useful one for understanding the process of integration or for 
questioning whether it would be reversed in the future. 
  The  British  government’s  decision  to  apply  for  membership  in  the  EEC  had 
implications not only for the Commonwealth but also for those non-member neighboring 
states which relied on Britain for a significant amount of their foreign trade and which were 
partners  of  Britain  in  the  recently  formed  EFTA.  Were  the  British  application  to  be 
successful, their exports of manufactured goods, instead of having duty-free access to the 
British market, would face the hurdle of the common external tariff of the EEC. Although the 
Republic of Ireland was not a member of EFTA it nonetheless depended almost entirely on 
Britain for its foreign trade. The Irish government, along with the governments of Denmark 
and Norway, therefore decided to apply for membership in the EEC at the same time as 
Britain and linked their applications to the outcome of the British application. Thus in little 
over four years after the Six had signed the Treaty of Rome, four neighboring states had 
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applied for accession to the EEC. They were to be followed by many more. When the British 
application was finally successful so too were the applications of the other three, although 
Norway,  uniquely,  was  to  turn  down  the  EEC’s  offer  of  membership  in  a  national 
referendum. In less than fifty years the EEC was to expand itself from six to twenty five 
members.  Why,  Alan  Milward  asked,  did  countries  want  to  join  the  EEC?  He  used  an 
invitation from the University of Graz to give the annual Joseph Schumpeter lectures, as an 
opportunity  to  consider  the  underlying  dynamics  of  European  integration  and  of  this 
expansion.
419  His  interest  was  in  analyzing  the  relationship  between  the  European 
Community and the wider international economy. As a first step, in his Graz lectures, he 
focused not only on the impact which the EEC had on its neighbors in Europe but also on its 
dependants  in  Africa.  As  he  emphasized,  since  the  first  expansion  of  the  European 
Community  in  1973  included  not  only  three  European  states  but  also  many  British 
dependencies throughout the world, it marked the beginning of the internationalization of the 
Community:  ‘The  European  Community  had  entered  the  world,  as  well  as  the  United 
Kingdom entering the Community.’
420 
  Social scientists held fundamentally different views about what motivated countries to 
seek association or membership in the EEC. At one extreme were those who argued that the 
motivation was essentially economic, based on reaping the benefits which membership in a 
rapidly-expanding high income market would bring. At the other were those who stressed the 
foreign-policy  benefits  of  belonging  to  a  united  Europe  in  a  world  dominated  by 
superpowers. Taking as his starting point Jacob Viner’s pioneering study of customs unions 
which measured the net welfare effect of their formation in terms of whether they led to trade 
creation or trade diversion, Alan Milward questioned the very idea of trade creation. ‘The 
concept  of  the  outside  market  as  uninfluenced  by,  even  independent  from,  the  common 
market, is […] historically dubious’, he asserted. As an example he demonstrated that ‘[i]n 
the first twenty years of the common market, at the least, the growing share of exports by 
other  member-states  to  Germany  was  partly  dependent  for  its  dimensions  on  Germany’s 
exports to non-member states.’
421 He felt that a more useful question to consider was why it 
was that ‘regional’ trade institutions, of which the EEC was but one example in the postwar 
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world, had become more effective instruments for liberalizing trade than the international 
institutions initially conceived by the United States.
422 
  The EEC had, simply by virtue of its own territorial expansion, been responsible for 
much of the trade liberalization in the postwar period. According to Richard E. Baldwin, this 
was due to the pressure which its increasing integration put on other economies. It was, in 
Baldwin’s view, the growing economic liberalization in the early 1980s culminating in the 
Single European Act, followed by the collapse of the Soviet bloc in eastern Europe, which 
had put pressure on eastern European countries to seek membership in  the Community. As a 
general rule Baldwin maintained that more integration or ‘deepening’, which he termed ‘an 
idiosyncratic shock’, led to territorial expansion or ‘widening’ of the European Union (EU). 
But it was an argument which did not stand up to Alan Milward’s historically-based scrutiny. 
‘There  was  no  idiosyncratic  shock  from  the  common  market  which  led  to  the  UK’s 
application for membership. The applications by Denmark, Ireland and Norway were largely 
determined  by  the  importance  to  them  of  the  British  market,  that  is  to  say,  by  a  shock 
emanating  from  Britain’,  he  pointed  out.
423  It  was,  he  maintained,  precisely  because 
additional states were seeking membership, which explained why the EEC/EU ‘intensified its 
internal  coherence’  at  specific  times,  rather  than  the  reverse.
424  Therefore  he  felt  that 
Baldwin’s argument, that it was integration which drove expansion of the EEC/EU, was not 
correct when tested against the record of history. It was certainly not the case that the most 
significant  example  of  integration,  that  of  the  CAP,  had  been  responsible  for  Britain’s 
application for membership in  the EEC. What, he asked, explained why Ireland and Denmark 
had applied to join the EEC? 
  Although Ireland and Denmark were two small, agrarian countries which applied for 
membership at the same time as the United Kingdom, their motives for doing so were, as he 
showed, very different. For the Republic of Ireland he maintained that ‘[o]ne of the deepest 
wells of support for Ireland’s entry into the EC was the political wish to be recognised in 
nature  rather  than  name  as  an  independent  country.’
425  The  Irish  request  for  Community 
membership involved a break with Ireland’s most immediate past, in terms of agrarian and 
industrial protectionism. Although the Irish government had rejected the option of joining 
EFTA through the fear of losing more than 50,000 jobs as a result of competition with British 
manufacturing  industry  and  a  further  contraction  in  the  population  as  emigrants  left  for 
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Britain, to continue the protectionist policies inherited from the 1930s was seen as no strategy 
for promoting economic development either. Alan Milward’s answer to the puzzle of why the 
Irish  government  could  consider  joining  the  EEC  when  it  had  rejected  EFTA  was  that 
whereas  ‘EFTA  was  only  about  trade;  the  EEC  was  also  about  similarities  in  general 
economic policy.’
426 Accession to the EEC offered the promise of markets not only for Irish 
agricultural exports at guaranteed prices but also for the manufacturing industry which the 
government  was  determined  to  promote  through  a  mixture  of  financial  incentives  and 
exposure to competition.
427 
  Denmark  was  a  much  richer  economy  with  potentially  more  options  for  promoting 
national development. Torn between the agrarian interests which depended on the British and 
German  markets  for  their  exports,  and  the  manufacturing  interests  which  looked  to  the 
Scandinavian market in EFTA, the Danish government had concluded a trade deal for some 
of  its  agricultural  exports  with  Britain  within  EFTA  rather  than  join  the  EEC.  Britain’s 
decision to apply for membership in the EEC in one sense held the advantage of bringing 
Denmark’s main single markets, Britain and Germany, within the same trading regime but it 
still  left  those  in  Denmark  who,  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  preferred  closer  links  with 
Scandinavia, dissatisfied. Denmark, even though it opted to join the EEC, was to remain one 
of  its  most  critical  and  dissatisfied  members.  Greenland,  which  subsequently  negotiated 
separate home rule from Denmark was to be the first territory – and the only one so far – to 
secede from the EC in 1985. 
  Britain’s accession to the EEC in 1973 had an impact, as Alan Milward showed, not 
only on its European neighbors but also on many countries outside Europe including Britain’s 
own  dependencies  scattered  across  the  globe.  Britain’s  accession  was  a  global  affair,  he 
insisted. This meant that the history and politics of the European Union had to include some 
understanding of how it was designed to preserve ‘Europe’s position and importance in the 
world’.
428 It was in its commercial bargaining that the EU exerted real power and leverage; it 
was as a common market that it had global weight. One purpose of Britain’s accession to the 
EEC ‘was to put the Community on a level of equal power with the USA in international 
trade  disputes.’
429  That  meant  above  all  cooperating  with  France  inside  the  European 
Community. ‘The British’, he insisted, ‘did not want to overthrow France’s position in the 
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Community; they wanted to share it.’
430 However the way in which British dependencies 
would be associated with the EEC was to bring Britain up against the system put in place at 
the insistence of France for associating its former colonies as well as those of Belgium and 
the Netherlands with the EEC.  
  France saw Britain’s membership in the EEC as an opportunity to reinforce Europe’s 
position in Africa and to provide financial assistance for the economic development of the 
continent. Under the terms of the Yaoundé Convention signed in the capital of the Cameroon 
in 1963, the sub-Saharan former colonies of France and Belgium were offered preferential 
access to the markets of the EEC for their exports, apart from those agricultural products 
which  competed  with  European  agriculture,  in  return  for  giving  the  EEC  states  reverse 
preferences  in  their  markets.  It  was  this  principle  of  reciprocity  which  distinguished  the 
French-inspired system from the one offered by Britain to its dependencies. Although the 
United States was opposed to all forms of discrimination in international trade it was not 
until, as Alan Milward showed, it became apparent that with Britain’s accession to the EEC 
the Community preferences would be extended to markets in the Caribbean, that it aired its 
objections. The real reason for the United States’ hostility, he suggested, had little to do with 
the Caribbean, but with its desire to win more important concessions on the CAP from the 
European Community during the negotiations in GATT.
431 The challenge for Britain was to 
find a way of presenting a united front with its partners in the EEC in order to bargain with 
the United States in GATT while opposing the principle of reciprocity on which the successor 
agreement to that of Yaoundé was to be based. The difference between Britain and France, 
Alan Milward argued, was not one between trade liberalizers and protectionists but was ‘over 
the extent to which African economies could respond to globalised trading rules and the 
extent to which they needed special provision.’
432 
  Since the countries themselves in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (known as the 
ACP) made clear their opposition to the principle of reciprocity, preferring to be free to find 
markets wherever they could in the world, this made it difficult for France, supported only by 
Belgium, to uphold its claim to be the voice of the underdeveloped in Africa, and had to drop 
its  insistence  on  reverse  preferences.
433  Thus,  the  successor  to  the  Yaoundé  Convention 
which was signed in Lomé, the capital of Togo, and renewed three times, provided duty-free 
access to the EEC markets for most exports of manufactured goods and of tropical agriculture 
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while providing subsidized loans and technical assistance to the African economies without 
any reciprocal arrangements.
434 Although the francophone states continued nonetheless to 
direct their exports to France, the more developed economies in west Africa expanded their 
exports to non-European markets, finding increasing outlets in the United States. But as Alan 
Milward showed, the Lomé states became increasingly marginalized in world trade and the 
trade of the whole ACP countries with the EU declined as a proportion of total EU trade, 
amounting to less than two per cent of EU exports and less than two per cent of its imports in 
2000.
435 If this was the responsibility of the EU Commission it was, he argued, quite beyond 
its competence to do anything about it. To have changed the terms of the Lomé agreements 
and  their  successors  would  have  called  for  the  Commission  to  reach  an  agreement  with 
France  and  Britain  and  then  with  the  other  member  states.  The  history  of  the  Lomé 
agreements demonstrated that France and Britain simply agreed to pursue their own separate 
national policies in Africa and ‘to legitimate’ their decision by constituting a common EU 
trade framework for EU-African trade linked to a common but small EU aid program backed 
by a European Development Fund.
436 ‘The Franco-British agreement on which the Lomé 
Conventions rested,’ in Alan Milward’s words, ‘[did] not seem to have been designed for 
change.’
437 It was in his search for a theory of historical change that he remained interested to 
the end of his life. 
 
13. Alan Milward’s implicit theory of historical change  
 
Alan Milward was neither a Marxist nor a liberal. He came closest to being a Keynesian but 
he rejected the protectionism which he saw as underpinning the general theory of Keynes. In 
his life-long search to find a theory of historical change he combined the historian’s method 
of conducting detailed research into as many relevant archives as were accessible at the time 
of writing with the economic historian’s method of consulting the statistical record. Against 
the  resulting  historical  narrative  he  tested  social  science  theories,  those  of  economics, 
political science, and sociology. The result was an economic history of nineteenth-century 
Europe, of the Second World War and of the great thirty-year western European economic 
boom that followed it, which challenged much conventional wisdom.  
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  Although he did not live to acknowledge that he had developed a theory of historical 
change, or to make it explicit, it has become clear to us that over the course of his lifetime’s 
research he had developed such a theory. The lessons of history which he drew upon in 
formulating  his  theory  was  that  change  –  social,  political,  and  economic  –  for  it  to  be 
sustainable, had to be a gradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmic 
revolutionary  event  occurring  in  one  sector  of  the  economy  or  society.  Benign  change 
depended much less on natural economic endowment or technological developments than on 
the ability of state institutions to respond to changing political demands from within each 
society. State bureaucracies were fundamental to formulating those political demands and 
advising politicians of ways to meet them. Since each society was different there was no 
single model of development to be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one 
nation-state on others, either through force as France and Germany had tried to do under 
Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler or through foreign aid as the United States had tried to 
do under the Marshall plan. Nor could development be promoted by following the example of 
a more successful economy, as Iceland had tried to do in copying Denmark. Since there was 
no single model of development each nation-state had to find its own response to the political 
demands from within its own society. It was how nation-states responded to those domestic 
political demands rather than to any external pressures arising from a supposedly greater 
degree of economic interdependence, which determined the nature of historical change. 
  If the gold standard at the end of the nineteenth century had met the demands of the 
restricted group of voters who held the franchise and for whom price stability was more 
important than employment, the gold exchange standard which replaced it after the end of the 
First World War was ill-designed to meet the political demands of a wider group of voters 
whose livelihood and economic security depended as much on employment in all sectors of 
the  economy  as  on  price  stability.  How  to  provide  such  security  was  a  challenge  which 
neither the liberal democracies nor the fascist states were able to meet before the Second 
World War. It was a challenge which those who created the ‘Bretton Woods system’ in 1944 
equally failed to address adequately. It was the defeated states in western Europe, which drew 
from the experience of occupation the lesson that they had to provide economic as well as 
military security for the majority of their electorates if the nation-state was to survive as a 
democratic  organizational  unit  in  the  postwar  world,  who  created  the  new  institutional 
arrangements  which  provided  such  economic  security  in  postwar  Europe.  The  new 
supranational institutions of what was to become the European Union were not designed to   127
replace the nation-state but to enable it to achieve domestic objectives which it could not 
achieve through more traditional arrangements, while at the same time providing security to 
Western Europe against a resurgent Germany. The Treaty of Paris signed in 1951 establishing 
the  ECSC  was  designed  to  offer  security  to  the  six  signatory  states,  including  the  new 
democratic West German state, through a form of joint state control over the strategic sectors 
of coal and steel. The Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 establishing the EEC was designed to 
offer to the Six member states of the ECSC economic security through a commercial treaty 
which provided for the gradual liberalization of trade in manufactured goods, combined with 
continued protection for the rest of the economy, including agriculture, while at the same 
time locking West Germany into that trading structure. The Single European Act signed in 
1986 was designed to provide for economic security through the gradual liberalization of 
trade in services as employment in the service sector increasingly replaced employment in 
manufacturing and in agriculture as western Europe faced increasing competition from Asia. 
The Treaty of Maastricht signed in 1992 was designed to lock the new unified Germany into 
western Europe by controlling German monetary policy within a European monetary union 
(EMU). But he  warned that EMU would work only if the nation-states retained political 
control in order to address the social and economic consequences of monetary union rather 
than relinquishing such control to an independent European central bank. ‘Domestic politics 
in Europe will determine the Euro’s fate, not central bankers’, he predicted on the eve of the 
creation of the new European currency.
438 For Alan Milward the drivers of benign historical 
change in a democracy were domestic politics rather than external pressures arising from the 
international economy or the work of diplomats.  
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